


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21 October 1983

USSR REPORT TRANSLATIONS FROM KOMMUNIST

No 11, July 1983

Translations from the Russian-language theoretical organ of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow (18 issues per year).

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IN THE MAJOR AREAS OF OUR WORK

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[Text] The party's long-term strategy for the 11th Five-Year Plan and the 1980s is aimed at making the life of the Soviet people better, their toil increasingly effective and our socialist system reveal its humane nature and constructive possibilities with every passing year. The previous achievements of the Soviet people have become a reliable foundation for further laying the material and technical foundations for communism and enhancing the well-being of the people and the country's social development.

The main content of the activities of the party and the people under these circumstances is to improve all aspects of the developed socialist society. The November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums have become most important political events in the life of our party and country. The plenum resolutions and documents and the election of Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium met with the unanimous support and total approval of all Soviet people. The main thing now is to undertake without delay the implementation of the planned measures, guided by the rule of concentrating on action rather than loud words.

A great deal has been accomplished over the past 2 years. It indicates that today, as always, the communist party is leading our multinational country along the Leninist course. Difficulties exist along this way. We cannot be satisfied with the growth rates of labor productivity, which is the main indicator of economic efficiency. Plans are frequently fulfilled with great outlays of resources, unrhythmically, thus substantially lowering the quality of output. Comprehensive high labor, planning and state discipline is needed, for without it no success can be achieved in production intensification. Such tasks can be resolved only with the conscious activeness of the toiling masses. The material embodiment of our plans is precisely the result of such activeness.

A variety of problems face the national economy, demanding different solutions. For example, in order to enhance and strengthen labor discipline in many cases no significant material outlays are necessary. What is needed is above all purposeful, organizational and educational work.

The efficient utilization of available resources is a different matter. We are legitimately proud of the tremendous production potential at the disposal

of the developed socialist society, created through the heroic efforts of the Soviet people. However, the normal functioning of this tremendous production apparatus requires more than strict discipline and organization. It necessitates considerable fund outlays for production reconstruction and modernization and the technical updating of productive capital on the basis of the latest technology. In this case machine building plays the prime and leading role. Its purpose is not only to supply the new enterprises with modern machines and equipment but to maintain on the proper level those which were built decades ago. Essentially, this means to update old production facilities to the level of the latest ones and to curtail the need for capital investments in new construction.

In this connection, the social role of scientific and technical progress is contradictory. We cannot fail to admire the tremendous successes of the scientific and technical revolution, in which a mass of discoveries and inventions radically change production technology within a short time and lead to the creation of increasingly advanced machines and equipment. At the same time, however, their moral obsolescence becomes particularly faster. The need to replace productive capital increases and larger capital investments become necessary.

Therefore, the huge, large-scale production facilities developed in our country trigger a number of related objective problems. Their successful solution depends on the proper scientific planning, efficiency and quality of our work and the ability and willingness to work intensively and purposefully and to handle production conditions and results skillfully.

The tasks facing the Soviet people today, as they struggle for the implementation of the 11th Five-Year Plan, were considered at the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums. They clearly earmarked and concretized the main lines of economic development of our country at the present stage. They noted that the immediate objective is to put everything available to us in order and to ensure the most sensible utilization of the country's production and scientific and technical potential.

The fuel-energy complex is one of the boosters of the further upsurge of the national economy. We know how much has already been accomplished in this direction. In 1982 our country generated more than 1,367,000,000,000 kilowatt hours of electric power. This is as much as Great Britain, the FRG, France, Spain and Italy combined. However, the national economy demands more energy. The future of the Soviet power industry lies in the utilization of the latest nuclear reactors and, in the future, the practical solution of the problem of controlled thermonuclear synthesis. The task today is to build at an accelerated pace nuclear power plants in the European part of the USSR, thermoelectric power plants in areas of strip coal mining and hydroelectric power plants in the eastern part of the country.

The construction of the very long-range Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod gas main is an example of the broad implementation of the energy program, confirming the possibilities of our economy and leading economic sectors. In accordance with the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, five gas pipelines will be

laid during the 11th Five-Year Plan from Urengoy to the Center and one export pipeline from Urengoy to Uzhgorod. This tremendous gas piping complex will be 20,000 kilometers long. It will cost 25 billion rubles, which exceeds the combined cost of projects such as the BAM, KamAZ, VAZ and Atomash. The European part of the country will receive billions of cubic meters of natural gas annually and 32 billion will be exported.

The first of the six pipelines was completed ahead of schedule, in 1981--the Urengoy-Gryazovets pipeline. The laying of the Urengoy-Novopskov pipeline has been completed as well. The Urengoy-Uzhgorod 4,451-kilometers-long pipeline is being built at a high pace.

The nature of the work along this project constitutes a single yet vivid example of how to resolve the problem formulated in Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's speech at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum: drastically reducing the amount of manual labor mainly through comprehensive mechanization in order to enhance production efficiency. The latest equipment is being used at the construction of the pipeline; comprehensive mechanization is being applied, reaching 99.7 percent along the main sections. This was helped by the efficient cooperation between practical experience and science. Thus, for example, the Electric Welding Institute imeni Ye. O. Paton, together with the organizations of the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises developed an automatic machine for welding large-diameter nontilting pipe joints. All technological operations have been automated, labor productivity is higher by a factor of 4-5 and the welds are of consistent high quality.

However, it is not new equipment alone which determines the high speed of the work and its quality. The progressive form of their organization is making a substantial contribution as well. The spread, an organizational subunit, has become the basic production unit in the construction of the linear part of the main pipelines. It constitutes a large cost-effective brigade supplied with all the necessary equipment for carrying out the entire work cycle in laying the pipeline. Its power-labor ratio is quite high, reaching 52-55 kilowatts per worker.

The construction project clearly shows the advantages of cost-effective brigades. However, as in other production areas, contradictions arise between new and old labor organization methods. Cost-effectiveness calls for a brigade wage fund based strictly on labor and output. The effort to compute it on the basis of "achievements" lowers the interest in the new work method in many brigades. Wages must be precisely based on what has been done and be closely tied to work economic indicators such as capital returns, production costs, profitability and reduction of cost estimates. Another topical problem is that of including engineering and technical specialists in the brigades, i.e., in the cost-effectiveness system.

We gave the extraction and transportation of natural gas--one of the energy resources--as an example. However, this example also includes the great power of summation, clearly revealing the characteristic features in the development of our fuel-energy complex: huge production scale, its shift in

an easterly direction--toward uninhabited and hard-access areas--and high scientific and technical extraction and transportation standard, proving that substantial capital investments have been made. These are the sources of the growth of the country's economic potential, the enhanced power-labor ratio and the manifestation of new and more efficient forms of its organization, which ensure the growth of its productivity.

The study, assessment and summation of this experience, like many others similar to it, and the extensive dissemination of its positive results are the topical task of the economists, the successful implementation of which requires the attention and concern of party committees.

Production conditions and the scale of consumption of fuel and energy resources entirely explain the gravity of the problem of their conservation and economical and sensible utilization. More than 200 million tons of regular fuel will have to be saved this five-year plan; natural gas, coal, petroleum, petroleum products and thermal and electric power will have to be used economically. As Comrade Yu. V. Andropov pointed out, this will require "a certain reorganization in all sectors and, above all, the extensive use of energy-saving equipment and technology, improving the norms of utilization of material and moral incentives in the struggle for economy and a stricter responsibility for overexpenditures and norm and ceiling overruns."

Neglecting the important matter of conservation of fuel and energy resources and poor utilization of the established procedure for stimulating successes achieved in this field subsequently turn into losses. Assignments on the conservation of fuel and energy resources last year on the part of union ministries in the construction materials industry, the production of chemical fertilizers, the chemical and light industries, and others were not implemented last five-year plan largely because of underestimating the importance of incentive.

Experience proves that the thrifty use of resources is successfully developed wherever collective forms of labor organization and incentive have been applied. The cost-effective subunits are applying a strict conservation regimen. The collective contracting method is an important form of labor organization which encourages the interests of the working people in the thrifty utilization of resources and creates conditions for the systematic revision of outlay norms.

Everything currently accomplished in the area of the fuel and energy complex is a structural component of the work as defined in the country's long-term energy program. This program includes the technical retooling and development of the petroleum and gas extraction, petroleum refining and coal industries, the installation of new capacities and power transmission cables and the efficient and economic utilization of power resources. The success of its implementation is being forged by the individual production collectives as of now. Making all working people aware of this and converting it into a leading principle in the activities of the labor collective and the individual workers is the duty of the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations.

The implementation of the national economic plans, including the development of the fuel-energy complex, is closely related to the work of the transportation system, which has triggered a number of justified complaints in recent years, despite the existence of a tremendous transportation network and huge volumes of haulage, which are reaching today dozens of millions of tons daily. The transportation system includes 143,000 kilometers of operational tracks, 99,000 kilometers of railroad spurs leading to enterprises, 139,000 kilometers of internal waterways, 217,000 kilometers of pipelines and hundreds of thousands of kilometers of automotive, sea and airline routes. This gigantic network in a huge country such as ours not only plays a production role but is of great social significance: by bringing the country closer to the town it contributes to the efficient and flexible utilization of manpower and exposes the people to the achievements of socialist culture in the broadest meaning of the term.

What should be done to ensure the steady and fast hauling of economic freight from producer to consumer? The facilities are numerous and their impact on end results differ. However, the following should be taken into consideration as well: problems which have appeared in rail transportation, for example, were not instant; they took a certain time to develop.

Although the volume of capital investments broken down by industrial projects has increased by 43 percent compared to 1975 for the Ministry of Railways, the fleet of mainline diesel and electric locomotives increased by 26 percent; measures were taken to improve the social living conditions of railroad workers and the economic mechanism of the transportation system. However, no suitable results were achieved.

It became necessary to counter the developing difficult conditions with high-level organization, discipline, exigency, principle-mindedness and a suitable psychological atmosphere in order to ensure the strict and prompt satisfaction of the needs of all shippers for rolling stock.

The decisions of the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum played the role of a turning point in the organization of the work of the transportation system. The enhanced discipline and organization have already yielded substantial returns.

The transportation workers have other major reserves as well. We cited data characterizing the scale of our transportation network controlled by the separate ministries. Yet life and the experience of the leading transportation centers proved a need to create a unified comprehensive transportation system in order to enhance work efficiency, aimed at ending national economic results rather than concentrating on partial sectorial indicators. This was pointed out in the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "On Improving the Planning and Organization of Transportation of National Economic Freight and Passengers and Intensifying the Influence of the Economic Mechanism on Upgrading the Work Efficiency of Transportation Enterprises and Organizations." Comprehensive planning of haulage, closely related to production plans and deliveries, is needed. This presumes the proportional development of all transportation systems. A major prerequisite for lowering

transportation costs is the efficient combination of the different transportation systems. This will be the first time in rating the work of the transportation personnel on the basis of freight haulage in tons, with mandatory consideration of their stipulated nomenclature and the reduction of normative freight delivery deadlines.

The implementation of this decree will demand persistence, the elimination of existing inefficient freight flows and increased responsibility for the timely commissioning of new production capacities in various parts of the country. For it is precisely because of such confusion that fertilizers must be hauled from the European part of the USSR to the Far East while trains hauling salt roll from the Lower Volga to the Pacific.

Transportation efficiency suffers from the narrow departmental approach to the planning of hauling. Each ministry plans the transportation of reinforced concrete regardless of the requirements of other sectors in the area. As a result, although enterprises producing reinforced concrete may be found in each oblast, more than one-quarter is hauled at distances in excess of 800 kilometers. It is only the combined and coordinated work of planning workers, producers, transportation workers and consumers that can ensure the efficient work of the transportation systems without unnecessary runs.

The lack of coordination in economic management frequently triggers inefficient hauling. Actually, if the cost of river transportation is higher than by rail, the shipper will demand freight cars, although this may prove to be wasteful from the national economic viewpoint, for labor outlays per unit of freight hauled by water are 37 percent lower than by rail. Meanwhile, lack of freight cars forces some enterprises to ship freight by truck over long distances, which proves to be tens of times more expensive.

However, the experience of coordinated interaction among the various transportation facilities gives examples of extensive economic results. This includes the accomplishments of the Leningrad transportation junction and the interesting practical experience of the Moscow railroad (Mitkovo-II station) in organizing a conveyor system which uses computers in organizing its interaction with trucking facilities. The Orekhovo-Zuyevo station is also automating its work with a computer in sorting the trains on the highest possible technical and organizational level.

The active use of the achievements of science and technology is the key to intensifying the work of the transportation system and the other economic sectors. We know that the most difficult part of this process is the practical application of a scientific and technical discovery. "The task," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov has pointed out, "is to develop the type of system of organizational, economic and moral measures which would interest managers, workers and, scientists and designers in updating the equipment."

We must point out that the problem of difficulties which exist in the practical application of scientific and technological accomplishments is an old one. In the remaining 2.5 years of the 11th Five-Year Plan the railroads must accomplish in the field of scientific and technical progress what was

planned for virtually the entire five-year plan. One of the most important tasks is to ensure the planned increase in the handling capacity of the railroads, which should double the 10th Five-Year Plan increase. Given the existing circumstances, most such increases could be achieved by raising the weight of the trains. This can be achieved by increasing the length of the train or its mass per meter of width. However, there are roadbed sections in which the length of a train is limited not by that of the station sections but the need for greater traction. This is the case of the Yuzhno-Uralskaya railroad--the most important link in the country's transportation system linking east to west. A solution to the problem was found by the All-Union Scientific Research Railroad Transportation Institute which developed a system (unique in world practice) consisting of an electronic robot which makes it possible to couple locomotive engines in order to increase the traction. This system makes it possible to eliminate the use of a crew of locomotive engineers, to couple engines of different modifications and to couple and uncouple easily and quickly. The application of this invention made it possible to develop with the existing locomotive engines the type of traction which can pull a train regardless of its weight with fewer train brigades.

The point now is to ensure the extensive dissemination of this experience. Let us note that the successful application of this innovation in Chelyabinsk Oblast became possible only thanks to the active help of the oblast party committee which firmly supported the realization of this invention of extremely great importance to the country's entire rail transport system.

The urgent problem of reducing car turnover time, protection and timely repairs faces our railroad transportation system. However, the railroads need specific assistance in this respect, which is being provided by the industrial enterprises which, following the initiative of the Moscow working people, have undertaken to repair cars they receive without outside help. Although this is a forced, temporary measure, it is useful and necessary bearing the existing situation in mind.

Ferrous metallurgy is one of the base economic sectors which holds leading positions in the world in volume of output. In recent years, however, the work of this sector has not fully met the needs of the national economy and breakdowns in the work of its enterprises have become more frequent. This is due to a variety of reasons, both objective and subjective. Most of the productive capital here requires renovation. The work is hindered by the lack of coordination in the preparations being made by various production facilities. The power and transport services to metallurgical enterprises must be improved substantially.

A great deal of unused reserves exist in the area of technological tolerances. Work with minimal tolerances--more intensive, naturally--requires the strict observance of technological requirements but yields substantial savings of valuable alloying additives or else increases the production of finished goods without increasing the amount of metal used. Naturally, these are all familiar things. The point is, however, that it is precisely the ministry--"the owner of the sector"--which must ensure the comprehensive application of progressive technology and labor methods.

Greater attention should be paid not only to the application of new equipment and technology but to economic problems as well, improving the wage system in particular, so that no production sectors may be stripped bare or the level of worker skill reduced. The experience of leading enterprises, such as the famous Magnitka and the Donetsk and Novolipetsk metallurgical plants must be systematically disseminated. Something could be learned from metal-consuming enterprises as well. They can teach us how to use metal better, more economically and thriftily.

Capital construction is one of the biggest consumers of metal and other materials. Huge funds are being appropriated for the development of the economy and the building of new capacities and housing and cultural construction projects. Nevertheless, a number of problems remain in capital construction: dispersal of material and manpower resources among many projects; unjustified increase in the number of new construction projects and an insufficient percentage of reconstruction and modernization of existing ones; poor mobility of construction organizations and a frequently unsatisfactory work quality.

More persistent and active efforts must be made by the economists in resolving the problem of improving the economic mechanism in construction. Radical changes in construction, even should its material and technical procurements be improved, could be hardly expected without their substantial contribution.

The question of "different profitability" of projects has become particularly urgent. It frequently leads to "unfinished" and delayed construction projects. Changes in the structure of the work based on the characteristics of the projects adversely affect economic indicators, labor productivity above all. The imbalance between stipulated amounts of work and production capacities leads the construction workers to prefer work at some projects rather than others, although from the national economic viewpoint this may prove to be unjustified.

A steady upsurge of the economy is the imperative base for improving the well-being of the Soviet people. The urgent task facing all party, soviet and trade union organs and all ministries and departments is to concentrate maximum efforts and energy on the implementation of the social program adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress. Its main part is the Food Program, combined with the increased production of consumer goods and the expansion of services.

Weather conditions, which have been adverse in recent years, affect the situation in agriculture and the fulfillment of the Food Program. The dependence of most crops on the amount and time of precipitation is most noticeable in droughty areas; it is strongly manifested when non-drought-resistant strains are used. The accumulation of moisture in the soil from precipitation during the period preceding the sowing and in the first half of the year is of decisive importance to cereal crops. We must point out that the dependence of agricultural production on the weather is not a monopoly of our country. In the United States and Canada wheat crops fluctuate in the various areas, depending on the volume of precipitation, within the 36-80 percent range. Consequently, it is only an overall upsurge in the level of

agricultural output, to which the party directs us, that could equalize and reduce such considerable fluctuations which to this day inevitably affect the availability of an entire variety of foodstuffs for the population.

At its April conference the CPSU Central Committee considered some important practical problems of agricultural development and implementation of the Food Program. The results of and the speech delivered by Yu. V. Andropov at the conference and its stipulations and formulated tasks indicate the main trends to be followed in order to achieve high end results during the current farm season and the entire five-year plan and are a manual for specific practical work.

Considering the actual conditions, ways must be found to surmount difficulties and increase agricultural output. The pace of agricultural development must be accelerated comprehensively and the solution of the food problem is a vitally important task facing all rural working people, the entire personnel of the agroindustrial complex.

Improving the utilization of the land is the way to enhance the level of agricultural output and ensure its greater stability. The Soviet Union has an exceptional variety of soil and weather conditions, for which reason farming cannot be practiced uniformly everywhere, regardless of specific territorial features. Our agricultural science has developed zonal farming systems for virtually all production conditions encountered in our country. Their application, however, is dragging out. This inertia must be surmounted and scientific farming systems must be applied more rapidly. To this effect the crop rotation system must be mastered more rapidly and we must convert to the type of crop structure which would ensure the highest possible output per hectare.

The widespread use of industrial technologies and available valuable scientific and technical developments and progressive experience are prerequisites for achieving this objective. Hardly all farms are making proper use of their productive capital. It is obvious that after the March 1965 CPSU Central Committee Plenum the material and technical base of agriculture changed considerably: productive capital quadrupled; the power-labor ratio and chemical fertilizer deliveries more than tripled, and the size of the reclaimed land increased by a factor of 1.7. Existing production facilities enable us to obtain significantly better results by improving the organization of the work, upgrading cadre skills and creating the necessary prerequisites for the use, repair and storage of the equipment.

The efficient utilization of irrigated and drained lands is a major agricultural reserve. They cost the state a great deal of money. Today more than 40,000 kolkhozes and sovkhozes have such land. The local soviets and the farm specialists of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources should supervise everything related to irrigated farming and actively take the necessary steps to ensure proper work.

The animal husbandrymen as well face many tasks such as the further intensification of the sector, upgrading cattle and poultry productivity and increasing output. Here the most important part is securing a fodder base.

The national economic effect of this sector will be reached through the more extensive use of local resources and internal feed production possibilities.

All problems of economic construction in both town and country are based, in the final account, on the cadres. Their solution calls for enhancing the level of the work of republic, kray and oblast party organizations and their responsibility for the implementation of the Food Program. This is particularly important also because the new management organs--the agroindustrial associations--are already gathering strength. We must see to it that they become operational faster, choose a proper line of activities from the very beginning, and undertake the solution of the urgent problems facing the development of the agroindustrial complex energetically and efficiently.

The party persistently encourages the fastest possible staffing of kolkhoses and sovkholes with permanent cadres wherever they are in short supply. This calls for housing and more and more housing, schools and preschool institutions, vocational technical schools, and consumer service complexes. We have the necessary funds and experience for such construction and now everything depends on the initiative, enterprise, efficiency and persistence of the local organs.

The most important task is the organization of the work in the countryside, which will ensure the extensive utilization of efficient forms of work with the people, practically tried in recent years, strengthening the discipline, encouraging work on a collective contract basis, comprehensive development and strengthening of cost-effectiveness, and a type of labor organization which would provide extensive scope for the socialist competition and the development of truly collectivistic principles in the work.

The recent CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decrees "On Additional Measures To Improve Supplies of Consumer Goods to the Population in 1983-1985" and "On the Further Development and Improvement of Consumer Services to the Population" are directed at the successful implementation of the social program of the 26th Congress and ensuring a real improvement in the well-being of the Soviet people.

The question of the inadmissibility of the failure of assignments for the production of consumer goods, increasing their variety and improving their quality, has been raised on a most urgent basis. It is abnormal for the local authorities to tolerate shortages of even the simplest consumer items, which triggers the legitimate discontent of the working people, or import such commodities from elsewhere.

It is important to bear in mind that under present-day conditions, when a certain saturation of the market with commodities has been reached, variety and quality become increasingly important. The lack of attention on the part of industry to this situation slows down sales of a number of commodities and lowers their purchase by the trade network. For example, last year 2 million cameras remained unsold at wholesale fairs, or half of the industry's production capacity. Over the past 3 years stocks of color television sets in the stores have quintupled although their output has not even doubled.

Ignoring this fact, the respective ministries and the local party and soviet organs are insufficiently strict with economic managers in such cases and do not always assess them on a principle-minded basis.

The fastest possible saturation of the market with quality goods demands of each material production sector and enterprise, regardless of specialization, to make its contribution to the production of commodity resources as required by our party. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree stipulates the assignments for additional output of consumer goods in 1983 both through the better utilization of internal enterprise reserves and additional allocations of raw and other materials and equipment. The experience of the leading enterprises in Moscow and Sverdlovsk Oblast on increasing output and improving the variety and quality of consumer goods must be disseminated extensively. A number of steps will be taken to expand the production base for such commodities: easy loan conditions for measures aimed at developing production, apportionment of ceilings for capital investments and contractual work, and so on. Steps must also be formulated and taken to increase the economic responsibility of enterprises for the procurement of substandard goods and to encourage labor collectives which produce high-quality items. The trade organizations will assume greater responsibility for meeting the needs of the population and increasing their exigency toward enterprises for fulfilling delivery contracts.

In improving the economic mechanism, measures must be formulated for planning, financing, crediting and providing economic incentive for the production of consumer goods. This will offer the personnel favorable conditions and will increase the interests of enterprises in all industrial sectors in terms of organizing and increasing the production of goods for the population.

A great deal is being done and remains to be done in the area of consumer services. The development of its various forms and increased scale of satisfaction of requirements, the broadening of the material and technical base of the service industry, raising the level of cadre training and material support and improving the organization of the entire service industry are the main directions of the work in this area.

The party's efforts, aimed at accelerating the growth of the economy, strengthening its organizational foundations and taking steps to optimize the economic mechanism and enhance discipline in all its manifestations, are already tangibly affecting the results of the work of the national economy. The task is to ensure the stability of all developing trends in improving basic economic indicators. The constructive toil and increasing creative energy of working people in town and country confirm the irrefutable truth that, as Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said, "the tasks and assignments the party sets itself accurately express the expectations and needs of all Soviet people. Our multimillion-strong people are implementing the party's policy through their actions."

The party's course of improving economic management, increasing the responsibility for the observance of national interests, and creating the necessary

economic and organizational conditions for encouraging qualitative and productive toil, initiative and socialist enterprise, surmounting inertia and attachment to obsolete labor methods and decisively opposing all violations of party, state and labor discipline, supported by the entire Soviet people, is finding its material embodiment in the labor accomplishments of the Soviet people.

The documents of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums are seen by the party members and all working people in the country as clear guidelines for our historical progress. The materials of the June Plenum are being currently discussed in a spirit of self-criticism, efficiency and high exigency by the republic, kray and oblast party organizations. In their addresses at party plenums, the party members discuss in detail topical problems of party ideological and mass-political work and important problems of economic life. The purpose of the steps contemplated for the various sectors is energetically to influence labor productivity and production quality and ensure the better utilization of production capacities, raw and other materials, energy, working time and capital investments. Steps will be taken to ensure the further strengthening of discipline and to counter red tape, inertia, bureaucratism, departmentalism and parochialism. the plenums are concentrating on production intensification, application of the latest achievements of science and technology and sensible economy in everything and everywhere. By focusing on the key tasks facing our society, the party members are concentrating the efforts of party, state and economic organs and all working people on the fulfillment of the plans.

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MARX AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE FIRST PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83) pp 14-22

[Article by N. Fedorovskiy]

[Text] The study of the revolutionary creativity of the broad popular masses, the proletariat above all, in periods of most significant social upheavals and changes, has played a most important role in the formulation of the scientific theory of the working class. Marx and Lenin treated this experience with profound respect. Naturally, this is not to say that they exaggerated the role of spontaneity or underestimated the importance of the organizational and theoretical preparation of the proletarian masses for class battles.

The attention of the founders of Marxism-Leninism was particularly drawn to the history of the heroic struggle of the Paris Commune--the first attempt at revolution by the working class. Marx considered it not even history but a part of his life, a most important stage in the activities of the First International he headed, and the practical test of a number of most important Marxist concepts and most valuable material for the further development of theory. Lenin repeatedly emphasized the strictly scientific nature of Marx's study of the experience of the communards. "Not a drop of utopianism may be found in Marx in the sense of fabricating or fantasizing a 'new' society," he wrote. "No, he studied the birth of the new society from the old one as a natural historical process and the transitional forms of the latter to the former. He drew actual experience from the mass proletarian movement and tried to extract from it practical lessons. He 'learned' from the Commune in the way all great revolutionary thinkers did not fear to study the experience of the great movements of the oppressed class..." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 33, p 48).

Marx considered the activities of the popular masses involved in the revolutionary process a most important organic part of all historical development. He was extremely specific in interpreting the experience of people's revolutionary actions. At all times Marx had a clear idea of what made one social or political movement or another objective or subjective and the extent to which its nature was defined by the practical tasks formulated by reality. In all individual cases Marx clearly saw the deployment of class forces, the level of development of each class and its role and place in the social structure.

The bourgeoisie acted in the name of society in the revolutions of the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries. This was possible as long as its objectives were consistent to a certain extent with the requirements of the bulk of the working people. However, as early as the 1848-1849 revolution one of the structural components of these masses--the main moving force of revolutionary process--formulated its own demands. The developing working class asserted its role in social life not only through its increasing influence on the course of the bourgeois revolutions but through its awareness of the inadequacy of the objectives in terms of its own interests and its readiness to ensure the development of the revolutionary process to its benefit through armed struggle.

It was as of that point that the study and summation of the practical revolutionary experience of the proletariat became one of Marx's main scientific theory problems. He considered this experience comprehensively from all its sides. Marx drew lessons for the future not only from the victories of the working class but equally from its defeats.

In analyzing the activities of the proletarian masses awakened by the revolution, he singled out particularly carefully its elements of spontaneous gravitation toward organization. This is an aspiration inherent in any action taken by the oppressed classes over a longer or shorter time segment. Furthermore, the length of the actions of the exploited largely depends on their successes in strengthening their own organization. No other way is possible for surmounting the strong opposition of the ruling classes. In the search for organizational forms, the popular masses frequently use those already at their disposal (sometimes given a new meaning), both legal and clandestine. In the absence of such forms, or should they fail to meet the requirements formulated by the revolution, the working people create new ones. All of these organizational trends are particularly inherent in the proletariat--the class the birth and existence of which is related to large-scale machine output. The concentration of large worker masses in a single spot and labor conditions which call for high-level organization, discipline and a certain minimum of education, strengthen the unity of the proletariat and develop in it a spirit of collectivism and class solidarity.

The Paris Commune offered Marx the unique opportunity of observing first-hand the appearance, development and defeat of the only proletarian revolution in the 19th century.

Marx's summation of the experience of the revolutionary activities of the Parisian popular masses, headed by the working class, was based on a lengthy study of the growing crisis of the regime of Napoleon III. Marx predicted the collapse of the Louis Bonaparte monarchy in a work he wrote at the time the Second Empire was just being established. In his "Louis Bonaparte's 18th Brumaire," one of the masterpieces of Marxist theory, he not only showed the legitimate inevitability of the collapse of this purist and most complete embodiment of bourgeois power, but named the class which would carry out this historical assignment and under what conditions. Marx ascribed decisive importance to rallying the majority of the French toiling classes around the

proletariat. He emphasized that the ever-increasing oppression of Bonapartist dictatorship would necessarily lead them to this alliance. "The proletariat," Marx wrote, "is unable to regain its revolutionary grandeur within itself or draw new energy from the new alliances unless all classes against which it fought in June (i.e., the uprising of the Paris workers in June 1848--the author) are not overthrown the way it was overthrown" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 8, p 127).*

Belief in the approaching profound upheavals within capitalist society did not prevent Marx and Engels **seeing** with blinding clarity the entire tragic complexity and even contradictoriness of the process of social changes. Although still confident that the "revolutionary initiative," the "initial impetus" will come out of France, Marx believed that by the turn of the 1870s Germany would be readier for a social movement (see vol 16, p 404; vol 32, p 363). This assessment was based on an objective comparison between the levels of development of the French and German detachments of the international proletariat.

As the true leaders of the labor movement, Marx and Engels did not limit themselves merely to noting the weaknesses of the French proletariat. They undertook persistent efforts to prepare the progressive segment of the French workers for the forthcoming revolutionary battles.

At that time the First International was the most important channel through which Marxist theory could influence the national detachments of the international proletariat, including the French, and a major school of organization. Its general council, headed by Marx and Engels, did a great deal to strengthen the French section of the International Association of Workers, and to surmount the influence of a variety of petit bourgeois theories among its members.

The heat of the class struggle in France reached a critical point by 1870. The revolution was knocking at the doors of the Second Empire. In an effort to postpone the collapse of its regime, the government of Napoleon III rushed into its next military adventure. The Franco-Prussian war broke out. Marx had no doubts as to the fate which awaited Louis Bonaparte's monarchy in this conflict. "... The funeral toll of the Second Empire has already sounded in Paris," he wrote in his "First Appeal of the General Council of the International Association of Workers on the French-Prussian War." "The Second Empire will end as it began, as a pitiful parody" (vol 17, p 3).

Initially, a powerful wave of chauvinism triggered by the war splashed the broad strata of French society, including a certain percentage of workers. It was only after the initial defeats of Napoleon III's army, which exposed the total corruption of his regime, that a cruel period of sobering up took place. A minority, the vanguard of the French labor movement, the most conscious and theoretically trained members of the International, were the first to act in the rushing revolutionary tempest at the initial stage of the war.

* Further references to the works of K. Marx and F. Engels will indicate volume and page numbers only.

Their mission was complicated by the fact that the French sections of the International Association of Workers had been greatly weakened on the eve of the war by a wave of police repressions. "Fortunately," Marx wrote to Engels on 28 July 1870, "the class war in both countries, in France and Germany, has reached a state of development such that no external war could seriously turn the wheel of history back" (vol 33, p 9). This conviction was strengthened by the antiwar actions of the members of the International in the belligerent countries (see vol 17, pp 2-3). The shameful surrender of the emperor's forces at Sedan was the final point in the self-exposure of the crumbling Bonapartist monarchy. Its rotten wreckage was swept off by the bourgeois revolution in Paris on 4 September 1870.

Led by the working class, the people of Paris easily overthrew Napoleon III but organizationally proved unable to seize the power. This fact was used by the members of the big bourgeoisie who were able to set up a so-called "national defense" government behind the back of the working people. In his "Second Appeal on the Franco-Prussian War," Marx drew the attention of the international proletariat to the fact that a republic had been proclaimed in France "not as a social gain," and that the people who were heading it inherited "from the empire not only a pile of wreckage but its fear of the working class" (vol 17, p 280). Marx did not conceal the difficulty of the situation in which the French proletariat found itself. "Any attempt to overthrow a new government during the present time of crisis, when the enemy is almost knocking at the gates of Paris," he wrote, "would be a gesture of mad desperation. The French workers must do their civic duty. However, they must not let themselves be carried away by the national traditions of 1792.... They must not repeat the past but build the future" (ibid., pp 280-281). This was Marx's cautioning of the French proletariat against the threat of bourgeois attempts, speculating on the "defense of the fatherland," to lead the popular masses away from the solution of imminent social problems.

In gathering data for his "Civil War in France," Marx carefully assembled confirmation of the spontaneously developing process of organization of the working people, from 4 September 1870 to 18 March 1871. The collected data proved the great accuracy of the recommendations to the working class expressed by him and Engels in 1850 in the March Address of the Central Committee to the Alliance of Communists. In their address Marx and Engels had summed up the experience of the 1848-1849 revolutions and taken into consideration the initial results of the efforts of the proletariat to find organizational forms consistent with the requirements of its class struggle. They advised the proletariat in their appeal to use local self-administration authorities and worker clubs and committees in the organization of their own ranks and pressuring the government which had emerged from the revolution (with the assumption that it would be petit bourgeois). They ascribed particular importance to the creation of a worker guard with its own general staff (see vol 7, pp 263-264). The organizational forms they recommended had been culled from life, from the experience of the revolution in the course of which they had had the opportunity to see efforts to adapt such forms to the new circumstances.

The workers and the other toiling strata in Paris tried to ensure the further development of the revolution and to prevent the ruling classes from voiding

its gains. The proletarian national guard battalions, which had been created during the siege, refused to obey the former Bonapartist generals and took specific steps to strengthen their ranks. "Vigilance committees," which had appeared in each district, increasingly assumed the functions of municipal authorities. People's clubs were appearing everywhere.

A spontaneous search for a form of organization which could rally the working people of Paris in defense of the revolution was occurring in this powerful trend of self-organization of the Parisian popular masses. For a number of objective and subjective reasons this role was assumed by the National Guard and its Central Committee. The newspaper reports which Marx used in preparing his work revealed the close interest with which he followed the increased influence of this Paris authority born of popular revolutionary initiative. Marx singled out the statements by bourgeois journalists on the omnipotence of the Central Committee, which had virtually paralyzed the influence of municipal officials appointed by the government, the total scorn on the part of revolutionary Paris of governmental decrees, particularly that of closing down left-wing newspapers, and the profoundly national nature of the revolutionary movement in Paris (see "Arkhir Marks'a i Engel's'a" [Marx and Engels Archives], vol III, VIII), Moscow, 1934, pp 93-101). Marx virtually recorded the process of the growth of the bourgeois into a proletarian revolution. It was precisely this which he discussed in his first draft of the "Civil War in France," noting that "the uprising against the defense government of everyone alive in Paris..., did not begin on 18 March, although it was on that day that it won its first victory over the conspiracy; it started on 28 January, on the day of capitulation! The National Guard, i.e., the entire armed male population of Paris, organized and actually controlled Paris as of that day, regardless of the usurping capitulationist government which Bismarck deigned to allow" (vol 17, p 542).

The French reaction was unable to deal with the revolution while opposed by the armed and organized working people of Paris, headed by the heroic proletariat of the French capital. In Marx's view, this precisely was the reason for the counterrevolutionary conspiracy, the implementation of which was to begin on the night of 18 March by disarming the Paris National Guard. The revolutionary actions of the popular masses in Paris, which answered this effort, ended with the seizure of power in the city by the working class, represented by the Central Committee of the National Guard. The 18 March actions of the working people in the French capital reflected the complex intertwining of elements of spontaneity and organization, characteristic of the entire period of revolutionary developments in 1870-1871. Still hoping for a possibility of avoiding civil war, Paris assumed a defensive position "satisfied with the de facto self-administration." Meanwhile, as Marx emphasized, "it was organizing its resistance calmly and stubbornly" (ibid.). The results of such preparations were manifested immediately after the population in the working districts spontaneously prevented the seizure of the artillery of the National Guard by regular army units. It made possible the efficient organization and deployment on the battlefield of superior forces of armed and organized troops. It largely determined the shift from defense to offense, which ensured the victory of the proletarian revolution in Paris.

Initially caught unawares by an attack during the night mounted by the government forces, in the second half of the day the Central Committee already acted as the leading organ of the uprising, holding the entire initiative in its hands. It was thus that in the capital of France, one of the largest European cities, an authority elected by representatives of more than 200 National Guard battalions, which rallied the overwhelming majority of the entire male working population of Paris, was in power.

The experience of the Paris Commune allowed Marx to complete the formulation of one of the cornerstone parts of his theory of the proletarian revolution--the concept of proletarian dictatorship. It was precisely on the basis of this experience that he reached the definitive conclusion of the need for a transitional period from capitalism to communism and the fact that "during that period the government can be no other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" (vol 19, p 27).

Several generations of falsifiers of Marxism have tried to structure an imaginary conflict between the views expressed by Marx and Engels on this most important concept in Marxist theory. They are doing everything possible to depict Marx as supporter of the representative authorities of the workers, created exclusively through elections, whereas Lenin is presented as the absolute opponent of any democratic form of government. Such assertions cannot withstand criticism. They are an obvious attempt to ascribe to the Marxist classics the vice inherent precisely in their opponents.

In his work "On Twin Power," written in the spring of 1917, Lenin offered a classical definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a system of a new type established through the revolutionary activity of the working people. He pointed out that the source of this power "is not a law discussed in advance and passed by Parliament, but the direct initiative of the popular masses from below and in the local areas, an open 'seizure,' to use the popular expression" (op. cit., vol 31, p 146).

If we turn to the conclusions which Marx reached in his "Civil War in France," based on the experience of the Paris Commune, we shall see that the Leninist concept not only does not conflict with the appeal launched by the General Council but is the direct extension and development of its ideas. In his famous work Marx described the 4 September revolution as the "legitimized condition of France" (vol 17, p 332). The same idea is expressed even more clearly in the first draft of the "Civil War in France:" "Therefore, the only legitimate power in France is the revolution itself, the center of which is Paris" (ibid., p 513). Therefore, according to Marx, the source of the legitimacy of the French republic and all its institutions is that same "direct initiative of the popular masses," which Lenin subsequently described as the first sign of a proletarian dictatorship.

According to the logic of this claim, Marx considered legitimate anything which contributed to the development and strengthening of the revolution; conversely, any attempt at preventing the development of the revolutionary process (such as the effort to disarm the National Guard on the night of 18 March) was against the law. In describing the refusal of the Central Committee of the National Guard to march without delay on Versailles as a "fatal

error," and condemning the loss of valuable time by the leadership of the Paris revolution in organizing elections for the commune, Marx proceeded precisely from this view on the legality of the new system in Paris. Unfortunately, those who headed the 18 March revolution did not always display the same confidence in the legitimacy of their actions.

The fact that both Marx and Engels acknowledged the need for the primacy of popular initiative in asserting the revolutionary power of the proletariat did not mean in the least their rejection of democratic norms, the creation of representative institutions of the working people in particular.

In both his drafts of the "Civil War in France" and its basic text, Marx emphasized that "by its very nature the commune was unquestionably hostile to substituting a hierarchic investiture for universal elections" (vol 17, p 344). Furthermore, he believed that the victory of the proletarian revolution and the elimination of the old organization of the system precisely create conditions under which "the universal election right, so far misused either as a means for parliamentary sanctioning of the sacred governmental power or as a toy in the hands of the ruling classes,...has now been adapted, in accordance with its true purpose, to the election of either communes (i.e., the people's authorities--the author) or their own officials in the areas of management and legislative initiative" (ibid., p 549). Fully in the spirit of these ideas, in his "The State and Revolution," Lenin pointed out absolutely unequivocally that "we cannot imagine democracy, even proletarian democracy, without representative institutions..." (op. cit., vol 33, p 48).

In considering the dialectical unity between the revolution of the working class and the right of the majority of the people to elect their representatives to the state authorities, Marx and Engels shared the conviction that this right is above all the prerogative of the toiling masses. Marx considered self-evident the fact that the majority of elected Parisians "consisted ... of workers or acknowledged representatives of the working class" (vol 17, p 342).

The election of the Paris Commune gave Marx more food for creative thought. After the 4 September 1870 revolution, Marx witnessed the extensive popular movement which had spread to a number of French industrial centers, the purpose of which was the creation of communes not merely as representing the municipal power but as organs representing the interests of the people's masses, the opposite of the police-bureaucratic machinery of Louis Bonaparte's regime. Paris was no exception in this respect. In his first draft of the "Civil War in France" Marx noted that "the purpose of the various movements in Paris at the beginning of October was organizing the commune as a means of defense against foreign invasion and implementing the assignments of the 4 September uprising" (ibid., p 540). In other words, in Marx's view, the working people considered the organs of communal self-management one of the means of their organization, which enabled them to consolidate the results of the revolution. They saw in the use of the communal system of organization of the proletariat a possible tremendous revolutionary power. In the hands of the working class the commune could become a powerful weapon in the destruction of the bourgeois state, which Marx described as a "supernatural

portion of society" (ibid., p 546). He believed that elections for communal self-management organs in the large French cities would inevitably convert such communes into proletarian governments (ibid., p 601).

Marx, who ascribed exceptional importance to the role of the people's masses in history, perfectly realized that their influence could act either as a booster of the revolutionary process or else its hindering factor. This fully applied to France. The fate of any French revolution has been decided by the attitude toward it of the peasants, as the bulk of the country's population. In his "Summary of Bakunin's Book 'Statehood and Anarchy'" Marx summed up the experience of the labor movement, including that of the Paris Commune, in a conclusion of prime significance in resolving the problem of the allies of the proletariat in the proletarian revolution. "...The peasant will either hinder and bring about the failure of any worker revolution, as he has been doing in France so far," he wrote, "or else the proletariat... being the government should take steps which would directly improve the situation of the peasant and, consequently, will draw him over on the side of the revolution" (vol 18, p 612). In 1870-1871 the French workers were unable to lead the peasants. The communal movement in the provincial cities was suppressed before merging within a single current and before reaching its peak in the proclamation of the Paris Commune.

In assessing the experience of the French proletariat and developing it under the new historical conditions, Lenin pointed out in 1918 that the absence of means of influencing the majority of the country's population was one of the main reasons for the defeat of the communards. "The French workers," he said, "had to pay an incredibly high price for the first attempt at a worker government, the purpose and objective of which were not known to the overwhelming majority of French peasants.... They had no machinery, they were not understood by the country..." (op. cit., vol 35, pp 261-262). Unlike the proletarian commune, which could resist for a while in a single city, the soviets of worker, soldier and peasant deputies, which rapidly spread throughout Russia, ensured the Great October Socialist Revolution the support of the population's majority and, in the final account, victory.

The 18 March revolution was national rather than urban although it failed to go beyond the Paris barricades. The double ring of German and Versailles siege, which reliably isolated mutinous Paris from the rest of the country, largely determined its defeat. However, it also contributed to the exceptionally clear display of the proletarian nature of the Paris Revolution. Under most difficult civil war conditions, deprived of any outside support, the workers of Paris, assuming the historical initiative, proved the type of ability for self-sacrifice and heroism which triggered the unanimous admiration of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

In his famous letter to L. Kugelmann, dated 12 April 1871, Marx defined the nature of what the communards had done as an effort to break down the bureaucratic-military state machinery of the bourgeoisie (see vol 33, p 172). He saw in the commune the confirmation of his thought expressed in his work "Louis Bonaparte's 18th Brumaire," to the effect that if the proletariat seizes the political power it cannot use for its own purposes the state

apparatus of the exploiting classes but must destroy this machine of oppression and replace its organs with a true people's system.

The essentially new feature of the 18 March revolution, in Marx's words, was that "the people were not disarmed after the first uprising and did not surrender the power to the republican jokers of the ruling classes and that by establishing the commune, they took in their own hands the true management of their revolution and, at the same time, found the means, should they be successful, to keep this leadership in the hands of the people themselves and to put their own governmental machine in the place of the state machine, the government machine of the ruling classes. This was the nature of their unparalleled crime! Workers are threatening the privilege of managing the state by the 'upper 10,000'" (vol 17, p 561). This means, according to Marx, that the first step toward the destruction of the bourgeois state is the seizure of power by the commune elected by the workers and representing their interests. This alone would have secured for the Paris revolution a place of honor in the history of the international proletarian movement.

The communards, however, went further. The features of the future proletarian state could be seen, although weakly at that point, in the organization of the commune system. Most of the economic steps taken by the communards, whether a moratorium on house rent, ban on arbitrary fines or withholdings from wages or else, finally, preparations for giving to the workers the enterprises abandoned by their owners, were essentially the same type of despotic interference on the part of the proletariat with the "right of ownership," which both Marx and Lenin considered one of the basic characteristics of proletarian dictatorship (see V. I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 33, p 199).

The commune's social policy was implemented with the active participation of the mass organizations of the Parisian toiling population. The economic measures of the proletarian government were discussed in the people's clubs. In their appeals to the commune the trade unions frequently assessed its activities and expressed wishes on improving the situation of the working people.

Marx, who showed tremendous respect for the common sense of the working class, pointed out that the communards, who had undertaken to resolve the problem of the reorganization of society, proved to be totally alien to the utopian concepts of the complexity and duration of their project. "The working class expected no miracle from the commune," he wrote. "It did not think that ready-made complete utopias would come about by popular decree. It knew that in order to achieve its liberation and reach the superior form toward which contemporary society irrepressibly strives by virtue of its own economic development, it would have to withstand a lengthy struggle and go through a number of historical processes which would entirely change both circumstances and people" (vol 17, p 347).

While noting the truly national, popular nature of the commune, Marx emphasized that it was an organic link of the entire international worker movement. The nature of the commune as a revolution of the proletariat determined, in his words, its organic internationalism.

The activities of the first worker government was to Marx a vivid manifestation of the revolutionary creativity of the popular masses awakened by the revolution. He well knew that the communards were not a single entity either ideologically or organizationally. Both Marx and Lenin clearly saw the limit which could be reached by the spontaneous organization of the proletariat but which it could not cross. The lack of unity of will and clear understanding of the objectives and means to achieve them, which can be achieved only by an organized and cohesive proletarian party, armed with scientific revolutionary theory, had a fatal consequence to the Paris Commune.

The experience of the communards confirmed the accuracy of one of the most important concepts in Marxist theory of the unsuitability of the bourgeois state machinery in resolving the problems of the proletarian revolution and the need for its destruction. It enabled Marx to concretize the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat and to define its position as a stage in building a socialist society. In developing Marx's idea, Lenin proved that the forms of this dictatorship are not the result of the thinking of ivory tower scientists but of the revolutionary creativity of the popular masses the interests of which the dictatorship of the proletariat must defend. Based on the experience of the communards, Lenin discovered in the soviets of worker deputies, created by the Russian proletariat, a form of revolutionary organization of the masses and the nucleus of the future state of the working people, similar to the commune. Lenin's thorough study of Marx's assessments of the Paris Commune and its achievements and failures was an important structural component of the preparations for the Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of the Soviet state.

Even in today's greatly changed world the lessons of the commune, as reflected in the works of Marx, remain a tool of the worker and communist movements. They teach us the importance of properly combining revolutionary creative initiative from below with the leading role of a Marxist party, which has mastered the scientific theory and has rallied around it the proletariat and the other toiling classes. They remind us that today not only basic social but consistently democratic changes can be accomplished by the working class only. History has repeatedly confirmed the tragic experience of the communards, which proves that the bourgeoisie remains within the framework of bourgeois-democratic legality only as long as its basic interests are not threatened. Marx called upon the proletariat making the revolution to maintain a high vigilance in the face of the possible unification of the exploiting classes on an international scale. That is why the international unity of the working class in different countries, which can defend revolutionary gains, assumes such tremendous importance.

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V. I. LENIN ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND MORALITY

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[Article by Prof A. Titarenko, doctor of philosophical sciences]

[Text] We are well familiar with Lenin's principle-minded concept that "the main feature in Marx's doctrine is the clarification of the universal historical role of the proletariat as the builder of the socialist society" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 23, p 1).

The proletariat is a class to which narrow egotistical and selfish interests are alien, which does not aspire to dominate anyone and, being exploited itself and justly hating all oppression, tries to rally around itself all working people in the struggle for the creation of a society in which exploitation has been eliminated and collectivistic relations are created among people on the basis of the elimination of private ownership, and a beneficial sociohistorical situation is created for molding a harmonious and comprehensively developed person. In assessing this feature of the struggle waged by the working class in terms of moral concepts, clearly it is expressed most accurately through one word: honesty. This means honesty in relations with other classes and, according to V. I. Lenin, relations among classes are the essence of politics.

The humanistic universal historical mission of the working class also determines an essentially different interrelationship between politics and morality as factors of social historical progress. This interrelationship was brilliantly disclosed in Lenin's works. Lenin not only defined it in an innovative and scientifically profound manner but helped its shaping and assertion in the global communist movement. This not only reflected a new and most vital problem of our time but practically codified the most important progressive trend in sociopolitical life, which imbued for decades the moral-political atmosphere of our time. The dilemma of political cynicism and abstract moralizing in sociopolitical activity, insurmountable in a non-Marxist outlook, was not only resolved but the specific historical coordinates were defined of the triumph of the new, i.e., as Marx said, the real humanism in human relations.

The solution of the problem of the interrelationship between politics and morality in Leninism organically combines sociopolitical and ethical-humanistic aspects, combined within a single entity through the scientific and dialectical-materialistic approach. This problem is complex and comprehensive. Also broad is the range of Lenin's thinking in its development: from

general problems of the correlation between politics and morality as relatively independent factors of social life (particularly in the course of the revolution and the class struggle) to more specific problems such as, for example, the qualities of the revolutionary movement and their political importance. Bearing in mind the extent of such problems and a certain neglect in their development, we would like to draw the attention to two important aspects of Lenin's ideological legacy in this area: the political expediency and requirements of morality as factors in the sociopolitical struggle, and the humanism of the communist party and the morality of the subject of this policy--the working class.

The contemporary ideological struggle clearly proved that one or another departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism or their distortion and vulgarization characterize, one way or another, the erroneous and distorted understanding of the interrelationship between politics and morality.

At this point we come across a double trend of ancient philosophical-ethical and political traditions. On the one hand, we face the tendency to consider politics as an area independent of morality, with no moral bans or principles, in which violence plays the role of the all-saving means of action; on the other, we face demands "to abandon" the methods of political struggle (including revolutionary violence) and to replace them with the "moral self-advancement" of man.

On the surface these trends may seem directly opposite. In the first case, the center of attention is politics while the strictly moral significance of social behavior is ignored. In the second, the emphasis is on morality, whose role becomes absolutized; it is ascribed a particular miraculous force while the actual political means of struggle are either rejected or belittled. However, the clash between these positions is purely external. They have a common theoretical premise: the acknowledgment of the inner incompatibility between morality and politics. It is on this basis that the "left-" and right-wing revisionists draw their conclusions. As a rule, the former openly justify cynicism and immorality as the only possible means of political action. The latter slight the true meaning and moral significance of politics and reject the real revolutionary struggle, suggesting that it be replaced with one illusory prescription of the moral "rebirth" of mankind or another.

Lenin's approach to the problem of the interrelationship between morality and politics rejects both vulgar political utilitarianism toward morality as well as the abstract exaggeration of the sociopolitical possibilities of morality or ascribing to it the role of the only "supreme judge" of social progress.

V. I. Lenin repeatedly noted the highly utopian nature of the concept that a society based on exploitation and organized violence could formulate without political force, through the promotion of individuals, noble slogans and moral demands. Communist objectives cannot be achieved, Lenin emphasized, without resorting to means such as political struggle and its most important gain--proletarian dictatorship. Ignoring such "simple" truths would mean making a radical concession to the class enemy.

A comprehensive consideration of the forces of the warring classes and their social, political, moral and other characteristics has always been and remains the base of an accurate policy. Particular perspicacity is needed in politics to see the different sociohistorical possibilities for action, the more so when it is a question of a complex and tense class conflict. A simple moral approach here is obviously insufficient, not to mention the expression of merely "moral indignation." Naturally, this is not to say that there is an impassable watershed between politics and morality. As long as a most acute class antagonism exists, morality as well is manifested in one class interest or another, although in its own specific manner. In that sense communist humanism is not an extrahistorical moral code "hovering over" the classes. Unlike bourgeois-idealistic ethics doctrines, which presented their principles as "eternal" and absolute, communist ethics demands that the moral choice in a political situation be based on the strict consideration of the specific conditions and prospects of the struggle. This means that the moral assessment of one political action or another should always be specifically historical. Moral wishes, formulated without an understanding of the nature of political events or a consideration of conditions, places and times are unacceptable, therefore, not only from the viewpoint of political expediency but in the ethical, the moral sense as well. A consideration of the situation is an organic part of the moral assessment of events, assuming that this assessment truly claims to be objective and truthful.

As we know, V. I. Lenin demanded of the Marxist politician high moral qualities, such as conviction, honesty, a sharp conscience, class justice and loyalty to communist moral ideals. It was also expected of him not to be helpless or naive in the face of the clever maneuvers of his opponents and be able to expose interests and political forces concealed behind moral judgments (as we know, morality frequently includes a certain amount of illusion), and to be able to identify the inner logic of political events and the real correlation among political forces. Lenin wrote that "...politics is both a science and an art which do not come from within themselves or are given as a gift...and if it wishes to defeat the bourgeoisie, the proletariat must develop its own proletarian "class politicians" no worse than the politicians of the bourgeoisie" (op. cit., vol 41, p 65).

However, here again the question of developing a skillful, sober and flexible policy (and the nomination of precisely such politicians to head the communist movement), political expediency and morality are basic Marxist-Leninist features. We know that politics reflects the basic interests of the class and represents, as Lenin frequently emphasized, relations among classes. Morality as well expresses through its specific language (value-imperative) the interests of a class and its attitude toward other classes. Consequently, the politics and morality of a certain class are usually in a state of qualitatively identical interrelationships, revealing from various sides the sociohistorical status, interests, role, and so on of that class. All in all, reactionary bourgeois politics is consistent with the hypocritical nature of bourgeois morality and the moral decay which accompanies the process of its historical dissent. "We live in mercantile times, when the bourgeoisie does not hesitate to trade in morality and conscience," Lenin said, emphasizing this strictly moral aspect of capitalist reality (op. cit.,

vol 23, p 61). That is why the tactics and strategy of bourgeois politics, even the most double-dyed and "skillful," are imbued with a reactionary, hypocritical-egotistic moral content.

Proletarian politics is different. It has its moral content. As the definition of the basic direction followed in the struggle of the working class, it is linked to the implementation of the end objectives of this struggle. These objectives include an ethical, a moral aspect--the ideals of the new humane society and the highly moral person. It is precisely on the basis of these objectives that the ways and means of political struggle are chosen, as applicable to specific historical situations. This choice depends on the scientific assessment of a given situation. It is also a sober assessment which does not conflict with the moral approach but is combined with it: among all efficient ways and means of struggle applicable to a specific political situation, the Marxist-Leninists must use the humane ones, consistent with moral norms. This choice determines their outlook, ethics, and moral convictions. Lenin taught that politics is a science and an art. It demands not only scrupulous scientific analysis but despite conditions of extremely variable political situations, when instant decisions are necessary, particularly sensitive and perspicacious application of the experience gained through individual political struggle. One of the aspects of this experience is moral, the experience of correct (and incorrect) moral assessments or, in other words, a choice based on moral intuition. Therefore, a political choice inevitably includes an aspect of moral experience, an experience of both masses and collectives and individuals.

The interests of the working class and its party are incompatible with a narrow class egotism and the political narrow-minded practicalism it triggers. The scientific and objective consideration of all political forces involved in the struggle gives the Marxist-Leninist outlook particular perspicacity. It makes it possible to find the most accurate and, consequently, most moral means for attaining lofty sociohistorical objectives.

Lenin's Decree on Peace is a specific example. When the decree was promulgated the imperialist governments of the belligerent sides were full of hatred and malice toward the first worker-peasant state. However, the leader of the revolution was entirely confident of the need and timeliness of calling for peace, a call which was directed also to those circles in the capitalist countries which, having soberly assessed the circumstances, could have listened to it. Therefore, it was not the result of a moral illusion applied to politics, riding a wave of revolutionary enthusiasm. By **no means**. It was consistent with both the political and moral trend of the revolutionary movement and its humane purpose.

Lenin's genius made it possible to reach a truth of decisive importance to the fate of the people on earth: the plundering imperialist war is a barbarism which must be excluded forever from mankind's life. Naturally, in this case Lenin applied in politics the basic moral convictions of the fighters for socialism. "The socialists have always condemned war among nations as barbaric and savage," he wrote (op. cit., vol 26, p 311). This combination of political expediency and morality, as was confirmed by

historical practice, proved to be more effective and perspicacious than all cynical maneuvers of the opponents of socialism and peace. However, it did not mean the abandonment of a class approach to the problem of war. Lenin not only condemned war morally but exposed its class origins, political reasons and culprits. In proving that the war has a predatory, an imperialist nature, displayed by both belligerent groups, Lenin directed the indignation of the working people not against the working people of the other nation but against the policy of the ruling classes, including their own bourgeoisie. Since the imperialists were pursuing a global slaughter ignoring the voice of the people, the revolutionary overthrow of the militaristic government and, in this case, waging a civil war had become necessary. Under these circumstances they were the most realistic means for rescuing the peoples from the pain and suffering of imperialist slaughter. Consequently, this was the most desirable method, from both the political and moral viewpoints. Let us note, incidentally, that in Marxist-Leninist theory the very classification of wars into just and unjust means, essentially, the acknowledgment of the need for a moral approach to politics. Here even the terminology makes use of concepts saturated with a profound moral content, which is precisely the most important aspect of Leninist political strategy and tactics.

Not for nothing did Lenin consider bolshevism as "justice" in struggle (see op. cit., vol 34, p 331) and such a justice as the powerful factor which the party of the working class has at its disposal in its constructive influence on the course of history. The Leninist logic of the political struggle, based on the idea of the conflict between the class interests of the exploiters and the exploited and the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, became accessible to the masses precisely because it was both accurate and just. The workers and peasants were convinced through personal experience of its accuracy and moral righteousness. Their class sense and spontaneous moral awareness were clearly manifested in the theoretical accuracy of Leninism: that is precisely why, as a political movement, bolshevism was consistent with their own sense of rightness and accepted as the fullest possible embodiment of justice. When Lenin fought all kinds of conciliationists, who believed that the Russian proletariat would be unable to counter the pressure of hostile forces and win in the socialist revolution, he paid attention not only to the strength of the proletariat, allied with the oppressed working people, but the fact that the struggle was being waged for a most just cause. This was no accident, for argumentation in Marxist science and in justice organically blend within Leninism.

In assessing the contemporary sociopolitical situation in the world, we can confidently say that today's communist policy is consistent with Lenin's strategic guidelines. "The pivotal direction in the foreign political activities of the party and the state was and remains the struggle for abating the threat of war and restraining the arms race," the 26th CPSU Congress emphasized. The November 1982 Central Committee Plenum reasserted this programmatic stipulation and its principle-minded consistency and firm resolve in the struggle for peace. The peace program for the 1980s, creatively relying on Lenin's doctrine, offers the people on earth a future and illumines to the peoples the path of sociohistorical progress. The contemporary ruling circles in the imperialist countries, naturally, have not become more peace-loving

than in the past but rather the opposite: the current policy of the U.S. Administration and that of its main NATO allies is one of preparations for the type of war which would have catastrophic consequences for all mankind. However, it is already clear today that the cynical-circumstantial immorally pragmatic policy based on instant success of the ruling circles of these countries, who use moral slogans only for camouflage purposes, is finding itself in an impasse with increasing frequency. It is unable to turn back the more stable progressive historical trends which are consistent with the objectives and hopes of the popular masses. An example of this is the drastic upsurge experienced by the peace movement in the capitalist countries, which was unexpected even to the most farsighted and, one would think, politicians particularly skillful in the "art" of maneuvers and intrigues.

Not only the obvious anticommunists and anti-Leninists but all those who have donned the garb of "sympathizers" of the highly moral objectives of the socialist revolution have always tried to prove that political expediency and sober considerations in politics (which is, unquestionably, inherent in Leninism) allegedly inevitably "destroy" moral ideals. The "abandonment of ideals" in this sense is ascribed to Marxism-Leninism as something self-evident, as confirmation of its "rejection" of "morality" and "ethics" in general.

Leninism refutes such views in both theory and practice. As Lenin emphasized in his polemics with the populists, actually all the communists want is for ideals to be based on specific sociohistorical grounds and turn from nebulous consolations to positive incentives for the real struggle waged by classes led forward by history itself. Not without reason did he consider an ideal as "morally superior." In summing up the experience of the political struggle waged by the Russian communists, Lenin wrote that "...on what is the discipline of the revolutionary party of the proletariat based? How is it verified? What supports it? To begin with, the conscientiousness of the proletarian vanguard and its loyalty to the revolution, its firmness, self-sacrifice and heroism. Secondly, its ability to be linked, to come closer to and, to a certain extent, if you wish, to blend with the broadest possible mass of working people, the proletariat above all, but also the nonproletarian toiling mass. Thirdly, the accurate political leadership provided by this vanguard and the accuracy of its political strategy and tactics, providing that even the broadest possible masses can become convinced of this accuracy through personal experience" (op. cit., vol 41, pp 6-7).

Principles and ideals cannot be changed arbitrarily based on the hope for instant success. They do not obey fashion like shoes or clothing. They are the humanistic corps of the communist outlook, and it is precisely on their basis that changes in reality are recognized and the further enrichment of ideals and development of principles take place. In discussing compromises in the class struggle against the bourgeoisie, Lenin particularly emphasized that they could be and, among the opportunists, are means for the preservation and protection of the capitalist system and, in the final account, constitute acts of treason toward the revolutionary proletariat. Does this mean that one should totally abandon compromises in politics and condemn them morally as phenomena of political practicalism and lack of principles, the more

so since many compromises, clearly necessitated by difficult circumstances facing the revolutionary fighters could bring no moral satisfaction whatsoever? Not at all. The task, Lenin pointed out, is "to be able to test one's loyalty to principles despite all compromises, for they are inevitable..." (op. cit., vol 34, p 133). Loyalty to principles and to ideals (including their moral significance) are the precise characteristics of Leninist policy.

In other words, accusing the communist outlook of petty politicking and "separation" of morality from politics is an obvious stupidity. Suffice it to consider Lenin's words about conscientiousness, endurance, self-sacrifice, heroism, solidarity and the other qualities of the proletarian vanguard, acknowledged by the broad popular masses on the basis of their experience, to realize the lofty role which Lenin ascribed to the moral factor. Marxism-Leninism considers popular revolutions the "locomotives of history" for a good reason. Society advances during revolutions with seven-league steps because the masses themselves are implementing their moral noble objectives. This lowers the influence of behind the screens and cheap practical policy on social development. This is natural, for the very sphere of narrow pragmatism is narrowed even more, as are the opportunities for unhindered political maneuvering on the part of the ruling segment of the exploiting class.

The increased role of the people's masses in social life, including politics, has far-reaching moral consequences as well. The working people bring into politics the experience of their moral searches and moral norms, demands, hopes and ideals. Upgrading the political activeness of the masses means intensifying the influence on politics by the morality which has developed within the people. Lenin considered the revolutionary initiative of the masses an "awakening of the conscience, mind and daring of the oppressed classes..." (op. cit., vol 31, p 459). Conscience and courage are moral qualities and the concept of linking the political activeness of the working people to the development of their moral qualities is of basic importance.

In Leninist political strategy and tactics the moral factor has not only been viewed as the most important "circumstance of the struggle but has been inherently present in the very approach to political decisionmaking. One of the mandatory requirements here is teaching the people's masses on the basis of their own experience and leading them toward the objectives of the communist movement in the course of their own struggle. Therefore, this rule also reveals the moral foundations of the interrelationship between the party, as the vanguard of the movement, and the people: here respect and trust are combined with reciprocal exigency and responsibility. It is no accident in the least that Lenin so persistently pointed out the close tie between the political and the moral consciousness of the working people. In particular, in his article "The Successes and Difficulties of the Soviet System," he noted that the building of socialism by the victorious working class requires not only political consciousness but moral firmness, comradely discipline and organization and belief in the justice of one's cause. In his article "On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," he especially singled out among the new forms of class struggle "teaching the new discipline," i.e., he ascribed particular significance to the struggle for shaping and strengthening the moral factor in politics. The harmony between politics and morality increase

the more interested the involved masses become and embody their moral requirements.

A sharper feeling of justice and high moral convictions and the initiative-mindedness and self-sacrifice it inspires are the mandatory characteristics of a truly mass revolutionary movement. Naturally, mere enthusiasm is insufficient. Lenin always ascribed exceptional importance to the political upbringing of the masses and the development of their own experience in fighting an efficient political struggle. An inexperienced and politically naive mass easily becomes the victim of deception and treachery on the part of the ruling exploiting classes at crucial moments of the political struggle. Here again the importance of the political maturity of the communist party and its leading role and purposefulness is particularly great. "In the serious meaning of the term, politics can be made only by the masses. However, the nonparty mass or the mass not following a strong party is a scattered unconscious mass which cannot withstand and which becomes the toy of clever politicians..." Lenin pointed out (op. cit., vol 24, p 66). He called for exposing the immorality of bourgeois politics, emphasizing that "the entire art of bourgeois politickers is precisely the art of deceiving the masses..." (op. cit., vol 16, p 155).

Strictly moral requirements unrelated to the real conditions of the socio-political struggle can frequently turn into demagogic slogans unattainable at that stage. At that point the antisocialist forces try to utilize them to weaken the political vigilance of the working people and conceal from them their own deviations from the building of socialism (it was precisely this, in particular, that the recent events in Poland confirmed).

However, in resolving political problems Lenin never made politics an aim within itself. He was able to lead it into the channel of the humane general historical prospects of the communist movement. That is why within Leninism, and within the political experience in the struggle it has summed up, the morality of communist humanism shines as though "from within" politics. This interpenetration can be expressed as follows: "revolutionary morality in politics and revolutionary politics in morality."

The various revisionists and vulgarizers are trying to make Leninism "fit" their one-sided simplistic concepts. They have pitted Lenin the political strategist against Lenin the humanist. Thus, the Leninist principles of the political struggle are being grossly misrepresented in a spirit of political Jesuism and moral lack of principles, and the very concept of "humanism" is proclaimed "non-Marxist" and "bourgeois," allegedly not inherent in the Leninist outlook. An attempt is also being made to interpret Lenin's views on the interconnection between morality and politics in an opposite spirit of abstract moralizing, thus dulling the practical significance of the Leninist strategy and tactics of the political struggle (this is the way the "liberalizers of socialism," the supporters of the theory of "ethical socialism," etc., act).

Both interpretations substantially distort the essence of the problem. Lenin's understanding of politics and morality was distinguished by its

integrity. Like Marx, Lenin was a "real humanist" in this sense. He firmly opposed moralizing and utopianism in politics, concealed behind pseudohumanistic blabbering and pious talks as well as political immorality, petty pragmatism and cynicism. He is the author of the sharp theoretical remark that "honesty in politics is the result of strength while hypocrisy is the result of weakness" (op. cit., vol 20, p 210). This Leninist formula expresses the organic unity between revolutionary politics and morality, based on the objective and subjective historical characteristics of the communist movement.

"People who mean by politics the petty methods which sometimes become almost fraudulent must be most firmly condemned by us.... The classes must not be misled," Lenin points out (op. cit., vol 43, p 58). It is precisely this class principle to which the "critics" refer in proving the "immorality of group egotism" within Leninism, which actually turns out to be the antidote to fraud and all kinds of moral machinations in politics, for as it liberates itself the proletariat liberates all mankind. This is no longer merely the historical mission of the working class but a high positive moral principle governing its activities and struggle.

The collectivism of communist morality is the opposite of selfish bourgeois individualism. That is its essence. The humanistic meaning of the moral principle of collectivism finds its vivid embodiment in the ethical arsenal of Leninism. The noble and humane ideals of communism are consistent with morally adequate means for its attainment. In developing and supporting the principles of humanity, solidarity, collectivism and friendship among nations, communist humanism counters the immorality of the reactionary classes, which are abandoning the historical proscenium, with its lofty ethical ideas. Love of mankind and altruism are, as Lenin pointed out, "the basic, the most elementary premises, convictions and principles of any democracy" (op. cit., vol 22, p 95). It is precisely in communist policy and directly "within" it that we find the most fertile grounds for the growth and blossoming of real rather than merely proclaimed humanism. This is the basis of the Marxist outlook, which was repeatedly emphasized by Lenin as something self-evident.

Let us cite the following happening from the history of the socialist revolution in Russia: in September 1921 Commissar S. S. Danilov sent Lenin a letter; in considering the vital need to cultivate feelings of "love, compassion and mutual aid within the class, within the camp of the working people," he asked the leader of the revolution his opinion on this account. Lenin answered: "Comrade Danilov! Both 'within the class' and among the working classes developing a feeling of 'mutual aid' and so on is unquestionably necessary" (op. cit., vol 53, p 187).

The war against the intervention was coming to a close. Dislocation and hunger were torturing the young state of workers and peasants. The immeasurable suffering and difficulties experienced by the working people of former tsarist Russia should have triggered a wave of hatred, cruelty and revenge. Indeed, the revolution was forced to act mercilessly toward its direct and irreconcilable enemies. Its experience (moral included) confirmed the need

to apply most extreme measures wherever necessary. At the same time, however, revolutionary morality would have disappeared had it been reduced merely to hatred or a feeling of revenge which is not typical of the true revolutionaries. This revolutionary rejection of the sociopolitical foundations of the old exploiting world with its predatory-hypocritical morality--a rejection which was embodied in the heroism and dedication of the masses which were fighting the counterrevolution arms in hand--was backed by the great creative and positive tasks of the sociopolitical reorganization of life on a socialist basis, and the new moral incentives to improve society and the individual.

Lenin repeatedly emphasized that the main historical role of the socialist revolution (unlike all preceding revolutions) was not violence, rejection or destruction, although they were unavoidable, but the creative and constructive principles which it encompassed. The humanistic, the positive historical direction of the socialist revolution, consequently, creates new conditions for the triumph of the progressive morality, including morality in the political struggle. With good reason Lenin proudly noted that, relying on the sympathy and support of the workers in the progressive countries, "our proletariat, numerically weak and afflicted by difficulties and privations, was able to win through the power of its moral strength" (op. cit., vol 43, p 135). Its "moral influence" (see op. cit., vol 39, p 234) changes the entire course of sociohistorical development of the entire society and working people through politics.

Therefore, political assessments, which are a powerful means for influencing the moral consciousness of the masses, are applicable to morality. As we know, Lenin constantly provided such assessments. In turn, politics is subject to consideration from the viewpoint of progressive morality, on the level of the principles of communist humanism. It could be humane and anti-humane, profoundly national or hostile to the working people, just or unjust, nobly frank or falsely hypocritical. Such considerably moral assessments of politics help to define its sociohistorical purpose, meaning and trends. They are particularly important to the masses, making clear to them the meaning of one political line or another. Equally unquestionable is the tremendous impact which such assessments have on the very course, the entire atmosphere of the political struggle.

The contemporary opponents of Leninism spare no effort to defame the Leninist approach to the practice of the political struggle and the social reorganization of society, an approach which is both politically objective and humane. To this effect they even take up Lenin's familiar work "Tasks of the Youth Union" and its main stipulation which states that "communist morality is based on the struggle for strengthening and completing communism" (op. cit., vol 41, p 313). Taking this statement out of context, they interpret it as the embodiment of coarse sociopolitical utilitarianism toward morality; in Leninism, they claim, morality loses its significance and serving the tasks of communist construction allows, they claim, the use of any, including immoral, means. Yet it was precisely through this statement that Lenin emphasized the sense in which Marxism rejects the autonomy of morality; in the sense of an eternal morality based on "God's will," standing "above" social problems.

Lenin formulated the most important social criterion of socialist morality: "Morality helps human society to ascend, to reject the exploitation of labor" (op. cit., vol 41, p 313). This criterion organically combines realism with humanism.

In other words, the recognition of the sociohistorical, the class base of morality does not mean in the least the application of some kind of ethical utilitarianism or the cynical "subordination" of morality to one political slogan or another. Lenin firmly cautioned against reducing communist upbringing to the senseless memorizing of slogans against "communist boastfulness," political blathering and phrasemongering. He believed that such an upbringing would harm tremendously the building of communism. "All education, training and study by modern youth must involve the development of a communist morality," Lenin emphasized (ibid., p 309).

Communist humanism--precisely as an ethical, a moral criterion--imbues all basic Leninist ideas on the sociopolitical ways and means of building socialism. This is confirmed not only by the study of Lenin's theoretical legacy but the entire practical-political experience of Leninism, in which the task of building new sociomoral relations occupies a central position. It was not without a purpose that Vladimir Il'ich paid such great and constant attention to the problem of properly combining moral with material incentives (in substantiating the theory of cooperation, the need for control over the amount of labor and consumption on the part of the masses themselves, and so on). His concern for keeping alive the enthusiasm of the working people awakened by the revolution, and for developing it as it changes and goes through new stages, is a brilliant page in the real and historical embodiment of the high morality of the revolution and consistent humanism in the building of socialism, which also involves the levers of political management and influence.

Naturally, it would be a self-delusion to claim that Lenin saw no conflicts, moral included, in Marxist policy. The clash between moral norms and problems of moral choice is inherent in all social life and, naturally, also occurs in politics, which is an area crowded with sharp contradictions. The very fact that ideally, as Lenin repeatedly emphasized, the communists are against any violence but are nevertheless forced to resort to it alone cannot fail but trigger in the people complex and conflicting feelings and problems of a moral-psychological nature. It is precisely in this case that the strictest possible consideration of sociomoral boundaries and lawfulness (from the viewpoint of the ideal!) of the use of violence is important. The unnecessary use of violence is unacceptable and even criminal from the moral viewpoint. It is here that we apply the moral bans which earlier, under less favorable sociopolitical circumstances, had to be temporarily pushed back. It was Lenin himself who particularly pointed out, for example, the fact that violence applied toward the working people during the peaceful period of building socialism is unacceptable. "The use of violence is acceptable toward those who would like to restore their power. However, the importance of violence stops there and influence and example take over. The significance of communism must be proved through practical measures, through examples," Vladimir Il'ich said (op. cit., vol 42, p 75).

It is precisely Leninism that today clearly proves the organic combination in politics of national considerations with the lofty ideals of active humanism. Ensuring the harmonious combination of politics with morality for the sake of preventing violations of the principles of communist humanism or sliding to a position of bare moralizing is, naturally, a difficult task. It would be erroneous to claim that such a synthesis arises by itself, spontaneously, without creative efforts.

It is very important to emphasize here that in Leninism scientific knowledge is not the result of "pure" and abstract theorizing. It is the result of the summation of the moral-political experience of the people and the comprehensive study of the past and prospects for further development. In this case we cannot do without a search for the most efficient means of work or without sociopolitical experimentation and consequent risk. As socialism develops its advantages--economic, social, political and moral--become increasingly apparent. However, this means that resolved problems are replaced by new ones, unresolved, broader and more difficult.

Socialism is not a peaceful backwater of satisfied wishes, tranquility and complacency. It is a process of steady progress and implementation of increasingly important objectives. The creative initiative of the working people in a socialist society and their political and moral purposefulness and high activeness are prerequisites for the successful reaching of objectives. The development of such activeness and its channeling into the proper bed are impossible without the help of a reliably operating moral factor. This applies not only in the case of the masses, for the active life stance of the individual largely depends on the reliability of his moral foundations. We have good reason to speak of the moral-political qualities of the Soviet people, i.e., qualities within which the political and moral aspirations toward their objective become interwoven. "... The party," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "sees to it that in our country the people are raised not merely as the carriers of a certain sum of knowledge but, above all, as citizens of a socialist society, as active builders of communism, with their specific ideological concepts, morality and interests and high labor and behavior standards."

Today thousands of strings tie socialist policy to the moral life of the people. Politics not only has a tremendous impact on the development of this life but experiences its strong influence which contributes (or hinders, in cases of moral deviations) to the successful solution of today's problems. In this case strengthening the favorable moral atmosphere in our society is particularly important. The party considers efforts in this direction as a major long-term prospect. An increasingly favorable atmosphere is developing for the assertion of fraternal and friendly relations among people under the conditions of the elimination of class disparities and the rapprochement among nations, the movement toward communist equality and the growth of social homogeneity. The course of surmounting major disparities between town and country and between physical and mental work and strengthening the sociopolitical and ideological unity within the Soviet people creates equal possibilities of spiritual advancement and increased moral wealth for all members of society. The development of socialist democracy and the enhancement of

the role of social organizations in the administration of social processes are impossible without the intensive growth of public initiative and individual activeness which largely depend on the level of consciousness and the "morality standard" of every Soviet person.

Therefore, the problem of the moral advancement of the individual under socialist conditions is organically paralleled by the overall course of the country's sociopolitical progress. The all-round development of man and his well-being and happiness are the supreme objective of communist social reorganization. At the same time, the individual has no loftier objective than building the most just society on earth. Such dialectics of the social and the individual constitutes the internal, the organic interdependence between the lofty moral and sociopolitical objectives of the development of socialism.

The Leninist approach to the interrelationship between politics and morality is creatively embodied in contemporary CPSU foreign policy. Communist policy, which is class-oriented in nature and party-militant in spirit, is internally incompatible with immoral narrow-minded pragmatism which is so typical of the policy of the ruling bourgeois upper crust, concealed behind claims of "above party-mindedness," "non-class nature," "eternal morality canons," and so on. The features of the Leninist foreign policy--publicity, extensive information of the masses, readiness for constructive agreements, exposure of secret imperialist deals, etc.--are the direct moral opposite of the methods used by the bourgeois class in its political struggle.

Today's ideological struggle has coupled most general philosophical ideals with moral values and identified the morality underlying even the most abstract political theories. The formation of the world socialist system and the increased strength of the international communist movement have not only increased the need but the real opportunity for the harmonious combination of politics with lofty moral norms.

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BEGINNING OF BOLSHEVISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83) pp 34-44

[Article by Dr of Historical Sciences K. Tarnovskiy]

[Text] V. I. Lenin scientifically proved the need for a truly revolutionary party and headed the struggle for its establishment. The "Alliance for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class," founded by V. I. Lenin in 1895, became the embryo of such a party. The First RSDWP Congress, which was held in 1898, proclaimed the founding of the party but was unable to create it as a unified and centralized organization. This was accomplished by the Second Congress, which was prepared by Lenin's ISKRA.

From the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress."

"Bolshevism," V. I. Lenin wrote, "guided the old ISKRA for a period of 3 years, from 1900 to 1903, and took up the struggle against menshevism as its target" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 19, p 103).

The purposefulness of an ideological-political trend means the existence of a certain unity among theoretical, tactical and organizational principles and their consistency with the conditions and tasks of the revolutionary liberation movement. Once such coordination exists, the possibility arises of using the data of specific experiences in the development of revolutionary theory which, in turn, becomes a manual for specific revolutionary action. The purposefulness of the ideological-political trend, therefore, is an indicator of the existence of the necessary conditions and prerequisites for the development of a revolutionary proletarian party, which is a superior form of combination of the mass worker movement with Marxism. It was precisely such prerequisites which were established as a result of ISKRA's 3-year activities.

Lenin's striving for unity between theoretical and practical activities became apparent as early as the mid-1890s. On the one hand, this enabled him, for the first time in Russian history, to combine Marxism with the mass labor movement and to create the embryo of a proletarian party--the Petersburg Alliance for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class. On the other, the consideration of specific experience, together with the use of a

broad range of socioeconomic and political sources, became Lenin's most important methodological principle in the elaboration of problems of revolutionary theory. Consequently, in undertaking the creation of ISKRA, Lenin had developed most highly an understanding of the condition of and prospects for the revolutionary process in Russia.

By the mid-1890s the history of Marxism as an autonomous trend of social thinking in Russia was more than 10 years old. G. V. Plekhanov had criticized the populist utopias of Russia's "special way" to socialism and proved that the fate of the future social revolution was linked to the proletariat. Plekhanov defined the immediate prospects for the country's development through the concept of "Europeanization." He believed that in the more or less distant future Russia would have a bourgeois-democratic revolution, after which, together with the Western European countries, it would undertake to organize its forces for a socialist revolution. Therefore, "Europeanization" expressed the idea that Russia's socioeconomic development was identical to that of the Western European countries and, consequently, that there was a basic similarity between the revolution which was ripening in Russia and the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries. It is true that at the beginning of the 1890s Plekhanov had come close to formulating the problem of the characteristics of Russia's capitalist evolution. After studying the speeches of the Petersburg proletarians delivered at the first May Day celebrated in Russia (1891), he concluded that "the political consciousness of the Russian working class was awakened earlier than that of the Russian bourgeoisie," and formulated certain concepts justifiably considered today as elements of the concept of the hegemony of the proletariat in the Russian revolutionary liberation movement. However, these were precisely elements. He considered unquestionable the basic similarity between the early bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe and the imminent revolution in Russia, for which reason, although noting the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie and its fear of the labor movement, Plekhanov nevertheless continued to consider the bourgeoisie--together with the proletariat, it is true--the motive force of the revolutionary process. Plekhanov did not consider at all the question of the leadership of the non-proletarian masses, which is the most important task of the hegemonistic class. Unable to formulate an integral concept of the hegemony of the proletariat during the bourgeois-democratic stage of the struggle, he made most serious errors in projecting the development of the socialist revolution. He almost shared the viewpoint of the leaders of the Second International, who believed that a socialist revolution can win only when the proletariat becomes the majority of the nation. In his effort to substantiate this concept, K. Kautsky wrote that in the course of a socialist revolution the workers would be opposed not only by "all exploiting classes but the majority of the petite bourgeoisie and the peasants and most of the intelligentsia." Therefore, the proletarian revolution would be the work of a single class only and could take place in the rather distant future.

The beginning of Lenin's political activities coincided with that of the mass labor movement. In order to head it it was necessary to determine the way in which the nature and objectives of the struggle of the workers were based on the characteristics of the development of Russian capitalism and to study the

evolution of Russian capitalism. It was this that Lenin did in the 1890s, as a result of which he concluded that a previously unknown form of establishment of the capitalist production method had become apparent in Russia. Compared with the Western European model, it was characterized by a sharp alternation of stages in the capitalist evolution. Thus, whereas the appearance of railroads in the West was the result of industrial development and, in this sense, as Marx said, crowned the definitive reorganization of capitalist production (see K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 34, pp 290-291), in Russia large-scale railroad construction began before the completion of the industrial transformation became the country's incentive for industrial development. The sequence of agrarian-capitalist and industrial changes was different. In the early capitalist countries the agrarian-capitalist change was a consequence of bourgeois revolutions and preceded the industrial change whereas in Russia, conversely, the industrial change and, respectively, the development of the proletariat as a class, had taken place before the bourgeois revolution and the agrarian-capitalist change had not been completed at all. This was the reason for the complexity and contradictory nature of the Russian economy; the interweaving of progressive and backward factors and the combination of large capitalist production, on the basis of which monopoly associations began to be established; an essentially semi-feudal land ownership; the extensive dissemination of early capitalist ways and means of exploitation of the proletariat and the toiling masses in general, including factory manufacturing; and, finally, the economic and political dependence of the Russian bourgeoisie on tsarism. Such dependence was economic, for the development of a number of industrial sectors and railroad transportation took place with the direct interference of the government; the political dependence was due to the fact that in its struggle against the labor movement the bourgeoisie relied on the armed forces of the autocracy. Both circumstances, in Lenin's definition, triggered the particular tendency of the Russian bourgeoisie to "sacrifice its democratic nature" (op. cit., vol 1, p 302). It was unable to head the struggle for consistent democratic change.

All of this meant that the revolution which was becoming imminent in Russia could not be a simple repetition of previous bourgeois revolutions. The latter had taken place under the leadership of the bourgeoisie and had ended with its political victory and the suppression of the independent actions of the toiling masses. In Russia a bourgeois revolution could have become proletarian in terms of its basic motive force and means of struggle and lead to the defeat of the liberal bourgeoisie at the democratic stage itself and offer socialist possibilities to the proletariat and its allies. Such was precisely the prognosis with which Lenin ended his book "Who Are Those 'Friends of the People' and How Do They Struggle Against the Social Democrats?" (1894): "... The Russian worker, who will assume the leadership of all democratic elements, will overthrow absolutism and lead the Russian proletariat (along with the proletariat of all countries) down the straightaway of the open political struggle to a victorious communist revolution" (ibid., p 312).

Correspondingly, in formulating the tasks of the revolutionary Marxist party which was developing in Russia, in that same work Lenin especially emphasized

that the Russian communists "more than anyone else" must never forget in their activities the "tremendous importance of democracy" (ibid., p 300).

Lenin formulated as the basic tasks and trends of activity of the Russian revolutionary-Marxist party, based on the objective situation of the country, the combination of the mass labor movement with Marxism and the struggle waged by the socialist proletariat with the movement of the popular masses; this was to ensure a course toward socialism essentially different from the one conceived by Plekhanov and the leaders of the Western social democratic movements, with different periods for the development of the revolutionary process. Under the conditions of the advent of a new age and given a country such as Russia, the struggle for democracy and the struggle for a socialist revolution would not be sharply divided in time as had been the case of the countries in which capitalist development had taken place earlier, but would become links within the single revolutionary process. There was no reason for the proletariat to wait until it became the majority of the nation. The proletariat could ally itself with the majority of the toiling masses not only during the democratic but also the socialist stage of development of the revolution.

A new trend developed in revolutionary Marxism by the turn of the 20th century. As a result of its combination with the mass labor movement it became ideological-political. At that point, in order to achieve unity, it was necessary to prove the possibility of combining the socialist with the democratic aspirations within the labor movement. In practical terms, this was the first time that such a problem had been formulated in world history. In order to resolve it, the labor movement had to rise to the level of the all-Russian political actions, to determine the structure of the "democratic elements" which, together with the proletariat, could oppose autocracy and find the proper forms of struggle for the proletariat which would influence the development of the democratic movement, and to create an organization which would head and rally the revolutionary pressure of the masses. It was precisely these problems which were being resolved during the period of activities of Lenin's ISKRA.

"In addition to newspapers," Lenin wrote, "the workers in Germany, France and elsewhere have many other means for the public manifestation of their activities and for organizing their movement: parliamentary activities, electoral campaigns, popular meetings, participation in local public institutions (rural and urban), open trade (professional, shop) unions, etc., etc. In our country, instead of all of this, and all of this precisely, and until we have gained political freedom, we must have a revolutionary newspaper without which no extensive organization of the entire labor movement would be possible" (op. cit., vol 4, p 192).

Lenin's plan for the conversion of the Russian revolutionary social democratic movement within a single ideological-political trend and, subsequently, a political party, had an integral nature. All the work had to be waged both from above, through the creation of a militant Marxist newspaper, as well as from below, with the most active participation of the local social democratic groups and organizations; the publication of an all-Russian political

newspaper made it possible to rally and direct toward a single objective all aspects of social democratic activities--ideological (theoretical) political (tactical) and organizational; finally, party construction would take place in connection with the labor movement in order to blend, to combine all of its manifestations within a single class struggle waged by the proletariat and to unite it with the mass democratic movements. Lenin particularly emphasized this aspect of his plan, for the organization of the labor movement in a class and, consequently, political struggle was considered both as an objective and as a base for party construction and an indicator of the coordination among all aspects of activities of the Russian revolutionary social democratic movement and the objective tasks of the movement and its nature at any given moment in time.

At the Second RSDWP Congress the activities of ISKRA "as an individual group" were described by Lenin as a "struggle for influence" (op. cit., vol 7, p 307). This formula contains indications of the conditions under which ISKRA did its work and the methods it used to achieve its tasks and objectives. It also provides a key to defining the time of conversion of the ISKRA movement into an integral ideological-political trend.

ISKRA began its activities as one of the many Russian social-democratic organizations and groups. Most local committees failed to realize the advantages of its party construction plan. Furthermore, since the newspaper immediately emphasized that separation from "economism," the supporters of which were predominant in the movement at that time, was a preliminary condition for firm party unity, "in the majority of cases," N. K. Krupskaya emphasized in her "Report for the Second Congress of the ISKRA Organization," they considered "the ISKRA enterprise something entirely alien to them." Under these circumstances Lenin did not consider it possible to accept the suggestion of some social democratic organizations to name themselves RABOCHAYA GAZETA, which the First Congress had accepted as the party's central organ. Instead, he selected for his newspaper a name which was soon to become famous. "... We wanted," emphasized Lenin in "What Is To Be Done?," "for our line, if properly pursued, to be respected for its accuracy and not for the fact that it had been promoted to an official organ" (op. cit., vol 6, p 164). That is why ISKRA "waged its struggle for influence less through literary polemics than through direct influence on the labor movement, in such a way that direct revolutionary experience could reveal the advantages of the ISKRA line and help the Russian social democrats consciously to take its side. The beginning of the official conversion to the ISKRA side by the RSDWP committees marked also the end of its status as a separate social democratic group. This process, the essence and results of which Lenin expressed in the formula "ISKRA became the party and the party became ISKRA" (op. cit., vol 46, p 293) became particularly intensive, as we know, starting with the autumn of 1902. However, the change in the position held by the local committees toward ISKRA had become apparent the previous spring. This proved the failure of the "economist" and Bundt efforts to convene a "congress" of their supporters in Belostok, bypassing ISKRA, and, particularly, the unparalleled success of Lenin's books "What Is To Be Done?," which offered an expanded description of ISKRA tactics and organizational policy in 1901 and 1902. The dissemination of this book and the publication by the ISKRA editors of a draft party

program (June 1902) marked the point at which conditions and prerequisites for the organization of a proletarian party of a new type had become fully extant in the Russian social democratic movement.

ISKRA formulated in its very first issue the central ideal of its program--the concept of the hegemony of the proletariat in the imminent bourgeois-democratic revolution. In emphasizing that tsarist oppression afflicted, along with the proletariat, the other social strata, ranging from oppressed nationalities to people's teachers, the newspaper pointed out the possibility of the appearance of a powerful democratic movement which, headed by the Russian proletariat, would be able to overthrow the oppression of Russian autocracy.

The accuracy of ISKRA's predictions was confirmed immediately. When the government announced in January 1901 that 183 students who had taken part in student disturbances in Kiev were to be drafted in the army, Lenin turned through ISKRA to the workers and social democrats with the appeal to organize a "widespread and open protest with a public demonstration" (op. cit., vol 4, p 396). ISKRA was able to anticipate the development of events and its third (April) issue carried a most detailed survey of the demonstrations in which workers in university cities took most active part side-by-side with the students. During February and March, for the first time in Russia the labor movement joined the democratic students. The revolutionary experience was a vote in favor of the ISKRA program.

The first victory won by ISKRA was of tremendous importance. The workers began to look at the demonstrations as their own form of struggle which had a direct impact on the democratic social strata and as of then combining strikes with demonstrations became the rule. The practice of the local social democratic organizations clearly proved the narrow-mindedness and limited views and tactics of the "economists." The ISKRA editors realized the effectiveness of this mechanism for influencing the revolutionary movement: articles-predictions on possible actions, based on socioeconomic data, were followed (once the movement had started) by directive articles which contained specific recommendations related to the ways, means and methods of struggle and, finally, reports on the movement itself with a detailed study of all its positive and negative aspects and conclusions for the future. The newspaper immediately established itself as a major political power. When the first postreform peasant uprising broke out in Poltava and Kharkov guberniyas in the spring of 1902, as ISKRA had predicted a year earlier, the newspaper's reputation became extremely high.

A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and agitator but a collective organizer. In this respect, Lenin compared it to "the scaffold of a building under construction" (op. cit., vol 5, p 11).

In its most general aspect, the organization Lenin directed for the delivery and distribution of the newspaper was the result of the development of two parallel processes. On the one hand, the number of groups cooperating with ISKRA was increasing; on the other, its agents were becoming more specialized and assuming specific functions in the comprehensive activities of serving

the newspaper. This led to the development of an interdependence among specialized ISKRA groups which, in turn, required coordination and centralization which was a task for an overall management and made the establishment of a respective organ necessary.

The basic elements and general outline of the organization which Lenin named the Russian Socialist Mail were already organized by the autumn of 1901. Its foreign section consisted of groups of cooperation with ISKRA, transshipment publication centers ("stations") and repositories near the border. The Russian part consisted of transportation groups, main repositories (at the border) and distribution (regional) repositories and clandestine presses in Kishinev and Baku. The terminal of the Russian Socialist Mail was the ISKRA cooperation groups, from where the publications were sent to the local social democratic organizations, thus reaching their main addressees--the workers.

The heavy blows of the tsarist security organs fell on ISKRA at the beginning of 1902. The rout seemed to be total. However, it was impossible to crush an organization which relied on the revolutionary class. In January of 1902 a conference (congress) of ISKRA agents took place in Samara, which laid the beginning of the Russian ISKRA organization. The principle of centralism was consistently applied in its organization. It was headed by a bureau, the prototype of the future party central committee. The management of the transportation process was centralized: in Russia the transport bureau coordinated all work related to the delivery and shipment of publications, while the transport group operated abroad. The Russian Socialist Mail became an autonomous section of the Russian ISKRA organization. The position of ISKRA as a separate social democratic group was approaching its end. "Economism" was clearly losing in the competition with ISKRA. The reputation of the newspaper rose immeasurably among the workers. The local RSDWP committees began to establish direct contacts with the ISKRA editors and organization. Conditions were developing for merging the ISKRA organization with the committees and groups within Russia within a single organization, based on ISKRA principles. Such were the circumstances under which the dissemination of the book "What Is To Be Done?" was started in Russia.

Lenin described his work as a summary of ISKRA tactics and ISKRA organizational policy. "Precisely 'summary,' no more and no less," he emphasized and even indicated the specific time segment of ISKRA activities he had in mind: 1901 and 1902 (op. cit., vol 16, p 101). Therefore, the ideas developed in the book were based on the Russian experience and provided clear answers to "the most sensitive problems of our movement," which was the subtitle Lenin gave his book. At the same time, "What Is To Be Done?" turned a new page in the history of Marxism also because it dealt with problems which had been insufficiently worked out in Marxist literature of the turn of the 20th century and because all problems related to the development of the revolutionary process were formulated in terms of the new historical age.

In the mid-19th century, during the second round of the bourgeois revolutions in Europe, the founders of Marxism were particularly concerned with the problem of the anticipation of political compared to economic processes. "The worst thing which could face the leader of an extreme party," Engels wrote in

1850, "is the forced need to have power at a time when the movement has not become sufficiently mature for the domination of the class it represents and for implementation of measures which would ensure such domination. What such a leader can do depends not on his will but on the level reached by the contradictions between the different classes and the extent of development of material living conditions and the correlation between production and exchange, which always determine the level of development of class contradictions" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 7, pp 422-423). Marx and Engels warned of the danger of premature seizure of power and concentrated on proving the objectively determined breakdown of the capitalist production method. Naturally, it does not follow from this at all that they underestimated the role and significance of political and ideological factors in social life. Some of their followers, however, underestimated them. With this in mind, Engels pointed out in 1890 that "Marx and, partially, I, are guilty of the fact that the young people sometimes ascribe greater importance to the economic side than they should. In refuting our opponents, we have had to emphasize the main principle which they rejected and did not always find the necessary time, place and opportunity to treat suitably the remaining aspects of this interaction" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 37, p 396).

By the turn of the 20th century, when the material prerequisites for a victorious revolution had sufficiently matured, inattention to political factors in the development of the revolutionary process and to problems of theory, tactics and organization of the vanguard of the revolutionary class bordered a refusal to prepare the masses for revolution and a rejection of the revolution itself. In Russia the revolution was at the threshold. In the book "What Is To Be Done?," Lenin's concept of the revolutionary process in Russia had been developed to the level of a theory of bourgeois-democratic revolution of a new type, a popular revolution in the imperialist age, which included concepts on the nature of the revolution, its motive forces, development prospects and role of the party in organizing the struggle of the masses. As such, Lenin's book was the base for the draft RSDWP program and its substantiation, drafted by the ISKRA editors.

The draft pointed out that in Russia "capitalism had already become the dominant production method," i.e., that material prerequisites existed for independent proletarian action. It also stated that "everywhere in the country we find vestiges of our old precapitalist social system," which "prevent the comprehensive development of the class struggle of the proletariat and contribute to the preservation and consolidation of the most barbaric forms of exploitation of the multimillion-strong peasantry" and "kept the entire people in a state of darkness and rightlessness;" this meant the existence of prerequisites for mass democratic actions against the entire socioeconomic system. The basic demands of the exploited masses, formulated in the draft program, also singled out the social forces the joint actions of which would ensure the victory of the revolution. They were the proletariat, the peasantry and the people's masses of the oppressed nationalities.

Proceeding from the concept that a socialist revolution can win only when the proletariat becomes the majority of the nation and, consequently, suppressing the opposition of the exploiters will become unnecessary, the leaders of the

Western European social democratic movements excluded from their party programs the concept of proletarian dictatorship. It was included in ISKRA's draft program on V. I. Lenin's insistence. It indicated a means for the victory of the socialist revolution which was essentially new compared to the concepts of the leaders of the Second International, and broadened the meaning of proletarian dictatorship: in addition to suppressing the opposition of the exploiting classes, after seizing the political power the proletariat was to unite and lead the broad nonproletarian toiling masses. In that case the dictatorship of the proletariat would become the direct extension of its hegemony during the bourgeois-democratic stage of the struggle. In this manner, the draft RSDWP program included the most important stipulations of Lenin's theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of a new type and the related way to socialism through the comprehensive strengthening of the alliance between the working class and the toiling masses of town and country.

The leading position of ISKRA in the Russian social democratic movement was becoming increasingly obvious to the members of the local committees. The struggle waged by ISKRA for influence within the party was entering a new stage. It was expressed in the directive which Lenin issued in May 1902 to ISKRA's agents in Russia, "... to join the committees" (op. cit., vol 46, p 186).

The conversion of ISKRA from a "separate" social democratic group to the ideological and organizational center of the Russian revolutionary social democratic movement was the result of the acceptance by the local RSDWP committees of ISKRA as their leading organ and their merger with the ISKRA organization. The conversion of the local committees to the side of ISKRA was paralleled by their official, i.e., written break with the system of the "economists'" theoretical concepts. Organizationally, it was manifested in abolishing the division of party committees between intelligentsia and workers and the inclusion of local committees in general party work. At the same time, in the local areas similar organizations were actively uniting and separating from hostile trends in the unified organizations. In order to help the local organizations, the party assigned to them members of the editorial board and the ISKRA organization. The ISKRA agents were assigned to become members of the largest organizations. This brought about major changes in the structure of the Russian ISKRA organization itself. The groups of cooperation with ISKRA were gradually winding up their activities as their functions were being taken over by the RSDWP committees. Another aspect of the change was the drastic curtailment or virtual disappearance of the autonomy, i.e., the independence of the ISKRA agents from the local committees. This process as well led to the implementation of yet another idea of Lenin's plan for the party's structure: professional revolutionaries became the heads of RSDWP committees. "Generally speaking, we can already consider the victory of the ISKRA trend unquestionable," N. K. Krupskaya reported to Russia in December 1902. "We have at least 15 ISKRA committees, with the balance being half ISKRA supporters...."

The victory of the ISKRA trend put an end to the publication of ~~RABOCHYE~~ ~~DELO~~, the main organ of the "economists." The conversion of the local RSDWP committees affected the nature of the labor movement as well. A further

enrichment of the forms of struggle waged by the workers took place in the course of the noted Rostov events (November 1902): the citywide strike was paralleled by mass political demonstrations and meetings attended by thousands of people, in which members of a great variety of social groups took part side by side with the workers. From strikes at individual enterprises the Russian proletariat converted to actions on the scale of large industrial centers.

The factual unity of the party was created. The necessary conditions and prerequisites for convening a partywide congress appeared.

The Second Congress, which took place in the summer of 1903, completed the tremendous amount of work done by ISKRA under Lenin's leadership. The congress found a truly Marxist party of the Russian proletariat on the basis of the ideological and organizational principles formulated and implemented by ISKRA. The work of the congress coincided in time with a general strike in the southern part of Russia, after which the wave of a powerful national movement gained momentum against the Russifying policy of tsarism spread in the Transcaucasus. The eve of the first popular revolution in the imperialist age was taking shape in the broad movement of the masses.

ISKRA immediately proclaimed the great importance which the active policy of the conscious vanguard of the class had to the fate of the revolutionary movement and proved this through all of its activities. The study of the correlation among the various aspects of this complex process in which Lenin's ISKRA participated proves that the turning points in its history anticipated the turning points in the history of the RSDWP and the workers movement and acted as conditions, as prerequisites for such crucial times.

The effectiveness of the ISKRA line was based on its consistency with the objective tasks facing the country and the Russian Marxists. Both were the result of Lenin's extensive studies of Russia's economic system and were refined through observations of the real actions of the various classes and social groups within Russian society. In Lenin's hands ISKRA became both a tool for such research and a means for expressing its results, used both in the political education of the Russian proletariat and as a manual in its struggle. The specific forms of action recommended by ISKRA proved to be the most efficient and enhanced the entire movement. This circumstance, in turn, explained the unquestionable support which the Russian proletariat gave ISKRA, the rapid development of ISKRA organizations and the conversion of local party committees over to ISKRA's side.

Equally related to this consistency were the methods through which ISKRA carried out its assignments and met its objectives, consistent with democratic principles to the extent to which this was possible under Russian conditions at the turn of the century. Justly assuming that revolutionary practice itself would testify in its favor, ISKRA refused to impose its line and positions to the Russian Marxists and the movement as a whole. It also refused to create "in advance" (the editors' term) an organization of professional revolutionaries. Nevertheless, the entire history of the ISKRA organization, with its unrestrainable expansion and growth of centripetal trends unquestionably proves that it was not something artificially introduced into the

revolutionary movement through the efforts of a narrow group of conspirators. Considering the specific forms dictated by Russia's circumstances at the turn of the century, its centralism was developed in the course of joint revolutionary work, voluntarily accepted by the members of the collective of ISKRA agents as the most expedient form of organization of professional revolutionaries which they developed as the overall result of their joint activities. ISKRA was able to find the proper combination of centralism with respect for democratic principles maximally possible under clandestine conditions, needed by the party for purposes of revolutionary action.

Qualitative changes took place under ISKRA's influence in the Russian labor movement. They were expressed in a shift from economic to political struggle. The country's working class broadened the forms of its struggle, directly affecting all social strata. It formulated, tested and consolidated the means for achieving and applying its hegemony in the revolutionary process. At the same time, ISKRA helped to define and to point to the progressive workers the revolutionary opportunities of the other social strata and forces awakening to the struggle, above all the peasantry in the central and national outlying areas of the Russian empire.

It was thus that, directly combining tremendous theoretical work based on the study of revolutionary practice with leadership of the struggle waged by the masses, Lenin discovered a new type of revolutionary-liberation movement characteristic of the new historical age. It was new in terms of the composition of the forces involved in the common struggle against tsarism, for it was characterized by the blending within a single revolutionary stream the class struggle of the politically autonomous proletariat, the agrarian peasant revolution and the national liberation movement. It was new from the viewpoint of the guiding force of this revolutionary current: it was the proletariat that now had the hegemony in the struggle. It was also new in terms of prospects, for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution was merely the initial proletarian objective. It was also new because it was taught, organized and inspired by the proletarian party of a new type created by ISKRA and Lenin.

These concepts became an important stage in the development of Lenin's doctrine on the bourgeois-democratic revolution of a new type. They concretized the concepts formulated in Lenin's initial works on the unbreakable tie between socialist and democratic tasks in the Russian liberation movement. In subsequent years, based on the doctrine of the new type of bourgeois-democratic revolutions characteristic of the new historical age, Lenin took decisive steps in developing the theory of the proletarian revolution. He reached the conclusion that socialism could win initially in a few countries or in a single country and comprehensively substantiated the concept of combining the struggle for democracy with the struggle for a socialist revolution, emphasizing the need to subordinate the former to the latter (see op. cit., vol 49, p 347). The theory of the new type of democratic revolutions, formulated on the basis of the ISKRA principles, was to become a structural component of Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution.

ISKRA was the ideological and organizational center of a revolutionary-liberation movement of a new type. At the turn of the 20th century Russia

had become a global revolutionary center, which was essentially different from the revolutionary centers which had existed in Europe during the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. Those were headed by the bourgeoisie. In Russia the liberation struggle was led by the proletariat. The main trend in the development of the bourgeois antifeudal coalition was narrowing the social base and turning the bourgeoisie into a counterrevolutionary force; the proletarian actions led to the involvement of the multimillion-strong toiling masses in the struggle. When the bourgeoisie began to oppose the dissemination of the revolutionary-liberation movement in neighboring countries and territories, it also entered the international arena as a counterrevolutionary force. Conversely, the proletariat immediately proved itself a revolutionary force. It became the most consistent fighter against any type of oppression anywhere on earth. The process of shifting the revolutionary center ended. Its growing impact on the development of revolutionary processes the world over began.

The new type of revolutionary liberation movement which appeared in Russia at the time of ISKRA was the prototype of the contemporary revolutionary process. It was a prototype because the main content of the contemporary strategic stage in the development of the global revolutionary movement is the struggle against the capitalist system and the transition from capitalism to socialism. This stage was inaugurated with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. However, the establishment of a new type of revolutionary movement and, consequently, the growth of the international worker and liberation movements within a single contemporary revolutionary process began before that victory, when capitalism entered its imperialist stage as recorded by ISKRA.

That is why, despite the tremendous changes which have taken place in the world, as identified by Lenin's ISKRA 80 years ago, the structure and nature of the liberation movement in Russia, on the one hand, and the contemporary revolutionary process, on the other, are essentially identical. Its basic elements are the labor movement, the peasant agrarian revolution and the national liberation struggle waged by the oppressed peoples, and its leading force is the global socialist system created by the proletariat. The objectives, ways and means of development expressed the global communist movement most fully and consistently.

... In the spring of 1917, on the request of the workers and soldiers of revolutionary Petrograd, N. K. Krupskaya wrote a short biography of V. I. Lenin. Entitled "A Small Page From the Party's History," it was immediately published by several newspapers and soon afterwards printed as a pamphlet which Lenin edited.

"No need to discuss the importance of ISKRA," N. K. Krupskaya wrote. "ISKRA created the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party," Lenin said, in an extremely brief assessment of ISKRA's historical accomplishment.

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There were 26 social democratic organizations represented at the congress: Baku, Batumi, Don, Yekaterinoslav, Kiev, Moscow, Nikolayev, Odessa, Petersburg, Saratov, Tiflis, Tula, Ufa and Kharkov committees, the Crimean Alliance, the Petersburg "Workers Organization," the "Northern Workers Alliance," the Siberian Alliance, the Alliance of Mining Workers, the Bundt, the "Liberation of Labor" group, the ISKRA Russian organization, the "League of Russian Revolutionary Social Democrats Abroad," the "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats Abroad," the Bundt Committee Abroad, and the "Southern Worker" group. The delegate representing the Nizhegorod Committee was arrested at the border and was unable to attend the congress.

The right to participate in the congress was granted to organizations which had engaged in active revolutionary work for no less than 1 year. This was the reason for which the Voronezh, Kishinev, Poltava and other committees, which had developed or resumed their activities only by the end of 1902 or in 1903, had not been invited.

The congress was attended by 43 delegates with 51 votes. Each organization was granted two votes regardless of the number of delegates it had sent to the congress, whether two or one. Twenty-three social democratic organizations had two members; the Bundt had three and two Petersburg organizations, one each.

The congress was also attended by 14 people with advisory votes, including two representatives of the social democrats of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPL)--A. Varskiy and Ya. Ganetskiy--who had come to discuss the unification of their party with the RSDWP.

Most of the delegates were young. Lenin himself was 33 years old. The senior generation was represented by the "Liberation of Labor" group: G. V. Plekhanov, P.B. Aksel'rod, V. I. Zasulich and L. G. Deych, as well as L. M. Knipovich, a former populist and, subsequently, a social democrat. The composition of the delegates proved that in the period after the First RSDWP Congress, thanks to ISKRA the social democratic movement in Russia had grown considerably and strengthened.

In terms of ideological convictions, however, the congress was not homogeneous. The delegates represented the various ideological trends which existed at that time in social democratic ranks. Along with Marxists and consistent revolutionaries, there were representatives of opposition views who had not broken off with "economism," and individuals who defended narrow interests to the detriment of the partywide ones. They included the delegates representing the Bundt, the "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats Abroad," and the representative of the Petersburg "Workers Organization." Lenin was to describe them later as "great opportunists." They had no more than eight votes (five Bundt and three "economists").

Although verbally the representatives of the "Southern Worker" group and other affiliated committees accepted the trend set by ISKRA, in fact they were not always consistent. They were hesitant and unstable. In the congress they acted as centrists. They had 10 votes. Lenin described them as "the swamp."

Given those circumstances, the proletariat alone could act as the hegemonistic force of the revolution and the leader of all forces opposing autocracy. The class of the industrial proletariat, relatively young in Russia, was rapidly expanding. The almost 3 million-strong worker army was the best organized and united social force. A considerable percentage of working people were employed at large industrial enterprises numbering more than 1,000 workers. Decades of strikes had tempered the leading workers who were rapidly developing and aspiring to knowledge and Marxism. Sormovo, Saratov, Lugansk, Rostov-na-Donu, Baku, Tiflis, Riga and others were the new centers of the proletarian movement, along with Petersburg, Moscow and the central industrial area.

In 1902, in his book "What Is To Be Done?," Lenin wrote: "History **now presents** us with the immediate task which is the most revolutionary of all immediate tasks of the proletariat of any country. Its implementation, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark not only of the European but also (we are now able to say) Asian reaction would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of the international revolutionary proletariat" (op. cit., vol 6, p 28).

In order successfully to implement its hegemonistic role in the forthcoming revolutionary struggle, the Russian proletariat needed a militant, a revolutionary party. As a consistent Marxist and a revolutionary and philosopher of the new stage, Lenin realized this better than anyone of his contemporaries.

Lenin arrived in Petersburg in 1893 and plunged into the thick of the revolutionary struggle. It was here that he met with the leading representatives of the working class, such as I. V. Babushkin, V. A. Shelgunov, B. I. Zinov'yev and others, and soon afterwards became the soul of the Marxist circles in the capital. The Petersburg "Alliance for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class," which became the embryo of our party, for it was the first in Russia to combine socialism with the labor movement, was created under Lenin's guidance.

After the "Alliance for the Struggle" was routed by the tsarist government and Lenin and his fellow workers were exiled to Siberia, for a while the revolutionary movement remained beheaded and its leadership was assumed by immature people.

The First Congress, which was held in March 1898, in the absence of Lenin and his fellow workers, proclaimed the founding of the Russian Social Democratic Worker Party. In itself, this was of great historical importance. However, at that point the congress was unable to found the party. No ideological unity existed among the delegates to the congress or the organizations they represented. The congress was unable to draft and adopt a program and bylaws for the RSDWP. The ideological and organizational disorder in social democratic ranks strengthened the power of the so-called "economists" within the movement, who believed in the spontaneous nature of the revolutionary struggle waged by the proletariat and amateurism in organizational matters. The Russian social democratic movement was experiencing a protracted crisis.

Lenin tirelessly thought about the party while in Siberian exile. It was there that he wrote his famous works "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," "The Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats," and others. In these works, based on his study of Russian socioeconomic conditions and development characteristics, he theoretically substantiated the revolutionary path of the working class and formulated the ideological foundations of the Marxist party. After reading the book by E. Bernstein "Prerequisites for Socialism and the Tasks of the Social Democrats," published in Germany, in which Bernstein openly favored a revision of basic Marxist concepts, Lenin became indignant by its theoretical groundlessness and political lack of principles. He immediately saw the similarity between the views of the Russian "economists" and Bernstein's. His "Protest of the Russian Social Democrats," directed against the "Credo" of this "economists" manifesto, was a decisive and most convincing rebuttal of Marxist revisionism and an exposure of attempts to turn the young social democratic movement in Russia away from its proper way which led to the founding of an independent proletarian political party.

While in exile, Lenin comprehensively developed and discussed with his comrades a plan for the creation of a party by organizing the publication of an all-Russian political newspaper. He brilliantly implemented this idea after his exile, by organizing the publication of the newspaper ISKRA abroad.

An expanded and profoundly scientific plan for organizing a party of proletarian revolutionaries, summing up the ISKRA experience in the unification of the social democratic organizations, was offered by Lenin in his book "What Is To Be Done?" This work, relevant to this day as the cornerstone of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the party, played the main role in the ideological and political preparations for the congress, the purpose of which was to rally the Russian social democratic organizations on a truly Marxist platform and to put an end to the discord and confusion within their ranks. The basic thought which runs through the book--the need to create a truly revolutionary proletarian party, a party of the social revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, headed by a progressive theory and a party decisively fighting against opportunism and any veneration of spontaneity--was firmly defended by Lenin and his fellow workers in the preparations for and proceedings of the Second Congress and became the flesh and blood of bolshevism.

The holding of the Second Congress was preceded by a tremendous amount of work done by Lenin and the ISKRA social democrats, the formation of an organizational committee, the drafting of the party bylaws by Lenin and the publication in ISKRA and in separate leaflets in Russia of the "Notification of the Founding of an 'Organizational Committee'" and the holding of a number of conferences and meetings in Russia and abroad.

The Second RSDWP Congress opened on 17 (30) July 1903 and concluded its work on 10 (23) August 1903. It was the longest congress in our party's history. It held 37 meetings. The first 13 were held in Brussels in an abandoned warehouse, after which the delegates had to leave Belgium because of police persecution. The delegates moved to Great Britain and the next 24 sessions were held in London, in premises borrowed from different labor organizations.

CONGRESS THAT COMPLETED THE FOUNDING OF THE PARTY

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83) pp 45-55

[Article by A. Solov'yev]

[Text] The CPSU has a long and glorious history. From small Marxist circles operating in clandestinity it has grown to a multimillion-strong ruling party of the first socialist country. It played a decisive role in the historical destinies of our homeland and had a tremendous impact on global development. Under its tried leadership the peoples of the Soviet Union rose from backwardness, ignorance and rightlessness to the peak of civilization and progress.

The Second RSDWP Congress, which was held 80 years ago, plays a particular role in the history of the CPSU and the global liberation movement. It completed the process of unification of scattered Marxist organizations within a revolutionary party of the Russian working class. A bolshevik party, a proletarian party of a new type appeared and started its activities on the basis of the ideological-political and organizational principles formulated by V. I. Lenin. "Bolshevism," Lenin noted in 1920 in his book **"Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder,"** "exists as a current of political thinking and as a political party since 1903" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 6).

The Bolshevik Party, headed by Lenin, was born in Russia 20 years after the death of Karl Marx, the founder of scientific communism. It was a party which was able to implement the doctrine of the proletarian socialist revolution and the building of a new society.

The contradictions within Russia's social development during the last quarter of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries took it to the front end of the revolutionary struggle. The country was on the eve of a bourgeois revolution the purpose of which was to clear the way for the development of capitalism and liberate it from feudal-serfdom vestiges and encrustations. The objective conditions of the growing revolution were characterized by the fact that the Russian bourgeoisie was not acting as the type of decisive revolutionary force which had marked earlier bourgeois revolutions in the Western European countries. Sensing the growing advance of the proletariat, it tended to conspire with the autocracy and to use the tsarist police system to restrain the working class.

The ISKRA supporters had 33 votes but only 24 were those of Lenin's supporters--consistent "firm" ISKRA people. They included N. E. Bauman, L. S. Vilenskiy, V. F. Galkin, S. I. Gusev, R. S. Zemlyachka, A. G. Zurabov, L. M. Knipovich, B. M. Knunyants, P. A. Krasikov, M. N. Lyadov, L. D. Makhlin, G. M. Mishenev, I. K. Nikitin, G. V. Plekhanov, S. I. Stepanov, A. M. Stopani, D. A. Topuridze, D. I. Ul'yanov and A. V. Shotman. Martov's supporters had nine votes. These were the ISKRA minority described by Lenin as the "soft" ISKRA people or the "petty opportunists."

Such was the rather heterogeneous composition of delegates, which determined the heated debates on most items on the agenda.

Plekhanov was elected congress chairman, while Lenin and Krasikov were elected deputy chairmen.

Due to the fact that the Bundt claimed the exclusive right to represent the interests of the Jewish proletariat, the congress was forced above all to consider the question of the Bundt's place in the party. The Bundt's demand of establishing relations with the RSDWP on a federated basis was rejected by a vote of 46 to 5.

The next item taken up by the congress was that of the party program. It was based on a draft written by the ISKRA editors. Lenin made significant basic changes to the initial text of the draft written by Plekhanov. The result was a document drafted in a strictly bolshevik spirit. The program was discussed over nine congress sessions. Virtually all delegates spoke. Each item in the program was considered separately. Stipulations on developing a socialist awareness in the labor movement and the leading role of the party of the working class triggered sharp disputes and attacks on the part of the opportunists. Akimov and Martynov, the "worker operators," openly stated that their purpose was to change the nature of the program and bring it closer to the programmatic documents of the European social democrats. They spoke out particularly sharply against the need for a dictatorship of the proletariat, taking with them the unstable and hesitant delegates.

In exposing the opponents of ISKRA's draft party program, Lenin pointed out the direct connection between their views and those of the revisionists. The congress confidently adopted Lenin's viewpoint. As a result, the thesis of proletarian dictatorship was clearly formulated in the RSDWP program, for the first time after the programmatic documents of Marx and Engels.

Discussions of the party program covered the question of the absolute value of democratic principles--freedom of speech and assembly, universal voting rights, and so on. The congressional majority rejected the abstract interpretation of democratic rights and freedoms as an absolute value always and under all circumstances. They spoke out in favor of acknowledging the dependence of democratic principles on specific historical conditions for their exercise. The ISKRA supporters accurately pointed out that a democratic principle should be assessed from the viewpoint of socialist interests. "The bourgeoisie in the Italian republics," Plekhanov said at the congress, "used to deprive of political rights members of the nobility. The revolutionary

proletariat could restrict the political rights of the upper classes the way the upper classes once restricted the proletariat's political rights."

Lenin highly valued Plekhanov's speech. When K. Kautsky said in 1918 that the bolsheviks in Russia had improperly deprived the bourgeoisie of political rights, in his book "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," Lenin pointed out that the Marxists had never raised to an absolute level so-called "pure" democracy and referred to Plekhanov's 1903 speech at the Second RSDWP Congress (see op. cit., vol 37, pp 290-291).

To this day the bourgeoisie is substantially restricting the rights of the working class, ignoring the most vital interests and needs of the working people and depriving them of work and means of existence. At the same time, the bourgeois ideologues keep hypocritically shouting about alleged violations of human rights in the socialist countries. The myth of the "American dream" and of an "equal opportunity society," in which the banker and the unemployed allegedly enjoy the same opportunities, and malicious slanders of socialism are used to this day by the bourgeois to mislead their people and to conceal the truth about the socialist countries.

Eighty years ago our party rejected the interpretation of democracy as a non-class category of allegedly universal value. The party has remained true to this approach to this day, when the state of dictatorship of the proletariat in our country has grown into a state of the whole people. "Soviet democracy, which encountered the particularly fierce opposition of counter-revolutionary forces, domestic and foreign," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary pointed out, "entered life honestly, not concealing its class nature and not shying at legitimizing the privileges of the working people compared with those of representatives of the exploiting classes fighting the new system."

Sharp debates developed at the congress in the course of discussions of the agrarian part of the program authored by Lenin. This part contained demands the implementation of which was to rescue the peasantry from landed estate slavery, sweep off the vestiges of serfdom and provide conditions for the free development of the class struggle in the countryside. The implementation of these demands would have strengthened the alliance between workers and peasants in the struggle against autocracy and land owners.

The representatives of the Bundt, the "economists" and the centrists unanimously opposed the agrarian part of the party program. Citing various pretexts they rejected items in the agrarian part of the program, thus manifesting their mistrust of the revolutionary ability of the peasants, on the one hand, and their mistrust in the strength of the proletariat and its party and the possibility of the working class to lead the peasantry, on the other. The ISKRA supporters were able to defeat the arguments of the opponents and to defend the agrarian part of the party program, which was accepted by a majority of 38 votes for and 9 against.

A proper solution of the national problem in the party program was of the greatest importance to a multinational country such as Russia. The draft

program called for the full equality of all citizens regardless of nationality and acknowledged the right to self-determination for all nations within Russia. Self-determination meant the unquestionable right of each nation to secede and form an independent country. This demand was absolutely necessary. It ensured the international unity among workers of all nationalities. The program also stipulated that workers must unite within single class organizations regardless of nationality.

Within the program commission the stipulation of the right of nations to self-determination, including secession, met with the opposition of the representatives of the kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. They misinterpreted this item, assuming that it would require the mandatory secession of each nation from Russia. Since the Polish revolutionaries and the Polish proletariat justifiably believed that a guarantee for Polish freedom lay in a fraternal union of the Polish with the Russian proletariat, they were unwilling to secede from revolutionary Russia and considered this item unacceptable to the SDKPL. A. Varskiy and Ya. Ganetskiy walked out of the congress, leaving a statement claiming that the item on the right of nations to self-determination "had been changed in a sense which allowed no interpretations in favor of a nationalistic trend."

The item on the right of nations to self-determination, which was passed by the Congress, was scientifically substantiated and was of great importance in uniting the working people of all Russian nationalities around the Russian proletariat and its party.

With Plekhanov's support, Lenin and his supporters were able to defend all the most important essential parts and stipulations of the program. As a result, the party program was adopted as a whole unanimously, with a single abstention.

The program adopted by the Congress consisted of a minimum program according to which the immediate party tasks were to start a bourgeois-democratic revolution, to overthrow tsarism in Russia, to establish a democratic republic and an 8-hour workday, to ensure full equality among nations, including the right to self-determination, and the elimination of the vestiges of serfdom in the countryside; it also included a program-maximum according to which the party's main objective was the victory of the socialist revolution, the establishment of proletarian dictatorship and the building of a new socialist society in the country.

This was a truly Marxist program of the revolutionary party of the struggling proletariat. The party was legitimately proud of its program, for it was not only a manifestation of its loyalty to Marxism but a result of the theoretical work done by Lenin and the other Russian Marxists. Both the minimum and maximum programs were implemented by the proletariat and its allies after three Russian revolutions, under the leadership of the Leninist party. The stipulations contained in the party program, daringly proclaimed and scientifically substantiated by Lenin and his fellow workers at the Second RSDWP Congress, were implemented in full.

After the program, the Congress discussed the party bylaws, the purpose of which was to supplement ideological unity on programmatic problems with organizational principles which would ensure party cohesion. The draft bylaws, which were written by Lenin, called for holding congresses based on full representation of all party organizations, collective leadership, discussion of problems and decisionmaking based on a simple majority and centralism, strict discipline and subordination of lower to superior organizations, and autonomy of local organizations in dealing with local matters. Bearing in mind that the party was forced to work clandestinely, the draft bylaws stipulated the establishment of two leading centers: the editorial board of ISKRA, the party's central organ, published abroad, and the party's Central Committee in charge of the practical management of the activities of party organizations within the country.

The first item in the bylaws, which listed party membership conditions, was a subject of extensive and sharp debates. Lenin's draft bylaws stipulated that "anyone who accepts the party program and supports the party materially and through personal participation in a party organization is considered a party member." This definition demanded of every party member strict discipline and, on the part of the party organization, control over each one of its members. It hindered access to the party of unstable and hesitating elements tending toward individualism and lack of discipline.

Martov's formulation was different: instead of mandatory registration of a party member with a party organization, it required no more than individual assistance to the party. As became clear in the course of the debates, this acknowledged, on the one hand, that secondary-school students, not to mention teachers, did not have to work within a local party organization; on the other, it proclaimed that it would be a good thing if every striker could consider himself a party member.

"It is better for 10 working people not to describe themselves as party members (true working people do not pursue titles!)," Lenin objected, "than for even a single loafer to have the right and the opportunity to become a party member.... Our task is to secure the firmness, consistency and purity of our party. We must try to enhance the title and significance of party membership higher, higher and higher...." (op. cit., vol 7, pp 290-291).

All opportunists opposed Lenin's formulation which protected the high title of party member. Martov's formulation was adopted with some amendments with 28 votes for, 22 against and one abstention. This defeat did not demoralize Lenin's supporters. In pursuing their struggle for the purity of the party's organizational principles, they defended all the other stipulations of Lenin's draft bylaws. As a whole, the RSDWP bylaws were passed with 42 votes for, 6 against and 1 abstention.

With the adoption of the bylaws the Congress completed the transition from amateurism and cliquishness to the establishment of an all-Russian party organization characterized by unity, centralization and a streamlined organizational system. In accordance with the bylaws the Congress decided to disband all organizations which did not fit its organizational framework. At

the congress itself, the "Liberation of Labor" and the Russian ISKRA organization self-disbanded. The members of the "Southern Worker" and "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats Abroad" groups continued to insist on leading an independent life. They were disbanded by the Congress. The "Southern Worker" group obeyed the Congress while the representatives of the "Alliance" demonstratively left the Congress after acknowledging the "League of the Russian Revolutionary Social Democrats Abroad" as the only party organization abroad. The Congress rejected the Bundt bylaws as conflicting with those of the RSDWP, after which the Bundt delegation proclaimed that the Bundt was withdrawing from the RSDWP and withdrew from the congress.

The resolutions of the Second Congress on tactical problems, passed at the final, 37th session, were closely related to the program and bylaws. They included resolutions on the attitude toward liberals, socialists-revolutionaries, demonstrations, trade union struggle, attitude toward students, organization of propaganda, and others.

In its resolution "On the Central Party Organ," the Congress acknowledged the merits of ISKRA in the ideological unification, development and support of the principles of the revolutionary social democrats and proclaimed it the central organ of the RSDWP.

In the resolution "On the Local Organizations," the Congress deemed necessary the existence of a single leading organization in each center of party activity.

The elections for leading party organs took place at the final sessions. After the representatives of the Bundt and the "Alliance of Russian Social Democrats Abroad" had withdrawn, the ratio of forces changed in favor of Lenin's supporters, the "firm" ISKRA people. For that reason the motion of the Martov supporters to elect to the ISKRA editorial board the previous six editors and the Central Committee membership they suggested were defeated. On Lenin's motion Lenin, Plekhanov and Martov were elected ISKRA editors while Krzhizhanovskiy, Lengnik and Noskov were elected Central Committee members. In accordance with the bylaws, the editors of the central organ and the Central Committee constituted the Party Council, operating on a parity basis. A council member in charge of convening the council was appointed directly at the Congress. It was Plekhanov.

The elections for the party's central institutions consolidated the victory of the Leninist revolutionary line. It was as of then that Lenin's supporters, who were in the majority in the election of leading party organs, were given the name bolsheviks, while Martov's minority supporters were described as mensheviks. It was at the Second RSDWP Congress that the party was divided into bolsheviks and mensheviks. This division was the outcome of the struggle waged between the revolutionary (bolshevik) and the opportunist (menshevik) wings on the type of party to be founded: a truly revolutionary Marxist party of a new type or a reformist party similar to a number of social democratic parties in Western Europe.

The lessons of history proved that in the new age, as Lenin pointed out, one had to "march forth fearlessly, away from the preparatory, legal organizations of the working class, trapped by opportunism, toward revolutionary organizations of the proletariat, which were able not to limit themselves to legalities and were able to protect themselves from opportunistic betrayal, proletarian organizations which were joining the 'struggle for power,' and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie" (op. cit., vol 26, pp 255-256).

Lenin's organizational principles became our party's law of life. Lenin irrefutably proved that the party is the leading organized detachment of the working class, based on the principles of democratic centralism, supporting strict and uniform party discipline, always concerned with the purity of its ranks, unafraid of criticizing its own errors and developing the activeness and autonomous actions of the party masses on the basis of intraparty democracy. The party is the supreme form of the class organization of the proletariat, called upon to lead all other proletarian organizations and tirelessly strengthen its ties with the masses.

Lenin's activities were of exceptional importance in the preparations for the congress and the proceedings of the Second RSDWP Congress. At the congress itself Lenin played a very active, one could say leading, role. He was elected member of the Bureau (Presidium) of the Congress and a member of the mandate, program and statute commissions; he submitted a report on the party bylaws and speeches in the course of the discussions of the program, on tactical problems, and so on. The minutes include more than 100 of his addresses, replicas and remarks. His excellent knowledge of theory and the situation within the party, clear understanding of the targets and tasks of the movement, impeccable logic and convincing arguments focused the attention of the representatives of local committees on Lenin. His amazing simplicity in turning to his comrades and his ability to dedicate himself entirely to the work, regardless of the amount of time spent or the "private" interests and his principle-mindedness helped Lenin stand out among the other delegates and participants in the congress. Vladimir Il'ich himself plunged into the work. He was cheerful and purposeful. His spirit was high and confident. In his book "One Step Forward and Two Steps Backward," in which he analyzed the work of the Second RSDWP Congress, Lenin described his personal impressions as follows: "I cannot fail to remember...a conversation I had with one of the 'centrist' delegates." "What a depressing atmosphere is weighing on this congress!" he complained. "What a fierce struggle, agitation of one person against another, sharp polemics and uncomradely attitudes!..." "What a splendid thing our Congress is!" I answered. "An open and free struggle. Views are being expressed. Shades are becoming clear. Groups are appearing. Hands are raised. Decisions are passed. Stages are covered. Forward! This is what I understand. This is life. These are not endless and boring intellectual arguments which end not because the people have resolved the problem but simply because they are tired of speaking...."

"The comrade from the 'center' looked at me puzzled and shrugged his shoulders. We were speaking in different languages" (op. cit., vol 8, p 333).

This is quite an expressive description of the state of mind of a true leader, a fighter, a person who can lead his fellow workers!

A large number of Lenin's works and documents have to do with the Second RSDWP Congress. Lenin kept the Congress's diary for the Brussels and London sessions. On the basis of these entries, soon afterwards he wrote his "Story on the Second RSDWP Congress." Finally, later, after a thorough study of the minutes, the publications and other data, he wrote his famous book "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward." We can confidently claim that no other party congress was the topic of so many of his works as the Second RSDWP Congress. In Lenin's view, this congress was one of a kind, an unparalleled phenomenon in the entire history of the Russian revolutionary movement. "For the first time we were able to reject the traditions of clannish slackness and revolutionary philistinism and bring together dozens of most different groups, which had frequently warred against each other desperately...., and to sacrifice all and any group specifics and autonomy in favor of a great entity we were creating--the party," Lenin wrote (op. cit., vol 8, p 401).

The victory of the Leninist majority at the Second RSDWP Congress was a legitimate result of the struggle which Lenin and his supporters waged before and at the congress. Although after the Second Congress the struggle between bolsheviks and mensheviks became even fiercer, the victory of bolshevism was predetermined, for the bolsheviks reflected the feelings of the progressive workers. They were theoretically prepared as Marxists to give proper answers to the questions which were raised by the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat at that stage of development. That is why the Second RSDWP Congress entered the history of our party as the congress which marked the birth of the revolutionary Marxist party in Russia.

History proved that the party of a new type, which was born in 1903--the Bolshevik Party--was the great revolutionary power which headed the struggle of the working class in our country for the victory of democracy and socialism and laid the path to democratic and socialist change the world over.

Based on the doctrine of Marx and Engels and the experience of the global and Russian labor movements, Lenin developed a clearly substantiated system of concepts on the party of a new type.

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress" states that the characteristic features and traits of the party of a new type, inherent in it since its appearance and crystallized in the course of its further development, are the following:

The party is guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and is creatively developing it, ensuring the organic unity between revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice;

It is the collective political leader of the working class, the supreme form of its organization and the vanguard of all working people; closest possible ties with the masses are the source of its inexhaustible strength;

It bases its activities on democratic centralism, tirelessly strengthening the ideological and organizational unity of its ranks and conscious discipline, and developing the activeness of party members;

It tolerates no factionalism, clannishness or manifestations of revisionism, opportunism and dogmatism;

It critically analyzes the results of its revolutionary-transforming activities and politics. It continuously studies, assesses and uses the experience gained by the international communist movement;

It systematically implements the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The communist party, which was created 80 years ago, headed and united all working people and led them to full victory over the forces of the old capitalist system and harnessed the working people in building a new socialist society. The exploiting classes were eliminated and the reasons for the exploitation of man by man were eliminated under its leadership; industrialization and collectivization were achieved within the shortest possible time and the country became a powerful state with high-level science and culture.

Despite the fact that the practical implementation of many of the programmatic stipulations involved extensive difficulties and proved to be complex and contradictory, along its historical path the party remained invariably loyal to the programmatic objectives and strove for their implementation. The struggle against Trotskyites, "left-wing" communists, "worker opposition," and right-wing and other opportunist and petty bourgeois deviations was linked to the defense of the party's programmatic objectives, aimed against capitulationism and adaptation on one side and pseudorevolutionarism, dogmatism and oversimplification, on the other.

To this day the CPSU sacredly preserves and creatively develops the great Marx-Engels-Lenin doctrine, which is the inviolable theoretical foundation for all party activities. It is concerned with maintaining monolithic unity within its ranks and wages an irreconcilable struggle against the enemies and distorters of Marxism-Leninism.

The decisions of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums, the materials related to the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, the Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress" and other party documents and the comprehensive practical activities of the CPSU confirm its loyalty to the Leninist bolshevik traditions.

The communist party's loyalty to the people earned their high respect and infinite trust. The party is the soul of the people, its acknowledged and tried vanguard. From a small cohort of revolutionaries, the CPSU has grown to a more than 18-million-strong communist party which is now heading the building of a communist society in one of the largest countries in the world. Born and developed as the party of the working class, it has now become the

party of the whole people without losing its class nature and continuing to be the party of the working class.

The building of developed socialism is the principal result of the constructive activities of the Soviet people headed by the CPSU.

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov wrote in his article "Karl Marx's Theory and Some Problems of Socialist Construction in the USSR" that "major, extensive tasks face the party and the people in the final decades of the 20th century. Combined, these tasks are reduced to what could be described as the advancement of developed socialism, in the course of which the gradual transition to communism will take place."

The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum was one of the indicative manifestations of the party's efforts into reaching these lofty objectives.

Eighty years ago, the Second RSDWP Congress paid exceptional attention to the formulation of a revolutionary party program, to instilling a socialist ideology in the working class and clarifying the importance of theoretical work. As though echoing its resolutions, the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum highly raised the importance of party ideological activities at the present stage. Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's plenum speech offers profound substantiations for the new edition of the CPSU program. It comprehensively discloses the tasks of party theoretical activities, communist upbringing and the struggle against bourgeois propaganda under conditions of unparalleled aggravation of the confrontation between socialism and imperialism. Comrade Yu. V. Andropov pointed out that in the course of the advancement of developed socialism "already today we can clearly feel the increased pace of progress, in the course of which ideological work becomes more efficient and the masses understand the party's policy better and accept it as their own, as consistent with the profound national interests."

In preserving its loyalty to the Leninist foreign policy principles, the Soviet Union is promoting the strengthening of friendship and cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries. It is giving aid and support to the revolutionary and progressive forces of our time and displaying comprehensive concern for the unification of the international communist movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

Peace is necessary for the successful building of communism. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a policy of peace, a policy of peaceful co-existence with members of other social systems, a policy of detente and disarmament. Such is the general line of Soviet foreign policy, warmly approved and supported by the entire nation.

The CPSU, which represents 80 years of experience and the richest traditions of bolshevism, is confidently leading the Soviet people along the untrodden path of historical creativity, brilliantly charted by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

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IMPROVING THE WORKSTYLE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83) pp 56-68

[Article by B. Yel'tsin, Sverdlovsk Oblast CPSU Committee first secretary]

[Text] The great accomplishments on Soviet soil, the building of developed socialism and its comprehensive progress convincingly prove the powerful transformation role played by our party, the veracity and vitality of its revolutionary theory and the effectiveness of the Leninist style of party work.

The Leninist style did not appear instantaneously. It was shaped in the course of the party's revolutionary struggle for the implementation of the ideas of scientific communism and the basic interests and progressive ideals of the working class and all working people, the establishment of a socialist society and the defense of the homeland from imperialist aggression. The Marxist-Leninist theory of the laws governing the building of socialism, the people's masses as the most decisive force in history, the universal-historical mission of the working class and the leading role of the communist party during all the stages of transition from capitalism to socialism and in building communism is the theoretical foundation of party activities.

Elaborated under Lenin's direct guidance, the principles, norms and methods of work of the CPSU as a ruling party were further developed and enriched in the course of its activities of tremendous scale and social significance.

The November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum gave a new impetus to mastering the Leninist style of work by party committees, our cadres and all party members. The Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the RSDWP Congress" reemphasized the importance of the comprehensive assertion of the Leninist workstyle. As stated in the decree, this is a creative style which ensures a scientific approach to all social processes, steady reliance on the masses, high efficiency, concreteness and exigency, and intolerance of any manifestations of formalism, bureaucratism and ostentatiousness.

Guided by the CPSU Central Committee decisions and stipulations, the Sverdlovsk party obkom sees to it that its work and that of gorkoms, raykoms and all party organizations in the oblast become more consistent with the requirements of the Leninist style. Its mastery and skillful application are guarantees for new successes in resolving the responsible tasks set by the 26th CPSU Congress and the subsequent Central Committee plenums.

A scientific approach to phenomena in social life and the solution of arising problems is the most important feature, the core of the Leninist style. In his famous work "The Forthcoming Tasks of the Soviet System," which was written soon after the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin wrote that "it is insufficient to be a revolutionary and a supporter of socialism or communism in general. One should be able to find at each specific moment that particular main link in the chain, which must be grabbed with all our strength in order to hold together the entire chain and prepare the firm transition to the next link...." ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 205).

Persistently, again and again, Lenin pointed out the need for a strictly scientific assessment of the current situation, based on accurate and unquestionable facts, taken in their integrity and interconnection, singling out the most essential features in the line of social development and making decisions on the basis of such solid foundations. At the same time, Vladimir Il'ich called upon the party members to learn how to make an efficient and close study of practical errors and their correction (see op. cit., vol 42, p 347).

There are those who believe to this day that during the first years of building socialism a great deal was being accomplished only thanks to the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, infinite dedication to communist ideals and the ability of revolutionary leaders to fire up the people's hearts. Naturally, this did exist. However, there also was a precise assessment, there was Lenin's party program. Already then the scientific foundations for the administration of the state and the production process, and the reorganization of all aspects of society on the principles of socialism were being laid.

Tremendous work was being done to industrialize the country and accomplish agricultural collectivization and to train cadres with specialized knowledge and specialized Marxist-Leninist training. Within that extremely short time segment in the Middle Urals alone hundreds of enterprises in the ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, heavy and transportation machine-building and other industrial sectors were either rebuilt or built anew. The grateful memory of the people recollects the constructive exploits of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the young people's intelligentsia, who, under the party's guidance, created a powerful economic and defense potential during the first five-year plans and ensured the victory of socialism in our country. This was a triumph of the Leninist theory and the party's policy, of the Leninist workstyle, which made it possible to rally the toiling masses and to organize and direct their collective creativity toward a single objective.

Working conditions changed drastically from the very first days of the war imposed upon us by fascist Germany. Life imperatively demanded that the front be supplied with everything necessary at all cost and that a firm rear support be created which would steadily supply the armed forces. Naturally, during those difficult times changes took place in the forms and methods of

party work. In our Sverdlovsk Oblast 22 CPSU obkom secretaries were put directly in charge of the various production sectors. Let us point out that one-man decisions and strict and efficient management methods ensured our success. Virtually all 440 industrial enterprises which were evacuated from the western parts of the country and which, like the local Ural plants, were hammering out the weapons for victory, began to work the moment they were unloaded from the trains. This too was the Leninist style, the method of the "main link" in wartime conditions.

After the return of the country to peaceful toil, the full restoration of the principles and norms of intraparty life and socialist democracy was undertaken. To this day, however, some officials, particularly in the case of a topical matter such as strengthening the discipline, are envious of the leaders during the war period and some of them even believe that the work-style applied then was allegedly precisely what is lacking in resolving today's problems.

Naturally, it is useful to look at past experience. We must also agree with the fact that occasionally we are short of decisiveness in the struggle against negligence, irresponsibility and other negative phenomena. It is obvious, however, that the methods applied during extraordinary war conditions are inconsistent with a situation of peace and the essence of building communism. The party encourages improvement of the work and the application of means and methods which will contribute to the increased initiative and production and social activeness of the toiling masses. Today we have the most favorable possibilities at our disposal for engaging in efficient organizational and mass political work and for skillful economic management and administration on a scientific basis.

Our oblast, for example, has developed a tremendous economic and scientific and technical potential on the basis of which increasingly broad tasks can be formulated and successfully implemented. During the 1970s alone 900 new production capacities were commissioned. The volume of industrial output increased by 54 percent and that of machine building and metal processing by a factor of 2.1; the total freight haulage increased by 38 percent and the volume of output resulting from increased labor productivity increased by 94 percent. Some 25 billion rubles' worth of capital investments were made; during the 10th Five-Year Plan productive capital increased by more than 30 percent in industry and by a factor of 1.5 in agriculture.

The general educational and cultural standards of the people of the Middle Urals have improved considerably. Whereas at the beginning of the 1970s there were 509 graduates with higher and secondary (complete and incomplete education per 1000 of population; by 1980 there were 663.

The process of molding politically mature and initiative-minded cadres of Ural workers, specialists, economic managers and people who know their work and are able to achieve good results is continuing. The Red Challenge Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU and Komsomol Central Committee, which was awarded Sverdlovsk, for results achieved during the 10th Five-Year Plan and the all-union socialist competition in honor of

the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR marked the high appreciation of their efforts.

The Sverdlovsk oblast party organization has grown and strengthened even further. It currently numbers 252,000 members rallied in 4,750 primary and 6,495 shop organizations and 8,391 party groups. Some 80 percent of the party members work in material production.

The oblast party organization is focusing its main efforts on implementing the task set by the 26th CPSU Congress--completing the conversion of the economy to intensive development and enhancing production efficiency. We take into consideration that the factors which limit opportunities for extensive growth are felt particularly strongly in the Middle Urals. The industrial production concentration reached by the oblast at the beginning of the 10th Five-Year Plan had already exceeded the average for the RSFSR by a factor of 4.6. However, many of our enterprises have obsolete equipment. The fuel-power balance is quite stressed and available manpower resources have become practically exhausted.

Under such circumstances competence, work knowledge, ability to master economic management methods, strengthening the discipline and upgrading the level of organization at all production levels become particularly important. The objective nature of socialist economic laws, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov wrote in the article "Karl Marx's Theory and Some Problems of Socialist Construction in the USSR," call for eliminating all attempts at managing the economy through methods alien to the nature of socialism. Subjectivism, crawling empiricism, bare administering and hullabaloo, and talks and arguments instead of real work are incompatible with the Leninist style. "A manager who fails to understand, who systematically and persistently tries to replace organizational efforts with effective but inefficient campaigns, will not achieve a great deal," he states in his article.

We frequently think of the meaning which words such as "enterprise" and "practicality" has to us, party workers, for we do not directly participate in the production process and cannot order or use material penalties or administrative methods of influence in the implementation of one decision or another. "... We must," Lenin wrote, "distinguish far more precisely between the functions of the party...and the Soviet system; we must enhance the responsibility and autonomy of soviet personnel and institutions, leaving to the party the overall management of the work of all state organs, rather than the present excessively frequent, improper and frequently petty interference" (op. cit., vol 45, p 61).

How are we implementing this Leninist concept? Here is an example. We were instructed to lay five gas pipelines between Urengoy and the western areas of the USSR, including one between Pomary and Uzhgorod during the 11th Five-Year Plan, 2,000 kilometers long; we must also build and commission 20 compressor stations and make capital investments totaling 1,670,000,000 rubles. The Ivdel and Krasnoturinsk compressor stations were assigned priority status and their completion was scheduled for 1982.

The northern part of the oblast is sparsely inhabited. Pipelines and stations must be built under difficult conditions, the more so since we had no specialized construction and installation organizations for this purpose. In August 1981 members of the CPSU obkom bureau visited the location of the future pipeline, studied the circumstances and met with trust managers, designers, customers, construction workers and local party and soviet personnel. A joint program for action was developed which became the base for the decree promulgated by the party obkom bureau.

It became necessary to set up collectives of construction organizations and define the participation of subcontractors in the construction of gas compressor stations. The compressor station construction plan was revised in such a way that most of the work would be done under plant conditions. Assembled parts replaced monolithic foundations. As a result, labor outlays at the Ivdel station were reduced by 11,000 man/days. The project was completed in 8 months rather than the 23 projected. The experience of the first station is being duplicated.

This may lead to the opinion that the obkom has assumed ministerial functions. Naturally, such is not the case. The high professional skill of the party cadres enables them today in some cases to resolve both technical and organizational problems. This, however, is not the main thing. Six ministries are involved in the construction of the pipeline and gas compressor stations and the various sociocultural projects needed in ensuring the normal life of the people: the Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, the Ministry of Industrial Construction, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Power and Electrification and the USSR Ministry of Gas Industry as the customer. This faced the CPSU obkom with the need to provide "overall management of the work of all state organs combined" in the implementation of this governmental assignment.

In a short time the obkom developed the structure of the party organizations, set up primary party organizations and appointed party group organizers and brigade party organizers. Its sectorial departments assumed control over the production and delivery to the construction project of equipment, machines and mechanisms and ensuring uninterrupted supply of materials and structures. Together with the local party organizations the ideological departments took measures for the organization of educational and mass political work in the labor collectives and the providing of cultural services.

The obkom considered as its main task precisely the unification of the collective of construction and installation workers and the creation of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations. This problem was resolved, naturally by relying on the help of the interested ministries. Thus, when the construction of the compressor station was undertaken in Ivdel it was a single mobile mechanized column numbering 60 people; during the final period 1,500 people were at work here. It was necessary not only to provide them with working facilities but to feed them and to create the necessary conditions for cultural relaxation. Understandably, neither the obkom nor the city party organs stood aside in the implementation of this project.

On the initiative of the party organizations socialist competition among related units was promoted based on the "worker relay" principle. From the very first days the construction brigades worked under the slogan "From Reciprocal Claims to Reciprocal Aid and Support." This became the base for relations among the different collectives sharing the same work site.

Therefore, the CPSU obkom bureau passed only one decision on the construction of the Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod main gas pipeline. However, the bureau members repeatedly visited the site and resolved arising problems. We neither fired nor punished anyone. Efficiency, high responsibility and performance characterize the leading cadres of this gigantic construction project to this day. Two gas compressor stations were delivered ahead of schedule in April and May 1983.

In this case supplying the site with equipment played an important role. In answer to the discriminatory steps taken by the U.S. administration, the collective of the Turbomotornyy Zavod imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov Production Association, which is one of the major suppliers of contemporary gas pipeline equipment, decided to fulfill the order for the manufacturing of such equipment ahead of schedule. The obligation to manufacture above the plan (three units) another gas-pumping GTN-16 unit and 14 instead of 10 systems by the end of 1982 was adopted with a great feeling of upsurge. The association kept its word by completing four units in November 1982. The personnel of the Uralkhimmash Production Association mastered the production of an entirely new item--ball cocks for gas pipelines. Their output increased at a headlong pace: whereas the gas pipeline construction workers received 34 in 1982, they will receive 160 in 1983 and 310 in 1984.

Let us note that scientific studies and the use of their results are becoming a part of the practice of the oblast, city and rayon party committees. Thus, under the guidance of the CPSU obkom and with the help of scientists, specialists and production innovators, target programs for the 11th Five-Year Plan and through 1990 for the development of the economic and social areas, reducing manual labor, resource conservation, expanding the reconstruction of enterprises, improving the variety and upgrading the quality of consumer goods, and developing physical culture and sports were drafted. The responsibility for the implementation of the programs was entrusted to secretaries, heads of obkom party departments, and managers of oblast organizations and their deputies. Personal responsibility is also assigned in resolving other problems, involving the members of the party obkom bureau as well.

As we know, the ability to anticipate is an essential element of a scientific approach to the work. Unfortunately, proper steps are not taken nor disproportions eliminated promptly always and everywhere. This disturbs the rhythm of work in various sectors of the production line. For example, for 2 consecutive years the Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgical Combine imeni V. I. Lenin, which produces a large quantity of metal, did irregular work for a number of reasons. One more reason appeared this five-year plan. In the course of a visit which I. P. Kazanets, minister of ferrous metallurgy, and I paid to the combine, the furnace attendants complained that they were short of coke, for which reason production fell by about 33,000 tons of iron in 1982. What is the value of appeals to produce more iron if the coke is in short supply?

The reason for the development of this difficult situation was the shortage of coke production facilities at the combine. The final, eighth coke chemical battery was completed in 1957. Two batteries are more than 40 years old. Over the past 16 years only metal-smelting units and shops were built here. I unwittingly recall that as early as 10 years ago the Sverdlovsk party obkom suggested to the USSR Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy that coke production capacity at the Nizhniy Tagil Combine be increased. This was not done and now the construction of the ninth coke battery must be rushed and some 80 million rubles must be invested within a short time. The planning and economic organs must draw proper conclusions from this example.

Problems related to the intensification of organizational work for the implementation of the Food Program play a considerable role in the activities of the oblast party organization. In recent years we have been able to supply in full the population of towns and industrial centers with potatoes, vegetables and eggs through local production.

The general effort today is being directed toward improving milk and dairy product supplies. We are approaching the solution of this problem from the position of upgrading the share of local milk purchases to the level which would meet the requirements of the oblast population for milk products. We face a number of problems and shortcomings in this area. We clearly realize that the implementation of the tasks facing animal husbandry workers depends on the development of a solid fodder base. This year we intend to raise feed availability per head to 35 quintals of fodder units. To this effect more organic fertilizer has been applied this year compared with last, the liming of acidic soils has been increased and areas planted in leguminous crops have been expanded. All fodder crops have been assigned to mechanized links and two-thirds of the farms have organized fodder production as a separate sector.

Nearly 900 links and brigades working on a collective contract basis have been set up and have been assigned 35 percent of the plowland, compared to 12 last year. Areas in winter rye for green fodder, haylage and grass meal have been increased by a factor of 1.5 while areas with two hay mowings have quadrupled.

Rural manpower shortages remain one of the restraining factors which largely determine further increases in animal husbandry output in our oblast. In order to retain cadres, by the end of the five-year plan the farms will average the construction of 22-23 housing units per year. We have also reviewed the construction of rural schools. By the end of the current five-year plan all old and wooden structures housing secondary and eighth-grade schools will be replaced with new standardized improved ones. All construction organizations, regardless of departmental affiliation, have been involved in this project.

The practical implementation of the program for the third year of the five-year plan has started well and obligations are being fulfilled for all indicators.

Lenin taught us to resolve economic problems in close connection with political, ideological and organizational ones. Reality confirms that separating economics from politics (which is still practiced by some economic and even party managers) and pitting one against the other, operating on the principle that "the plan must be fulfilled at all cost," do not result in anything good.

The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum stressed that we must be well familiar with the socioeconomic factors which affect the mood and behavior of the people. We must link more closely ideological work with the struggle for the implementation of key national economic and sociopolitical tasks.

Understandably, ensuring the unity among political-educational, organizational and economic work is no easy practical matter. We are trying to upgrade the quality of decisions and to see to it that they are comprehensive and specific and are mandatorily implemented. We pay great attention to improving control over execution of decisions. Such problems are regularly discussed by the CPSU obkom bureau and are included mandatorily in the work plans of all oblast party committee departments. The Council on Coordinating Verifications and Strengthening Ties in the Work of Party Organs, which was created in 1981, the soviets of people's deputies, the people's control organs and the trade union and Komsomol organizations help to prevent duplication and parallelism and to reduce the number of supervisory commissions.

2

Lenin considered constant reliance on the masses a necessary prerequisite for successful party activities. "A vanguard," he wrote, "can fulfill vanguard assignments only when it never separates from the masses it leads and truly leads the masses ahead. Without the alliance with nonparty members in all possible areas of activity there could not even be a question of any successful building of communism" (op. cit., vol 45, p 23).

Meetings with people and labor collectives create new ideas and valuable suggestions. They sharpen the feeling of managerial responsibility, help avoid hasty decisions, promote discipline, encourage more energetic work and cure people of conceit, bureaucratism and other such "diseases." I know from personal experience and my comrades' references how useful direct contacts with the people are. We can even say that they upgrade one's own labor "productivity." In turn, realizing that one has gone to them not bearing direct instructions and not for the purpose of "criticizing" but to talk frankly, to seek advice and develop a consensus, the people willingly discuss matters frankly.

Currently, as we prepare for meetings at enterprises, kolkhozes, institutes and establishments, we must be familiar in advance with the problems and the type of life of their collectives. This is taken into consideration by the CPSU obkom which, in recent years, has held systematic meetings with various working people categories--workers, milkmaids, zootechnicians, brigade leaders, teachers of sociopolitical subjects in VUZes, students, creative workers, workers in public education and health care, party veterans and pioneer leaders.

"The brigades must grow and strengthen," was the slogan for the first rally of brigade leaders in Sverdlovsk Oblast. Today our leading economic sectors have about 64,000 brigades which apply progressive forms of organization and wages. They account for 55 percent of the working people and 20,000 of them are comprehensive. In such brigades labor productivity increases substantially. Conscious discipline strengthens and the responsibility of one and all for end work results is enhanced.

Steady contacts with the working people enables us to notice promptly anything new and progressive born of the inexhaustible live initiative of the masses. More than 10 years ago the best steel-smelting brigades at the Seversk Pipes Plant imeni F. A. Merkulov pledged to assume collective responsibility for the state of labor discipline. If any member of the brigade was absent or violated the public order all others voluntarily gave up their bonuses from the material incentive fund. The lawyers objected. In their view, this initiative violated labor legislation. It was also criticized by the central press. The easiest thing would have been to "veto" this worker initiative. However, neither the local party organs nor the CPSU obkom did this.

Practical experience proved them correct. During the period of effect of this initiative, overall working time losses at the plant dropped by almost one-third. According to sociological studies, people who work "on the basis of collective incentive" show a higher feeling of duty and awareness of the commonness of their interests with their fellow workers. They show a greater satisfaction with their wages. Ninety-six percent of those polled were "pleased with their relations with the administration." It was noteworthy that the movement, which was born at the Seversk Plant, was closely related to improvements in the brigade form of labor organization and incentive and contributed to new successes. Compared to 1981, 1982 absenteeism dropped by yet another 24 percent. This experience is currently used at 188 oblast enterprises, covering more than 190,000 people.

The CPSU obkom and the party organizations try to build their mass political work on a differentiated basis, in accordance with the interests and requirements of the various population categories. Thus, a meeting was held in May 1981 with VUZ students in Sverdlovsk and its oblast. The main purpose was to explain to the future national economic specialists the tasks formulated at the 26th CPSU Congress. The simplest thing may have been to hold a traditional meeting with the student aktiv and deliver a report. However, the party obkom acted otherwise. One month before the meeting students from 16 VUZes were asked to submit in writing questions of interest to them and to formulate their suggestions. They responded energetically. A total of 930 questions were received. They were analyzed and systematized and immediate steps were taken on the basis of a number of remarks and suggestions. Another 140 questions were asked during the meeting. The talk lasted more than 5 hours. The fact that no single question was ignored and that some suggestions were adopted at the meeting itself could not fail to influence the audience.

It would be insufficient to say that the results were positive. In our view, the most valuable feature was the clearly expressed life stance of the student youth, their unanimous approval of party policies and decisions and understanding of their own role in the implementation of communist construction plans. The young people do not consider themselves observers of history. They want to be active participants in the constructive accomplishments of the Soviet people. The meeting also confirmed how important it is for the party leaders to be among young people, to be familiar with their problems, to strengthen their communist convictions and to help them overcome erroneous, alien views.

The work plans of secretaries and members of the oblast party committee bureau include an increasing number of entries on how to "speak at a united policy day," "participate in an open letter day," "visit an enterprise," "talk with a group of working people," and so on. Such measures are being planned much more frequently today by city and rayon party committee secretaries and managers of soviet, trade union and economic organs.

Each meeting with working people is distinguished by its specific and purposeful nature and content as well as number of participants, although, in the final account, the purpose of all meetings is one: to describe the nature of CPSU domestic and foreign policy and efficiently to provide substantiated answers to questions of interest to the people, some of which may be quite sensitive.

The mass information media as well are applying a differentiated approach more extensively today. On the recommendation of the CPSU obkom, for example, oblast television began a program entitled "The Manager Answers Working People's Mail." The program was opened by the first secretary of the oblast party committee. A total of 4,090 letters and more than 2,000 questions, suggestions and wishes were received for the first telecast. Naturally, the program time was limited and not everyone could be given an answer. Some people were answered by mail. Nevertheless, about 2,000 televiewers wrote their approval of the new form of contacts between the party obkom and the population.

The study of the letters received for the television program proved the particular interest of the people in the Food Program, the state of labor and production discipline and work quality. The working people are also interested in problems of transportation and communications, settlement planning, road construction, etc. Based on the questions of interest to the televiewers the party and soviet oblast organs passed specific resolutions, including "On the Development of the Komsomol'skiy Residential Rayon," "On the Work of the Public Transportation System," "On Increasing the Production of Homes With Courtyards in the Villages and Improving Their Quality," and others.

Lenin considered working people's letters one of the valuable and confidential sources of information and a means of expressing public opinion and developing criticism and self-criticism. Letters help us to assess more objectively the activities of party, soviet and economic organs and public

organizations and their managers. Such data are used in the formulation of oblast party committee measures and also in preparing meetings between secretaries and obkom bureau members, on the one hand, and working people and managers, on the other.

3

The assertion of the Leninist workstyle as a whole, including strengthening ties with the masses, ensuring unity between words and actions, upgrading efficiency and exigency, and developing intolerance of any manifestations of formalism, bureaucratism and ostentatiousness depend, above all, on the leading cadres.

In the present stage we particularly need managers with a purposeful and comprehensively developed character, with increased awareness of their own duty and personal responsibility, curiosity and professional and moral standards. Inherent in the manager must be high party principle-mindedness and efficiency, a self-critical assessment of work results, extensive erudition, initiative and discipline, responsiveness to people and ability to rally them in resolving problems. Requirements concerning the level of the theoretical training of leading cadres and their ability creatively to use the method of dialectical materialism becomes stricter.

"Any underestimating of the role of Marxist-Leninist science and its creative development, a narrowly pragmatic interpretation of its tasks, neglect of basic theoretical problems and intensified reliance on circumstances or scholastic theorizing," Comrade Yu. V. Andropov wrote, "are fraught with serious political and ideological consequences."

This makes clear the need for a more thoughtful and analytical approach to the selection, placement and upbringing of leading cadres. Naturally, the question is not one of acute shortage of such cadres in our oblast. The absolute majority of managers heading the various economic and cultural construction sectors are skillful organizers who enjoy a deserved reputation in the collectives.

As a result of the purposeful work done by the party organizations in cadre promotion and proper organization of their training, two-thirds of the 20,000 workers registered with the oblast party committees have higher education and almost 40 percent are under 40 years old. Almost 96 percent of primary party organization secretaries have higher or secondary education, compared with 63.4 percent 20 years ago.

In continuing to upgrade the level of general educational and specialized cadre training, naturally, we pay proper attention to the political, practical and moral qualities of the personnel. Any type of one-sided approach must be excluded in the selection and placement of cadres. We must proceed from the fact that this is a process of reinforcing management cadres through the promotion of young and promising personnel who, however, have not as yet undergone ideological and political training and lack adequate experience, including that of working with people. However, even among experienced

competent and morally impeccable workers we come across comrades who find it difficult to change their workstyle in accordance with new requirements. Occasionally arbitrary decisions are still made as well as efforts to achieve positive results "at all cost." The power of inertia is felt as well. Manifestations of formalism and bureaucratic "organization" at various managerial levels occur.

Although small, there also is a group of managers who have lost their ability to assess critically their activities and who even deliberately violate party and state discipline and take the path of figure-padding, whitewashing and abusing official positions. It is important, therefore, not only to develop the necessary qualities in the manager but to exclude the possibility of the development of negative qualities, properly to organize control and verification and to create circumstance of high exigency and unavoidability of punishment for abuses.

The CPSU obkom ascribes proper importance to making the strict observance of the Leninist norms of party life and management principles, including, particularly, collective decision-making in drafting and passing resolutions and their implementation a mandatory managerial rule. Naturally, collective leadership does not exclude but, conversely, demands the enhanced individual responsibility of the party members for their assignments.

The oblast party committee pays great attention in its work with cadres to the extensive utilization of the experience of managers whose style and method are exemplary. The obkom bureau decrees and the materials of oblast conferences approve and recommend for dissemination one aspect or another of skillful managerial activity. We particularly emphasize the fact that the leading workers must not rely on achievements. They must adopt a self-critical attitude toward the activities of the party committees they head. They must promote improvements in managerial style creatively, with initiative and without allowances for themselves or others and, in the final account, ensure the most efficient implementation of assignments.

Talks conducted by the party obkom bureau are used in the comprehensive study of cadre work and in giving them prompt assistance in the elimination of shortcomings. We began this work with the cadres on the obkom list, above all the first secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms. In June 1982 the obkom bureau held a talk with Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Serkov, first secretary of the Rezh city party committee. In his previous difficult positions he had coped successfully with his duties. The talk was preceded by a thorough study of his economic management style and solution of social, ideological and organizational problems. His personal qualities were considered as well. Both unfinished and completed projects were discussed, as well as problems successfully resolved and those which needed help. The well-wishing conversation and specific remarks made by the bureau members helped Serkov, like other comrades, to consider himself impartially and to obtain a comprehensive assessment of his activities. The year which passed after this talk proved that the considerations and recommendations expressed by the obkom bureau were accepted by Serkov in a party manner and that his workstyle marked substantial improvements.

During the period of the preparations for elections for the local soviets of people's deputies, secretaries and members of the party obkom bureau held personal meetings with the heads of all oblast organizations who were oblast soviet deputies. They discussed the implementation of deputy obligations and voter instructions and the success of the institutions they headed. To some this was difficult, for individual deputies were blamed for neglecting sessions, rarely meeting with the voters and being cool toward their instructions. What matters is that the comrades felt their omissions and gave their assurances that they would be eliminated. In summing up the results of the talks we had to note that some workers consider that a position in a soviet or party gorkom and raykom is their due rather than based on their merits or additional contributions to the work of party, soviet or public organizations. We took this into consideration in our further educational work with cadres.

The problem of the character of the manager and the attitude of party organs toward abuses of official position by party members becomes particularly topical in the light of the requirements of the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. In 1982, 79 managers were expelled from the party in our oblast for swindling the state, violating laws on the protection of socialist property, production of substandard goods or use of official position for selfish purposes; party penalties were imposed on others.

In studying the reasons for such facts we reached the conclusion that the occasional unprincipled position of party committees, their liberal attitude toward party members who behave improperly, efforts to ignore unseemly actions and fear of making them public tremendously harm cadre education. Yet Lenin wrote that "... publicity is a sword which heals the wounds it itself inflicts" (op. cit., vol 23, p 53).

Problems of cadre policy were thoroughly discussed at a seminar for first secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms, sponsored by the Kamensk-Uralsk city party organization in December 1982. The participants heard the report "On Personal Responsibility, Discipline and Moral Aspects of Leading Cadres in the Light of the Requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress," and exchanged views. It was recommended that the seminar materials be discussed at conferences of primary party organization secretaries, sponsored by party gorkoms and raykoms.

The role of the primary party organizations in cadre education is, as we know, clearly defined in CPSU Central Committee decrees. They indicate the need for a thorough and comprehensive study of the activities of leading personnel and to giving them a principle-minded and objective assessment at party committee sessions and party meetings. Unfortunately, this requirement is not honored everywhere. The primary party organizations must make better use of the collective views of party members, of their reputation and knowledge of the good and bad qualities of managers in order to improve their work with cadres.

Our obkom drew serious conclusions from the following alarming fact: in 1982 the cases of many managers taken to task by the party were not discussed by the primary party organizations. The obkom directed the party organizations to ensure the more efficient use of the tried method of criticism and self-criticism in cadre upbringing. This includes reports submitted by managers,

including enterprise directors, at bureau and party meetings on the implementation of CPSU bylaws.

We are pleased to note that the work of the party organizations has become more efficient and specific. An oblast seminar-conference for gorkom and raykom personnel was held in November 1979 at which upgrading the efficiency of party work was discussed. This was followed by an improvement in the qualitative structure of the party committee personnel and the number of women committee members increased. In our efforts to improve the style of party management and work as a whole, we must, as the CPSU Central Committee demands, put an end to paper shuffling and the still-prevalent practice of drafting all possible references and data and the issuing of various circulars.

A good word must be said on the activities of many party committees and primary party organizations. The Sverdlovsk city party committee is displaying great persistence in resolving current problems. For example, having undertaken to resolve the urgent problem of eliminating barracks living, it not only approved the assignments of enterprises and organizations but actively helped them to receive from the central economic organs the necessary funds to this effect. A monthly supervision over the moving of citizens to comfortable homes was organized. During the 10th Five-Year Plan the program for the removal of such barracks was entirely fulfilled in Sverdlovsk. This problem was resolved for the entire oblast as well.

The party organizations are becoming more efficient. Nevertheless, not everyone has learned how to subordinate the ways and means of work to the interests of the project. Some party committees rarely hear reports on the implementation of decisions. Frequently real organizational and political work is replaced by a variety of different measures. Phrasemongering, blabbering and ostentatiousness have not been entirely eliminated. Nevertheless, the line of asserting the Leninist workstyle is yielding results. The party members are increasing their creative activeness, responsibility and interest in the success of labor collectives.

The CPSU Central Committee decree "On the Primary Party Organization Commissions for Controlling Administrative Activities and the Work of the Apparatus" opens new opportunities. Today the party organization has 4,700 such commissions with more than 40,000 members. We pay particular attention to their training within the party organizations which have the right to control the work of the apparatus on implementing the party and government directives and the observance of Soviet legislation.

Lenin taught that "... we must not be satisfied by the skill we have developed through previous experience but absolutely go further and absolutely achieve more and absolutely convert from lighter to more difficult tasks" (op. cit., vol 37, p 196). Mastery of the Leninist workstyle is the high road to enhancing the role of the party committees and our party as the collective political leader, organizer and educator of the masses and as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society.

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IN HARMONY WITH PRACTICE

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83) pp 69-76

[Article by P. Matveyev, Kurgan Oblast CPSU committee secretary]

[Text] The shaping of the communist consciousness of the masses is one of the long-term programmatic party tasks. It is implemented with the help of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, which formulate the vitally important thesis of upgrading the efficiency of party education. In particular, it is a question of combining our party policy with mass activities, so that party education may teach the people, in V. I. Lenin's words, "to act as is truly demanded by communism" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 302).

The invincible power of communist idea-mindedness is based on the firm foundations of Marxism-Leninism. The study of revolutionary theory has become the vital need of millions of Soviet people and the main form of development of social consciousness. The profound creative study of CPSU history, scientific communism, political economy and philosophy helps the working people to master the depths of Marxist-Leninist science and to see more clearly the prospects and laws governing our society. The skillfully organized training process develops in the people an accurate understanding of vital economic and political tasks and develops the qualities needed by the builders of communism.

The decree of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum comprehensively expresses the tasks of political education at the current social development stage: "The purpose of political training is for everyone profoundly to understand party policy, to be able to apply the acquired knowledge and have a clear idea of and carry out his social duty."

The regular school year within the Marxist-Leninist educational system has ended. Actually, as we know there are no summer vacations in political life. The city and rayon party committees and all labor collectives in Kurgan Oblast are engaged in the detailed and thorough analysis of last school year's results and of the workstyle and methods of our propaganda cadres. New curriculae are being drafted and training groups are being assembled.

The shortcomings in communist upbringing, in the political education of the working people in particular, can be seen more clearly and completely in the light of the decisions of the June Plenum. It is an open secret that a considerable percentage of lecturers, propagandists and party workers remain

attached to the old and obsolete educational methods. The vital concerns of the people and topical problems are frequently ignored in talks, lectures and class exercises.

The propagandist is the main figure in the party education system. His ideological and moral qualities, theoretical and methodical training and information largely determine the effectiveness of party thoughts and words. We cannot say that so far we have paid little attention to the work of propagandists and lecturers. However, a systematic approach was lacking and quality was sacrificed to quantity. Until recently few propagandists were party members. One-quarter of them lacked higher education. Another adverse factor was the fact that some party organizations had eventually resigned themselves to the fact that a considerable percentage of the heads of courses and seminars were overburdened: in addition to their main assignment, some comrades had several other permanent ones. This created some difficulties and, in the final account, could not fail to influence the quality of teaching. Actually, this fault is frequently caused by the existing procedure for selecting cadres for the ideological aktiv and the system used in improving their skills.

Usually, the propagandist plays several simultaneous roles: historian, expert on international affairs, atheist, philosopher, and political economist. Every year special method seminars based on new programs, which are generally summarized, are sponsored within the political education system with a view to increasing his knowledge and erudition. Under such circumstances becoming a highly skilled specialist in one or even two areas of knowledge becomes very difficult, the more so since the number of recommended courses is unjustifiably high: currently more than 40 operate within the political education system.

With the help of the aktiv of the Knowledge Society, the obkom propaganda and agitation department is engaged in purposeful work on improving the structure of political and economic training. Currently 56,300 people are involved in the party training system, or 24,900 less than during the 1980-81 school year. This does not mean in the least that the overall number of students has diminished. It is a question of the adoption of a differentiated approach in setting up training groups. Due to the increased number of party members with higher and secondary training, 88 percent of the students attended courses on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and scientific communism. The remaining party members (mostly elderly people with incomplete secondary education) have chosen simpler classes. The people are particularly interested in the following courses: "CPSU Agrarian Policy at the Present Stage" and "The USSR Food Program." Special courses and additional classes on all levels discuss the materials of the May and November 1982 CPSU Central Committee plenums, including courses in communist labor and specific economic problems.

The qualitative structure of propaganda cadres has improved substantially in the countryside as well. Some of the propagandists have no university training, although their reputation in the collective is sufficiently high. Some comrades have great experience in propaganda activities, for which reason it

would be erroneous to remove them from a project which, for the best of them, has become part of their very being.

Briefly, the staffing of party training units with propaganda cadres demands a thoughtful approach on the part of the party organization. Such problems are discussed openly, with the participation of trade union and Komsomol committees and administrations.

One could say that extensive publicity has a prophylactic property which blocks hasty steps or decisions. The purpose of the propagandist is not only to share with his students current knowledge in one field of Marxism-Leninism or economics or another but also to awaken in every person the need for socially useful activities and to promote active militant qualities. To this effect the propagandist, through his own example, must assert the dignity which he would like to develop in his audience, i.e., he must be highly ideal-minded, intolerant of shortcomings and enamored of his work. In general, through his growing skill he must set a model which the students can see in the course of their contacts with him rather than on the basis of abstract considerations.

Party, war and labor veterans, scientists, and people who are prestigious and respected in the oblast, are becoming increasingly involved in teaching party training classes. Interesting and instructive in this respect are the activities of our noted countryman Terentiy Semenovich Mal'tsev, link leader at the Zavety Lenina Kolkhoz, Shadrinskiy Rayon, Twice Hero of Socialist Labor. This man has lived a long and hard life and has a great deal of practical experience. He is a born propagandist. His speech is graphic and clear as well as simple, rich in metaphors, thoughts and proofs.

People such as T. S. Mal'tsev justifiably enjoy among the people a reputation of tutors. They bring to the masses the truth, explain party domestic and foreign policy, and sensitively react to events in the country's life. Even in the course of a simple talk with his students on strictly scientific or medical problems Prof Gavriil Abramovich Ilizarov, Lenin Prize laureate and Hero of Socialist Labor, shows tremendous thrust, patriotism and pride in our homeland, its science and our Soviet people! He infects the people around him with his optimism, the fire of his heart and the nobility of his spirit.

It is worth emphasizing the importance of teachers who do not come "from the outside" but are members of a given labor collective. Unquestionably, the propagandist must live with the affairs of his collective. He must be well familiar with the mood of the people, their demands and their needs.

A. V. Afonaskin heads the scientific communism course at the Kurgansel'mash Production Association. His labor career is linked to that enterprise. He began as rank-and-file worker, graduated from night school and the Machine-Building Institute while working full-time, defended his dissertation and became candidate of technical sciences. However, Aleksandr Vasil'yevich considers political training his most important university. Here are the stages of this education: attending a circle, followed by a correspondence course at the evening Marxism-Leninism University. For the past 20 years

A. V. Afonaskin has successfully combined production activities with propaganda work. He shows a skillful combination of theoretical concepts with reality and the affairs of the collective. He is directly involved in the implementation of the country's Food Program. The course headed by Comrade Afonaskin helps the students to formulate and implement individual and brigade plans and socialist obligations. It would be no exaggeration to say that the students attending this course are like-minded people, confident of their ideological accuracy and brimming with the desire to work to the fullest extent of their forces.

The characteristic features of Viktor Osipovich Astaf'yev, chairman of the Rodina Kolkhoz, Ketovskiy Rayon, are enthusiasm, responsibility for assignments and a creative approach. The farm is famous in the oblast for its economy: year after year it grows stable crops and achieves high cattle productivity. During the past 15 years grain production at the Rodina Kolkhoz increased by a factor of 3.6; meat production increased by a 1.8 factor and milk production quadrupled.

Comrade Astaf'yev has the heart of a true social figure. He cannot conceive of economic activities without propaganda which he carries out with enthusiasm and thoughtfulness. The seminar he heads is considered the best in the rayon. His students always willingly come to class. The lessons, as a rule, are meaningful and take place with the active participation of the students. The effective activities of this farm manager as a propagandist is confirmed also by the fact that Victor Osipovich has developed in many people a taste for social work. Yesterday's students have become propagandists, lecturers and political informants.

Unquestionably, the experience in propaganda work of party members such as Comrade Astaf'yev is of broad social interest. The farm hosted an oblast seminar for party gorkom and raykom secretaries in charge of ideological work. The participants in the seminar visited open classes conducted by propagandists at the Rodina Kolkhoz and rated them highly.

We are persistently following a line of mandatory personal participation in political-educational activities by production managers and technologists. This category personnel accounts for 85 percent of propaganda cadres. Propagandists include the first secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms who, as a rule, head city and rayon schools for the party-economic aktiv. G. Ya. Sozykin, Safakulevskiy Rayon party committee first secretary, was awarded the Leninist Honor Certificate for Active Propaganda Efforts; L. S. Paramonov, first raykom secretary, was awarded an honor certificate by the CPSU obkom; M. M. Tel'manov, raykom secretary, was awarded a medal, etc.

Noted scientists, leading workers and production innovators are invited to discuss more fully some topics included in the course curriculum. Such lessons are valuable for they enable the individual students to link more closely the theoretical part of the problem to the practical tasks of the collective. It is true that in this case the possibility of adopting a purely utilitarian approach to party training, some kind of down-to-earth approach, what have you, is not excluded. The point is that some comrades,

motivated by good thoughts, try to use political education classes to resolve purely economic problems, for which reason some classes sometimes resemble economic planning sessions.

The efficiency of party training--political and economic--is adversely affected by arbitrary changes in the curriculae of courses and seminars, related to events in the country's life. Naturally, one can understand the head of a course or seminar or a member of the apparatus of a party committee who would try to link as closely as possible the curriculum to current affairs. However, in this case we must not lose a feeling of measure, for in the opposite case one could easily disturb the streamlined training system and provide unrelated information instead of an overall system of knowledge based on a specific program.

During the 1982-83 school year all party and economic training units offered six additional classes on current CPSU materials and documents. This accounted for 40 percent of class time. Yet, as we know, current materials and CPSU documents are considered also at party and Komsomol meetings and party committee plenums and aktivs. They are the topics of policy days, lectures, talks and political information. It would be useful not to interrupt the curriculum with special classes based on current documents but use them in the study of the programmed material for basic subjects and courses either at classes or in the course of practical assignments, and so on.

The oblast party committee steadily supervises the strict observance of curriculae in the local areas, blocking any superficial attitude toward the organization of party education and all formalism. Actually, this is also the task of the system for training and retraining propaganda cadres on the oblast and rayon levels. Following the adoption of the familiar CPSU Central Committee decree on improving party training (for a period of 2 years), more than 1,800 heads of courses and seminars underwent special retraining at 2-week courses. Courses and seminars for upgrading the skills of propaganda workers were organized on the sectorial principle. This makes it possible to take more fully into consideration the specific nature of the sectors and link more specifically propaganda to life and the practice of building communism. The seminars were held under the slogan "unity among theory, method and practice." The propagandists have expressed their approval of this form of training.

We attentively followed the course of the debate on "Seminar for Propagandists. What Should It Be?" on the pages of the journal POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE and tried to use with increasing success the material in our work. We are extensively assigning propagandists to visit enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The oblast seminar for propagandists teaching the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and conducting communist labor courses on the USSR Food Program took place in Ketovskiy Rayon.

The rayon was not chosen accidentally, for it had been the winner of the All-Russian Socialist Competition based on the results of the anniversary year. Today's labor collectives have gained interesting experience in ideological and political-educational work. Another seminar with propagandists

teaching scientific communism and specific economic problems (based on the course "CPSU Agrarian Policy at the Contemporary Stage" and "The USSR Food Program") was held in Vargashinskiy Rayon.

It has become traditional for rural party rayon propaganda and agitation departments to hold 2-day seminars prior to the beginning of the school year, to consider the topics of the courses to be taught and the tasks for the new school year and to discuss teaching methods.

Measures related to the program for the all-union propagandist day are implemented in a lively and instructive manner. This is actually a review of the preparedness of the party organizations for the school year. Such meetings help to eliminate omissions in the work and to sum up and disseminate the experience of acknowledged propaganda masters. The best people are presented with Leninist honor certificates, desk trophies and party committee certificates.

The skill of the propaganda worker is an object of steady concern on the part of the primary party organizations and rayon and city party committees. Such skills are attained not only through training but efforts aimed at enhancing the prestige of propaganda work. Propagandists are given discounts in subscribing to periodicals and fiction. They are invited to attend previews of shows and motion pictures. Trips to historical sites and cultural centers throughout the country are regularly organized for their benefit.

The work of the propagandist is hard but highly meaningful and important; each class is unique and each meeting with a responsive audience inspires the lecturer to seek ways to reach the hearts of the audience. It is important for the live contacts between the propagandist and the audience to take place in an informal atmosphere and to be intimate, for nothing can be achieved by reading texts to the audience and retelling someone else's ideas or presenting cliches. Furthermore, truth presented in a dry and inexpressive language will not reach the mind and heart of man. The art of communicating with the audience deserves extensive public attention. The Kurgan journalists have actively become involved in this project. The "Radio School for Propaganda Skill" is broadcast regularly. The same topic is treated in the oblast newspaper SOVETSKOYE ZAURAL'YE. A monthly methodical bulletin is published by the oblast political education house. It contains recommendations on the organization of sociopolitical practice, methods for autonomous work on drafting individual plans, topics developed on the basis of V. I. Lenin's workers and materials on the use of technical propaganda facilities.

Nevertheless, local facilities cannot cover the entire set of problems related to upgrading party training efficiency. It would be suitable to organize on the central television and radio broadcasting systems a cycle of transmissions for propagandists on "Theory, Method and Practice." The Moscow program "Propagandist's Round Table," which discusses vital problems of propaganda skills, should be broadcast nationally. Unfortunately, the outlying areas are familiar with the program only by hearsay and only those who happen to be in Moscow when it is broadcast can find out about it.

We must also point out that the present cycle "Leninist University for the Millions" does not satisfy the audience in all respects. The broadcast authors frequently bypass serious problems and limit themselves to a superficial presentation. The same shortcoming is inherent in a number of articles published as aid to propagandists in the journals POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE, SOVETSKIYE PROFSOYUZY and PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO and some pamphlets published by Znaniye Publishing House. Paradoxically, materials on the practical experience of propagandists or aimed at helping the audience to clarify one problem or another by itself are boring and inexpressive.

Particular mention should be made of upgrading requirements regarding publications and television and radio broadcasts. A trend toward broadening the various forms of political self-education has been noted in recent years: 15 percent of the students in our oblast work on the basis of their individual plans. This requires continuous aid and control on the part of the propaganda and agitation departments and political education houses. The effectiveness of self-training is increased by expanding the circle of public consultants on complex topics and parts of the program, which facilitates work with prime sources.

The practice of the party organizations includes many examples of the skillful combination of theoretical courses with practical materials and a comprehensive approach to the solution of ideological-educational and production problems facing labor collectives. The "Propagandist-Five-Year Plan" movement is successfully developing and advancing. More than 30,000 students attending schools, courses and seminars at industrial enterprises and establishments in the city are attending the course on "The USSR Food Program." To urban residents this topic is more difficult, for which reason the idea arose of establishing close contacts between urban and rural propagandists. This experiment expanded beyond the framework of individual enterprises. Recently a large group of rural propagandists visited classes conducted at courses for party, Komsomol and economic training in the oblast center and in Shadrinsk. Specific examples and facts were used to describe the struggle for the implementation of the Food Program and the steps to be taken to improve ties between town and country. Many enterprises in which rural propagandists spoke decided to send mechanizers to work in the countryside during the spring sowing and the harvesting campaigns, consisting of entire links.

The exchange of propaganda lectures among subunits in agroindustrial associations is being increasingly practiced in political and economic training. Students attending the course on foundations of Marxism-Leninism at the Kurganpribor Production Association were quite pleased with the lecture given by A. L. Maslov, chairman of the Zavety Lenina Kolkhoz, Yurgamyshskiy Rayon.

Urban propagandists, lecturers and political informants are frequent visitors to rural labor collectives. The process is reciprocal. Members of the mechanized links in Pritobolnyy and Mokrousovskiy rayons, combine operators in Kargapolskiy Rayon and propagandists from other adjacent rayons visited classes in a number of urban courses. Unquestionably, such encounters help to master the material more profoundly and durably and support it through

practical action. Another important feature is the fact that in the course of such contacts the different "sides" exceed the range of planned problems by discussing topical problems of production relations and exchanging experience in the struggle for discipline and upgrading labor activeness in collectives. It is no accident that in a number of party, Komsomol and economic training courses the students do not allow violations of labor and public discipline and actively influence other members of the collective in this respect.

The oblast trade union council presidium approved the initiative of the students attending the communist labor course at the animal husbandry complex of the Rodina Kolkhoz, Ketovskiy Rayon, who called upon their comrades to strengthen labor and production discipline and work with the slogan "All Communist Labor Course Students Must Be Thrifty Managers at Their Workplace." This initiative met with the extensive support of most communist labor courses in the oblast. This year practical science conferences will be held on the participation of propagandists in the organization of brigade labor methods and educational work with cost-effective collectives.

Sociopolitical practice is one of the real means for upgrading the efficiency of training groups. The propagandists and students at the Kurgan locomotive depot initiated a movement for "A Social Assignment for Every Student." The effectiveness of training, they said, is shown not only in national economic or social results but in political practice. It has become the rule for the best students to become agitators, political informants or tutors of young people in their collectives.

With a view to strengthening the ties between propaganda and life greater attention is currently paid to questions and suggestions which arise in the course of seminars. The propaganda and agitation departments sum up and systematize such questions and submit them for discussion by the rayon and city party committee bureaus. Answers or explanations related to typical problems are covered by the press, the television and the radio.

In studying the organization of Marxist-Leninist education we have reached the conclusion that party committees are paying substantially greater attention to training problems. A report was submitted at the obkom plenum on the implementation of the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Further Improving Party Training in the Light of the Decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress." An oblast conference with the propaganda aktiv was held in March 1982 on the topic "The 26th CPSU Congress on the Ways and Means of Upgrading the Quality and Effectiveness of Party Training," at which the practical experience in work based on the new party training system was summed up and a number of shortcomings, as we already mentioned, were brought to light. The attention was focused on lagging rayons. The personnel of the oblast political education house and its aktiv concentrated on Makushinskiy and Polovinskiy rayons and were able to enhance party education efficiency. The same help was given to propagandists in Vargashinskiy and Shumikhinskiy rayons.

Obviously, the current task is to enhance the role of Marxism-Leninism universities, thus making them basic centers for training propaganda cadres.

The training process in courses on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and scientific communism covers a period of 8 to 10 years (or even longer if other subjects are introduced); however, training programs are published in insufficient editions and with occasional delays. This means that locally a great deal of time and effort must be invested in drafting specific calendar plans based on standard training programs. It would be more expedient for support material for propagandists to be published on a centralized basis and to dedicate to this topic, for example, the August or September issue of the journal POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE and one of the EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA issues. They could also carry out lists of recommended reading for independent study of prime sources by the students, topics for discussion and papers and practical assignments.

The latest movie projection facilities, slide projectors, tape recorders, record players, cartoons, slides, gramophone records and video motion pictures should be procured in order to maintain the training facilities within the party education system on a contemporary level. No proper order exists in this area and everything depends on the smartness and hustling of economic managers. That is the reason for tremendous disparities in available materials. Perhaps a special stock should be put at the disposal of the rural consumer cooperatives and issued on the basis of purchase orders.

Equally noteworthy is the problem of technical equipment for political education offices at enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and big establishments. To this effect 2,000 to 2,500 rubles are usually allocated on a centralized basis, which is clearly insufficient. It would be desirable to send political education clubs and offices not a single but several copies of cartoons, slides and visual aids. The oblast political education house should have a regular position for an instructor or method worker in charge of technical propaganda facilities.

Bearing in mind that a number of slide projectors and other equipment in political education offices, Knowledge Society organizations, enterprises, schools and cultural and educational institutions remain idle for lack of spare parts, it would be expedient for the Ministry of Population Consumer Services to organize, in the oblast centers at least, repair facilities for technical propaganda tools and supplies of necessary spare parts.

All party organizations are closely studying the documents of the June CPSU Central Committee Plenum. We can confidently say that they will help ideological cadres to make fuller and better practical use of the entire powerful arsenal of means for the instruction and education of the Soviet people on the basis of the new tasks facing our society today.

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GREAT VICTORY IN THE KURSK ARC

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83) pp 77-88

[Article by Professor Army General Hero of the Soviet Union S. Ivanov]

[Text] Forty years ago one of the biggest battles in the history of World War II, which lasted 50 days, took place on the territory of four oblasts of the Russian Federation and three in the Ukraine. Here, on these most ancient Russian and Ukrainian lands, in the words of West German historian Walter Gorlitz, the backbone of the Hitlerite tank forces--the main striking force of the Wehrmacht--was crushed.

Even before the Kursk battle the Third Reich had already gone through two deep crises caused by the most severe defeats at Moscow and Stalingrad. The first crisis, triggered by the failure of the plans to capture the Soviet capital, was surmounted, as it seemed to the Hitlerite strategists, quite rapidly. In the spring and beginning of the summer of 1942 the Soviet troops had suffered heavy losses and the German-fascist army had been able to capture new vast and economically important areas of our country. After the second crisis, which was the German catastrophe on the Volga, the Hitlerite command began increasingly to realize that unless this new and even deeper crisis was to be surmounted, it would prove to be irreversible.

Did German fascism have a chance to revenge itself for Stalingrad and, although temporarily, regain the initiative? It might have been possible, had the increased skill and experience gained by our command failed to expose the enemy plans on time, to concentrate powerful reserves in the proper areas and skillfully to prepare the troops for defensive and subsequent counter-offensive operations.

We must take into consideration that Germany continued to dispose of the economic potential of all of Europe, adequate reserves of basic raw materials and a powerful first-grade industry. In 1943 it had significantly increased production of most important types of armaments. It had produced 10,700 tanks and assault guns, or 72.6 percent more than in 1942 and 25,200 airplanes, or 71.4 percent more. However, the Hitlerite command focused its main hope on the quality improvements of its armaments. The German troops received new Panther and Tiger tanks, new Ferdinand assault guns and airplanes with improved combat features--the Fokke-Wulf 190A and the Henschel-129.

The forces and facilities at the disposal of the enemy remained impressive. At that time fascist Germany had concentrated on the Soviet-German front 232

divisions, including 36 of its allies. All of this represents an armada no smaller than the one which had invaded USSR territory in June 1941. The technical power of the Hitlerite forces was also high: 54,300 guns and mortars, 5,850 tanks and assault guns and as many as 3,000 combat aircraft.

What did the Soviet armed forces have at that point? They had 6,616,000 soldiers and officers, i.e., 20 percent more than the enemy. The Red Army also enjoyed considerable superiority in armaments. It had 105,000 guns and mortars (excluding 50mm mortars), about 2,200 rocket artillery systems ("Katyushas"), 10,199 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10,252 combat aircraft, including improved La-5FN and Yak-9 models, and others. We must bear in mind, however, that more than one-half of the guns and mortars consisted of 76mm guns and 82mm mortars and that almost one-third of all tanks were light. Furthermore, Supreme Command Headquarters, allowing for the likelihood of an attack by Japan and Turkey, kept in the Far East and southern borders nearly 2 million men, i.e., more than one-third of the armed forces personnel, and a high percentage of tanks, self-propelled guns and combat aircraft, and more than 25 percent of its entire artillery. This meant that the Far East and the south drew away approximately the same amount of forces as the Germans had to keep on the other theaters of military operations.

The Supreme Command and the general staff summed up the war experience, assessed the enemy's strong and weak sides and drew conclusions from previous errors in planning and preparing operations, in assessing the enemy's intentions and in controlling troop actions.

Although the ratio of forces on the Soviet-German front had substantially changed in our favor compared to the 1941-1942 campaigns, German fascism continued to present a mortal threat even now, when it had begun to understand the entire extent of the precipice which was opening in front of it. That is why Soviet historiographers legitimately believe that the victory on the Kursk Arc and the emergence of the Soviet forces on the Dnepr was the turning point of the war. Naturally, this author does not belittle in the least the importance of the great battle on the Volga in which he participated from the first to the last day.

Let us now consider the planning of the summer 1943 campaign from the German-fascist side. Whereas in 1942 the general staff of Hitlerite Germany was unanimous in its belief that offensive operations were necessary, at this point it was beginning to show a certain hesitation. Jodl, the Wehrmacht Supreme Command chief of staff, and some other generals, in particular, suggested maneuvering operations on the east within the framework of strategic defense. However, military strategy was certainly not formulated in the Third Reich by Hitler and his generals alone. In this case, as in all other crucial stages in the war, the definitive word was that of industrial magnates such as Flick, Krupp, Schacht and others, even more so now, when the military confrontation with the Soviet state had reached its peak and they had begun to realize that the billions of marks they had spent on the war may turn out to be wasted unless a turn of events would take place in the east precisely at that point. The businessmen in the Third Reich were not worrying needlessly. The Fuehrer had received from them such a strong signal that

on 12 March, at the daily conference in the "Wolf's Lair," he shrieked and choked with rage: "The Donetsk Oblast is the most important to us. If it is hit it is extremely important to us to suffer no loss there."

Quite symptomatic in this respect is the meaning invested, according to some sources, in the code name given to Operation Citadel. Essentially, it meant that the Reich's leadership intended to turn into an inaccessible citadel the entire European territory captured by the fascists and, with decisive sorties from the citadel, to exhaust the "enemy besieging the citadel," i.e., the legitimate owners of the occupied areas and, in the final account, to exterminate it. The beginning of the summer 1943 campaign was to be precisely such a large-scale "sortie." Naturally, it is not excluded also that by code-naming the operation Citadel, the Wehrmacht headquarters simply wanted to mislead the Soviet leadership by instilling in it the belief that the plans of the German-fascist side were of a strictly defensive nature.

On 15 April Hitler issued Operative Order No 6 which described the actual purpose of the first stage of Citadel as follows: "... Decisively and rapidly, one assault army out of the Belgorod area and another, south of Orel, through a concentric offensive, to surround and destroy the enemy forces in the Kursk area." According to Gorlitz, the well-informed West German historian, after the liquidation of the Kursk salient, depending on the extent of the success, the German leadership intended to determine what was more expedient: "To turn north toward Moscow or to prepare a new 'Cannae' for the Russian army in the south, in front of the Donets and the line along the Mius." To this effect Hitler concentrated 50 elite divisions, including 16 tank and motorized. This large force was divided in approximately even numbers between the Group of Armies Center (commanded by Kluge) and South (commanded by Mannstein).

As we know, the Soviet command perceived the enemy's intentions. G. K. Zhukov recalls that "in coordination with A. M. Vasilevskiy, chief of general staff, and the front commanders, we took a number of measures to organize thorough reconnaissance in the sectors of the Central, Voronezh and South-western fronts.... As a result, at the beginning of April we had adequate information on the deployment of the enemy troops in the Orel, Sum, Belgorod and Kharkov area." Something else which helped them anticipate the plans of the German general staff was the fact that its strategy was not distinguished by any particular variety of methods. Its favorite means was the double out-flanking operation, which was frequently reduced to slicing the largest salients in the front line. The Hitlerite command had started its previous war campaigns, including that of the summer of 1943, with frontal strikes at the base of such salients, in order to surround and annihilate the troops inside them and subsequently comprehensively develop the success in the most rewarding directions. Moltke, Sr. and Schlieffen--the spiritual fathers of Hitler's general staff--had advocated precisely this type of operation. It was no accident that one of Schlieffen's main works was entitled "Cannae." We knew this and realized that the Kursk salient would be likely to draw the enemy's attention.

We should not think, however, that in planning his "Cannae" at Kursk the enemy was so naive as not to take clever steps to conceal his tactical,

operative and strategic intentions. The Wehrmacht Command avoided any major regrouping but secretly reinforced and reequipped the formations which were to carry out the strike. Special steps were taken to disinform the Soviet side. However, they failed.

The plan of the summer and autumn 1943 campaign was discussed by Supreme Command Headquarters on 12 April. The conference was attended by J. V. Stalin, G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy and his deputy A. I. Antonov. It was decided to start a campaign of firm defense which would bleed the enemy white from positions on all sides, prepared in advance, with the subsequent routing of its strike forces and then to mount a general strategic offensive in the basic directions of the Soviet-German front. In the Orel dent the Soviet defense plan called for a double outflanking movement if possible; on the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, it called for a series of strikes with a view to splitting the powerful enemy concentration in order to rout the individual groups of force him to retreat in disorder. The plan also called for the systematic committing of reserves.

The defense variant of the plan was adopted as basic. However, it did not exclude another preventive plan in the unlikely situation that the Hitlerite command would not mount active offensive operations soon. Groups of forces were created by the Soviet command in accordance with the basic variant. The main role in the defensive battle was to be played by the Central (K. K. Rokossovskiy commanding, K. F. Telegin, Military Council member, M.S. Malinin, chief of staff) and the Voronezh (N. F. Vatutin commanding, N. S. Khrushchev, Military Council member, and this author, chief of staff) fronts. Behind them, the forces of the Steppe Front--the powerful strategic headquarters reserve (I. S. Konev commanding, I. Z. Susaykov, Military Council member, M. V. Zakharov, chief of staff) were concentrated behind these operative --strategic formations.

The second stage in the battle was to begin after the defensive operations had achieved their objective: a systematic development of a counteroffensive by forces of the left wing of the Western (V. D. Sokolovskiy commanding, N. A. Bulganin, Military Council member, A. P. Pokrovskiy, chief of staff), Bryansk (M. M. Popov commanding, L. Z. Mekhlis, Military Council member, L. M. Sandalov, chief of staff) and Central fronts, followed by the Voronezh, Steppe and right-wing flank of the Southwestern (R. Ya. Malinovskiy commanding, A. S. Zheltov, Military Council member, F. K. Korzhenevich, chief of staff) fronts.

More than 1.3 million men, 19,100 guns and ~~mortars~~ 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns and 2,900 airplanes (including long-range aviation) were concentrated on the 550-kilometer-long Kursk salient. This area accounted for as many as 26 percent of the manpower, guns and ~~mortars~~ 33.5 percent of the combat aircraft, and 46 percent of the tanks of the army in the field. On that sector of the front, the Soviet troops were superior to the enemy by a factor of 1.4 in manpower, 1.9 in guns and ~~mortars~~ 1.2 in tanks and self-propelling guns and almost 1.4 in aircraft. In the course of the entire period which preceded the battle (April-June 1943) the Soviet command was preparing the forces for the decisive forthcoming battle: multiple-defense lines were prepared and thorough combat and moral-political training of the troops was conducted.

Party-political work among the troops continued to improve. Thousands of new party members joined. By VKP(b) Central Committee decree, now primary party organizations were set up in battalions, batteries and subunits of equal strength, while regimental party bureaus were given party committee status. This improved party leadership in the primary units and helped to enhance the combat spirit of the troops. Compared with April 1943, at the beginning of the battle the number of party members in the troops operating in the Kursk salient area had increased by 26 percent and that of Komsomol members by 54 percent; the number of party and Komsomol organizations had increased respectively by 83 and 90 percent. Thanks to the comprehensive and purposeful party-political work, the front personnel were ready to repel the enemy offensive.

But let us consider now the decisions of the front commanders. I recall K. K. Rokossovskiy telling me in one of our meetings that "we were aware of the considerable concentration of enemy forces in the Glazunovka and Tagino area and took into consideration the crucial Orel-Kursk highway. For this reason, we estimated that von Kluge's main strike would be in the direction of Kursk, via Ponyri. Furthermore, the enemy offensive at any other sector was not as threatening, for the manpower and means for reinforcing our front defending the base of the Orel salient could be rapidly thrown in the direction of any other threatened sector. Even had the enemy succeeded in another direction, this operation would have merely pressed our forces back rather than surround and exterminate them."

At the southern side of the Kursk salient, 244 kilometers long, defended by the forces of our Voronezh Front, the threat came from three directions: from Belgorod to Oboyan, from Belgorod to Korocha and from the Muroma and Ternovoy area to Volchansk and Novyy Oskol. At that time our staff was trying hard to determine which of the three directions was the most threatening. However insistently A. I. Antonov asked, we had to report to him that two directions --from Belgorod to Oboyan and from Belgorod to Korocha--were almost equally dangerous. This conclusion was accepted by N. F. Vatutin and, subsequently, by headquarters. We were allowed to concentrate the main front forces there, on the left wing.

Between the end of June and the beginning of July, Hitler held his final military council before launching the summer campaign and set 5 July 1943 as its start; meanwhile, as early as 2 July, we received coded information from headquarters to the effect that enemy attacks should be expected between 3 and 6 July.

The offensive in the Voronezh Front sector began somewhat earlier than along the northern side. The combat outpost of the Sixth Guards Army fought heroically. However, powerful air and artillery support nevertheless allowed the enemy to push back our advance elements along the sector west of Dragunskiy by the evening of 4 July.

I remember Vatutin telling me that it was obvious that the main enemy forces would strike at dawn. An immediate decision was made to initiate an artillery counterbarrage at 2230 hours in the sector held by I. M. Chistyakov's

army and to repeat the same at 0400 in the sectors of the Sixth and Seventh Guards armies. This way, by inflicting casualties on the enemy, we would force him to delay his offensive to 0600.

It was after that, as we expected, that Mannstein committed to battle five infantry and nine tank and motorized divisions toward Oboyan and Korocho. It is true that the strike against Korocho was somewhat weaker. The front forces fought to the death. It was only in the center of the defense forces of the Sixth Guards Army and in one sector of the defense army commanded by M. S. Shumilov (Seventh Guards), after having literally annihilated the defenses, that the enemy advanced and at one point crossed the Severskiy Donets. This success cost the enemy more than 10,000 soldiers and officers, killed and wounded, and the loss of as many as 200 tanks.

As recommended by the staff, it was decided to continue to wear out the Hitlerites through stubborn defense on 6 July, to prevent at all cost any widening of the breach toward the flanks and, at the same time, to maneuver forces and armaments. General M. Ye. Katukov was ordered to move two of his corps to the second defense line of the Sixth Guards Army in order to keep Melovoye and Yakovlevo in our hands; the Second and Fifth separate guards tank corps were sent to the Teterevino and Gostishchevo sectors to prepare counterstrikes toward Belgorod with a view to blocking the development of the enemy's offensive to the northeast. Furthermore, from the Second Front echelon we moved forward the 69th Army, commanded by Gen V. D. Kryuchenkin, and the 35th Guards Infantry Corps; we also strengthened the defenses of the 40th Army commanded by Gen K. S. Moskalenko.

These plans were promptly carried out: M. Ye. Katukov's tank forces and the separate tank corps, advancing to our second defense line on both sides of the Oboyan-Belgorod highway, pressed the wedged enemy force between our tanks and fighter-antitank artillery. The two guards infantry divisions (67th and 52nd), which were defending the first defense line, continued to fight with dedication and firmness.

Therefore, the 2-day battle in the Oboyan and Korocho directions did not bring the enemy any decisive success. However, heavy losses did not discourage Mannstein who continued, with an armed fist, to push his troops forward toward Oboyan, having secured Hitler's promise to strengthen his forces urgently by withdrawing major troops from other sectors on the Soviet-German front.

Our own front reserves were exhausted and we were forced to turn to headquarters. On the night of 7 July we were given from the Steppe Front the 10th and from the Southwestern Front the Second Tank corps for our counterstrike. Furthermore, the air force on R. Ya. Malinovskiy's front was concentrated on giving support to our front.

With these available reserves, we asked ourselves how to use the tanks: should we throw them immediately into frontal combat or strengthen our defense with their help? Opinions were divided but, in the final account, it was deemed expedient to have most of the tanks dig in so that, while remaining invulnerable to the enemy, they could meet him with precision fire. As

the subsequent development of events proved, combined with the effective artillery and infantry operations, this created an insurmountable barrier for the enemy. Furthermore, we left some of the tanks dug in for action against wedged fascist tanks.

As a result of all of these measures, Mannstein's plan of quickly surmounting the second defense line and reaching operative grounds failed. The powerful defense convinced the Hitlerite strategist that he would be unable to gain maneuvering freedom toward Oboyan and he decided to bypass it from the east toward Prokhorovka. I radioed this information to Gen A. I. Antonov, after which J. V. Stalin himself was personally informed of the situation in the greatest detail and toward the end of 9 July ordered the forces of the Steppe Front to advance in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. The 27th Army with the Fourth Guards Tank Corps were directed to the Kursk sector; the 53rd Army with the First Mechanized Corps, to the line along the Seym River (southeast of Kursk); the Fifth Guards Army, to the army defense line between Oboyan and Prokhorovka; the Fifth Guards Tank Army, assigned to the Voronezh Front, was ordered to concentrate north of Prokhorovka.

Therefore, starting with the morning of 12 July, a counterstrike became possible aimed at stopping the enemy offensive and routing his wedged group. We committed to the counterstrike the Fifth Guards Tank Army (commanded by P. A. Rotmistrov), some elements of the Fifth Guards Army commanded by A. S. Zhadov, and the Sixth and Seventh Guards and First Tank armies. At this point there could not even be a question of operating with dug-in tanks for victory could be gained only as a result of a daring maneuver. The confrontation, therefore, assumed a different shape and developed into the famous Prokhorovka frontal tank battle.

As early as the night of 12 July the air force of the Second and elements of the 17th Air armies and the long-range aviation made concentrated strikes against the enemy. Thousands of guns and howitzers opened fire at 0830 and tanks and infantry moved to the attack. The main events took place in the sector of the offensive of the Fifth Guards Tank and Fifth Guards Combined armies. An fierce tank battle unparalleled in the history of war developed, which lasted the entire day of 12 July. It was difficult to determine who was attacking and who was defending. Hundreds of tanks mixed on the battlefield and the tankists were forced to fire point-blank. Command heights, hamlets and settlements repeatedly changed hands. Confidently using the better maneuverability of their machines, the Soviet tank men fired from short distances disabling the heavy enemy tanks. Our losses as well, however, were heavy.

The Prokhorovka battle, which involved 1,200 tanks and assault guns from both sides, ended with the defeat of the main German-fascist forces. That day they lost a large number of tanks and more than 4,500 soldiers and officers. Unable to succeed in his offensive, the enemy was forced to convert to defense.

After the war, Army Commander A. S. Zhadov wrote that "I will never forget the skillful and daring actions of the two Fifth Guard armies--the tank and

combined forces--in the Prokhorovka battle. Unparalleled firmness and mass heroism were the standard behavior of all guardsmen in this bloody battle."

The Prokhorovka tank battle was won by the Soviet forces. It cost the Wehrmacht heavy losses in personnel and as many as 400 tanks. 12 July was the day on which the German offensive toward Kursk from the south was defeated. The enemy's attempts to advance in the area held by the 69th Army, which lasted 3 days, were already of a local nature. Having failed in reaching their target--advancing toward Kursk--the Mannstein forces began to withdraw. The formations of the Voronezh Front began to pursue the enemy.

Events on the Central Front also developed in our favor. Here on the night of 5 July another artillery counterbarrage was opened, which brought confusion within the enemy's ranks. It took Model more than 2 hours to restore order. The Orel German-fascist group mounted its offensive at 0530 hours along the entire sector of the 13th and the right flank of the 70th armies, concentrating its main strike on a narrow sector of the front, as anticipated. During the first day of the offensive the enemy committed as many as 500 tanks and assault guns. The offensive was supported by strong artillery fire and air strikes. As many as 300 bombers operating in groups of 50 to 100 airplanes bombed the front defense line along its entire tactical depth and mainly the artillery fire positions. Heavy and stubborn battles broke out. The following day, the forces of the Central Front dealt the enemy a short but quite powerful counterstrike. Failing on 6 July both in the center and along the left flank of the 13th Army, in the morning of 7 July the enemy focused its main efforts on Ponyri. For 2 days fierce battles went on uninterruptedly. Ponyri passed from hand to hand but, in the final account, remained in ours.

By the end of the third day of battle virtually all front reserves had been committed. K. K. Rokossovskiy decided to risk it: he sent in the main direction his last reserve--the Ninth Tank Corps commanded by S. I. Bogdanov, deployed in the Kursk area, protecting the city from the south. As a result, in 6 days of continuous combat, the enemy succeeded in wedging itself within our defenses in an area no more than 6-12 kilometers wide. Therefore, the troops of the Central Front were able to carry out their assignment. Model's Ninth Army, which advanced from the Orel salient, totaling 15 infantry, six tank and one motorized division, supported by about 6,000 guns and howitzers and almost 1,000 airplanes, failed to break through toward its southern group which was deployed along the southern side of the Kursk Arc.

Shortly before his death in the steppes at Grayvoron, Lt Gen Gustaw Schmidt, commander of the 19th Tank Division, wrote the following on the insurmountable nature of our defenses in his survey of the combat operations: "prior to our offensive we knew little about the Russian fortifications. We did not assume the existence of even a quarter of what the Russians had erected. Each shrub, point, copse and hill had been turned into a fortress. They stretched in length and in width with a system of such well-camouflaged firing positions and pillboxes that it was impossible to detect them even from a distance of 5 meters. The pillboxes were covered with a thick layer of lumber and railroad ties, as a result of which the effect of our artillery

and mortar fire and dive bombers was little. It is difficult to imagine the stubbornness with which the Russians defended each trench and foxhole."

While wearing down the enemy hordes with a firm defense, the Soviet command was continuing to prepare a counteroffensive which, in addition to the forces of the Voronezh and Central fronts, which had defeated Operation Citadel, involved formations of the Western, Bryansk and Steppe fronts. The participation of five fronts in this counteroffensive was based on the strengthened economic and military power of the socialist state (the counteroffensives at Moscow and Stalingrad involved three fronts).

The forces of the left wing of the Western and Bryansk fronts, not involved in repelling the enemy's pressure on the Kursk Arc, mounted a counteroffensive on 12 July. The army of the right wing of the Central Front opened their offensive on 15 July. On 12 July the forces of the Voronezh Front, reinforced with strategic reserves, dealt a powerful counterstrike. On 3 August, together with the Steppe Front, they opened their counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

The counteroffensive of Kursk developed into two major offensive operations: Orel (code named "Kutuzov"), from 12 July to 18 August, and Belgorod-Kharkov (code-named "Polkovodets Rumyantsev"), from 3 to 23 August.

In the Orel salient the enemy forces totaled 37 divisions, eight of them tank and two motorized (as many as 600,000 soldiers and officers), more than 7,000 guns and howitzers, about 1,200 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1,100 combat airplanes. Long before their offensive on Kursk, the Hitlerites had built a powerful defense with a developed system of field fortifications, strongly protected by engineering obstacles. The forces along the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and Central fronts numbered 1,286,000 men, more than 21,000 guns and mortars, 2,400 tanks and self-propelled artillery systems and more than 3,000 combat aircraft. This meant that in this area the Soviet command enjoyed superiority over the enemy which was double in manpower, triple in artillery, more than double in tanks and almost triple in airpower. This superiority was overwhelming in the sectors where defenses had to be breached.

In preparing the forces for the operation, the command and the political organs paid particular attention to party-political work among the troops and to securing ammunition and fuel for the units and formations. The trend of party-political work changed flexibly: whereas at the beginning of the battle it was concentrated on developing inflexible firmness in defense, now its purpose was to create an offensive thrust. The scope of activities of the party and political apparatus was increasingly broadening and deepening: thousands of propagandists and agitators brought to the soldiers' masses the fiery calls of the communist party which summoned them to exploit and to ensuring the fastest possible routing of the hated aggressors.

The southern strikes launched by the Western and Bryansk fronts shook up the entire operative order of the Wehrmacht forces. Along these fronts the counteroffensive developed at a headlong pace. By the end of 13 July, as a

result of fierce battles, the 11th Guards Army of the Western Front pierced the enemy's defenses at a depth of up to 25 kilometers. The forces of the Third and 63rd armies of the Bryansk Front advanced 15 kilometers in the direction of the main strike. In order to develop the offensive of the Bryansk Front, on 19 July the Third Guards Tank Army commanded by Gen P. S. Rybalko was committed to battle. Gen Rudolf Schmidt, the commander of the Second German Tank Army, was doing everything possible to localize the success achieved by the forces under the command of I. Kh. Bagramyan, A. V. Gorbatov and V. Ya. Kolpakchi. He also requested help from Kluge and Hitler, who hastily transferred to the sector held by the Second Tank Army a number of formations from the operative reserve, other front sectors and even Model's strike force.

All in all, Hitler's command reacted quite nervously to the events at Prokhorovka and along the northern line of the Orel Arc. As early as 13 July, i.e., the day after the beginning of the operations, Hitler summoned to his headquarter Kluge, Mannstein and other commanders. The commander of the Group of Armies Center reported that Model's army, having lost 20,000 men, was no longer able to continue the offensive, for all of its mobile units had been removed from it; Mannstein swaggered. He stated that the battle on the front of the Group of Armies South had entered its decisive stage, for allegedly here the Russians had expended their last reserves. Infuriated, Hitler removed R. Schmidt from his command and combined the Second Tank and the Ninth armies under the command of Model, who enjoyed the Fuehrer's particular trust. At the end of the conference, Hitler allowed Mannstein to continue his offensive and the latter tried to move ahead until 19 July, when the following entry was made in the "Diary of Combat Operations of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command:" "The further pursuit of the Citadel operation seems no longer possible as a result of the enemy's strong offensive. We are terminating our offensive in order to create reserves by shortening the front line."

Therefore, the discussion of whether to continue the Citadel operation began on 13 July and was totally unrelated to the landing of the Western Allies in Sicily, as the bourgeois falsifiers of history claim, but was to the strikes inflicted by the Soviet forces at the Orel bridgehead and Prokhorovka. The termination of this operation on 19 July was also the result of our successful counteroffensive. Incidentally, on 10 July there were seven German divisions, one brigade and slightly more than 500 combat aircraft in all of Italy, whereas more than 200 enemy divisions were operating on the Soviet-German front.

Toward the end of July, the forces of the 11th Guard, Fourth Tank and 61st armies approached the main engineering facilities which supported the entire group of army forces in the Orel bridgehead and the Orel-Bryansk railroad and highway. Coming from the south toward them, the forces of K. K. Rokossovskiy were stubbornly advancing. Our troops were increasingly squeezing Model's forces in the immediate approaches to Orel, from three sides--north, east and south. On the night of 4 August elements of the Fifth, 129th and 380th infantry divisions were in the vicinity of Orel. The city lay in front of them in smoke and flames. Here and there the flames would burst over the city and explosions would be heard.

"Troops and commanders!" the Military Council of the Bryansk Front addressed itself to the forces. "In front of you the Hitlerite bandits are destroying the city of Orel.... Two or three hours of a rapid offensive...would prevent the enemy from totally destroying our city. Forward! Let us liberate it as soon as possible!" The headlong storming of the city began. On the heels of the retreating enemy elements of the Fifth Infantry Division were the first to enter the city. Their success enabled the other units to accelerate their advance. The population hastened to help the storming troops. On 5 August the red flag of the homeland was hoisted over Orel.

Thus, the Soviet forces advanced in the Orel bridgehead for 37 days, from 12 July to 18 August. Within that time they advanced 150 kilometers to the west and routed as many as 15 enemy divisions. The depression along our front in the Orel area was wiped out. Prior to the Soviet offensive Goebbels had claimed that the Orel wedge was a bayonet aimed at the heart of Russia. Now this bayonet had been pulled out of enemy hands. The powerful group of German-fascist forces, which had been created for the offensive on Kursk from the north, suffered a most serious defeat.

The forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began their counteroffensive under difficult conditions. They suffered severe losses in the heavy defense battles and, subsequently, in the frontal tank battle. South of Kursk, at the beginning of August the Wehrmacht had 300,000 men. This meant 18 divisions, including four tank, with more than 3,000 guns and about 600 tanks and assault guns and more than 1,000 airplanes.

The forces of our Voronezh and Steppe fronts were able to reach the area north of Belgorod by 24 July, from where we were able to strike a profound dividing blow at the Fourth German Tank Army with the Kempf operative group. After a thorough study of staff data, Gens N. F. Vatutin and I. S. Konev, decided to deal a powerful frontal blow with the neighboring flanks of the fronts in the overall direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, for the purpose of splitting the enemy group into two parts and routing them separately. Headquarters approved the decision.

On 3 August at dawn, as the forces of the Bryansk and Western fronts were approaching Orel, the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts started their offensive. Thorough preparations for the operation yielded results: coordinated and sudden strikes by the artillery, air force, tanks and infantry enabled the forces of our front, advancing toward Belgorod from the south, to breach the enemy defense line 3 hours later. At noon the First and Fifth Tank armies entered the breach. Meanwhile, I. S. Konev's forces, which were advancing north of Belgorod, were engaged in fierce battles against the enemy's main defense line until 1500 hours. In order to speed up matters the commander committed to battle the first mechanized corps which was able to breach the main defense line.

The immediate battle for Belgorod began on the morning of 5 August. Meanwhile, the forces of the Seventh Guards Army, commanded by Gen M. S. Shumilov, having crossed the Severskiy Donets, threatened the enemy garrison in Belgorod from the south. Elements of the First Mechanized Corps of the Steppe Front,

which had entered an area west of the city, cut off the Belgorod-Kharkov railroad and highway. The threat of encirclement hung over the fascist garrison. The first to enter Belgorod at 0600 on 5 August were the subunits of the 89th Guards Infantry Division commanded by Lt Col M. P. Seryugin. Closely interacting with the division was the 305th Infantry Division commanded by Col A. F. Vasil'yev. The raging enemy was forced to abandon the city in order to rescue the remnants of his defeated units. More than 3,000 enemy soldiers and officers were killed in these battles. Belgorod was entirely liberated from fascist forces on the evening of 5 August. Another ancient Russian city was returned to the homeland together with Orel. The first artillery salute in the history of the Great Patriotic War was fired in Moscow on the evening of 5 August in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Pursuing their offensive, in 5 days the forces of the Voronezh Front advanced more than 100 kilometers and by the end of 7 August had captured Bogodukhovo and Grayvoron, which were important enemy strongholds. At the junction of the Goth Army and the Kempf Group we had opened a 50-kilometer-wide breach in which we introduced the Fourth Guards Army given to us from the reserves. In an effort to avoid an encirclement west of Grayvoron, the remnants of three infantry and one tank enemy divisions with their trains and staffs started a hasty retreat. Columns of trucks, tanks and artillery spread over many kilometers and were routed in fast combat. On 11 August the forces of our front cut off the Kharkov-Poltava Railroad while the forces of I. S. Konev came close to the Kharkov defense line. This faced the enemy with the threat of having the main forces of the Group of Armies South surrounded. With his characteristic cruelty, Mannstein threw his forces into counterstrikes, initially out of the area south of Bogodukhovo, using three tank divisions against the guard tankmen commanded by M. Ye. Katukov (11-16 August) and then from Akhtyrki, committing the forces of three tank and two motorized divisions against the 27th Army (18-20 August). With these extremely fierce strikes the Hitlerite strategist was able to stop the offensive of the right wing of our front but failed to reach his objective. The power of the Soviet aviation and the 47th and Fourth Guards armies, committed to battle north and northeast of Akhtyrki, localized the enemy's breakthrough.

On the approaches to Kharkov, the Wehrmacht command tried to stabilize the front in the Bogodukhovo and Akhtyrki sectors and to occupy firm defensive positions. Hitler most categorically demanded of Mannstein to hold Kharkov at all cost. However, all enemy efforts proved futile: on 13 August I. S. Konev's forces broke through the external defense line and Hitlerite installations 8 to 14 kilometers out of the city. The battle for the second capital of the Ukraine lasted until 22 August. That day, the Fifth Guards Tank Army, which had left the Steppe Front, bypassed Kharkov from the west and the southwest, while the 57th Army bypassed it from the east and southeast. In order to prevent the total destruction of the city, I. S. Konev ordered that Kharkov be stormed on the night of 23 August. In the glow rising above the city, the Soviet forces rushed to the attack. They fought with dedication and heroism everywhere--in the center and the suburbs. By dawn, the remnants of the enemy garrison, threatened with being totally surrounded, panicking, ran to the south, leaving thousands of corpses in the streets. Most of this group **in fact also died.**

Kharkov was entirely cleared of the aggressors by noon on 23 August. The forces of the Steppe Front, which had stormed the second capital of the Ukraine, helped the right wing of our front which had resumed its offensive and routed the Hitlerites in the Akhtyrki area, liberating the city on 25 August. The Southwestern Front as well contributed to the success at Kharkov.

In the course of the Belgorod-Kharkov operation 15 enemy divisions, including four tank, were routed. The fronts which participated in this operation advanced as much as 140 kilometers to the south and southwest. The offensive front line reached 300 kilometers. Conditions were created for the subsequent liberation of the entire Left Bank Ukraine. The characteristic feature of this quite instructive operation was the fact that, without having the time to regroup and maneuver, we struck at the strongest enemy group and were able to crush its resistance.

Let us sum briefly the results of the great battle for Kursk, which was of tremendous military-political significance. In the course of the battle 30 elite enemy divisions were routed, including seven tank. The Wehrmacht lost more than 500,000 soldiers and officers, 1,500 tanks and 3,000 guns.

The victory at Kursk and the reaching of the Dnepr by the Soviet forces completed the radical turn in the course of the war. The fascist Reich and its satellites turned to defense in all theaters of combat operations. The defeat of the huge Wehrmacht forces in the east made possible the almost unobstructed landing of the forces of the Western allies in Italy. Also related to this battle was the further comprehensive energizing of the resistance movement. The reputation of the Soviet Union as the leading force in the anti-Hitlerite coalition became unshakeable.

In the battles for Kursk the Soviet troops once again demonstrated with tremendous power their mass heroism, increased military skill, high political consciousness and invincible combat spirit. More than 100,000 Soviet troops were awarded orders and medals and more than 180 received the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the Kursk battle no one dared to question the superiority of Soviet martial skills over those of Hitlerite Germany. A number of most important problems in the areas of strategy, operative art and tactics were resolved successfully, originally and flexibly by the Soviet military-strategic leadership. They include the efficient organization in time and space of strategic interaction among front groups, the careful concentration and fast utilization of strategic reserves, the concentration of forces and armaments along the decisive directions, the use of tank armies as an echelon with which to develop successes, and the gain of strategic air superiority.

The myth which prevailed in the West was that the Soviet side was able to engage in effective offensive operations only in the winter. The failure of "Citadel" and subsequent events refute this fabrication. The Kursk battle determined the further change of ratio of forces on the front and gave the

strategic initiative to the Soviet command for the rest of the war. Favorable conditions were created for a general strategic offensive by the Soviet army which was now able to dictate its will to the enemy. Along the still tremendously long Soviet-German front in no major operational direction was the fascist leadership able to engage in large-scale offensive operations. Defense and withdrawal, both strategic and operative, became the bitter lot of the recent pretenders to world rule.

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KAMPUCHEA: THE MIRACLE OF REVIVAL

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[Text] Words similar to these, side by side, may be read in virtually all articles on the People's Republic of Kampuchea. They are no exaggeration. Furthermore, no word can express the unbearable pain and the growing feeling of joy when visiting this beautiful ancient country which, after experiencing a tragedy which, in the unanimous view of our contemporaries, is without precedent in world history, has finally regained its lost freedom and returned to the high road of social progress.

The miracle of Kampuchea's revival is one more irrefutable argument in favor of the historical optimism of the communists, who are convinced of the inevitable victory of the revolution and the triumph of scientific socialism, and who are firmly aware of the fact that no reactionary doctrines hostile to it, and not even the most destructive experiments, and not even the fiercest terrorism can stop historical progress for too long. This miracle is entirely man-made. It is based on the thirst for life of a nation, aggravated by trials, and the stress of all constructive forces within the people, who are patiently surmounting the consequences of a despotic propagation of a man-hating utopia in the country. It became possible thanks to the deed of the international fraternity, accomplished on Kampuchean land on a daily basis.

It is a difficult revival.

The Burden of the Past

I shall never forget the wooden memorial ramada not far from the city of Kompong Speu, center of the province bearing the same name, several dozen kilometers away from the Kampuchean capital....

A pile of crushed human skulls lay on the earthen floor next to the rusty murder weapon, which looked like a hammer. A neat pile of bones tied with telephone wire, as were the hands of the victims, showed clinging bits of faded clothing. Sitting on the banister, with their backs turned to this silently shrieking nightmare, were Kampuchean children, by now accustomed to it all, swinging their legs and looking at the visitors with quiet curiosity.

This contrast looked unnatural and terrible. Equally unrealistic was the surrounding landscape, with peacefully grazing cows, drawn here by particularly rich grass which had grown over the 3 kilometers of this mass burial field containing more than 4,000 bodies in common graves.

This apotheosis of the counterrevolution, which turns one's blood to ice, is a merciless condemnation of a regime whose attitude toward its own people cannot be encompassed even by the concept of "genocide." It is a terrible warning of the danger of petit bourgeois down-and-out radicalism which has erected on Kampuchean land memorials of human bones.

KOMMUNIST (No 14, 1979) has already given a detailed analysis of the phenomenon known as Pol Potism and has explained the theoretical, political and class roots of this exported model of state slavery dressed in garish socialist clothing. This article will describe the present of the people's republic. However, as we describe it, we cannot avoid the past which is still oozing blood, making itself felt at every step, coexisting with the present.

"The memory of the past is unbearable," said Pen Pann, interim editor in chief of the newspaper KAMPUCHEA. "My 7-month-old child died in the 20th century for lack of milk and basic medicine. My father died of hunger and unbearably heavy work. My younger brother, who was 'unfortunate' enough to be a student, my sister, who was a teacher, her husband, her children and my nephew died. Many of my wife's relatives perished. It was easy to die under Pol Pot. There is no family without sorrow in Kampuchea. A terrible harm was done to our nation. All of us suffered. Pol Potism became a fact of our national history, something which no one can avoid. All of us suffer from it. We must understand the past thoroughly in order to tell the truth about it to our children and be able confidently to build a bright future for them...."

The 1981 constitution of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which legislatively codified the revolutionary gains of the people, clearly defined the path which the country intends to follow--the path of laying the foundations of socialism. Under Kampuchean conditions this is an extremely complex task. However, it is the only possible way to revive the country.

It is quite inadequate to say that Kampuchea is entering the transitional period with a virtually total lack of material prerequisites for socialism. In discussing the difficulties of the transitional period, my collocutors pointed out what a high price Kampuchea has had to pay and is paying for its feudal and colonial past, the neocolonialist policy of U.S. imperialism in the area and the direct U.S. armed intervention in the affairs of the country which was placed under the military-dictatorial Lon Nol regime and turned into an arena of bloodshed and war.

"As a result of military activities and American bombing more than 1 million Kampucheans died, were wounded or maimed...", we read in a brief essay on Kampuchean history, which is an interesting attempt to consider for the first time in world science the complex destiny of this country from most ancient times to the present from the positions of Marxist-Leninist methodology. "In

areas controlled by the Lon Nol regime agricultural output accounted for 25 percent and industrial production for no more than one-eighth of the prewar levels. Four-fifths of all enterprises and two-thirds of the rubber plantations were destroyed. More than three-quarters of the highways and railroads were destroyed and ports and docks suffered substantial damages. Prices of prime necessity goods reached fabulous amounts. The population suffered from inflation and unemployment. Corruption blossomed.* Running away from the bombing, hundreds of thousands of rural people rushed from the areas of military operations to the cities which were, as a rule, under the control of government troops. This disorganized the country's life even further and weakened social and individual ties.

The ideas and forces of the national democratic revolution, which won relatively quickly, were strengthened under the conditions of aggravated social contradictions. The working people of the people's republic celebrate 17 April 1975, the day the units of the liberation army entered Phnom Penh, quite justifiably as Kampuchean National Day. However, they also recall that the day the revolution won did not become liberation day.

Betrayal had been ripening for quite some time and developing secretly. The people were fighting for freedom while Pol Pot and his stooges were fighting for power, not stopping at intrigues and assassinations. Like flotsam rising from the deep to the crest of the revolution, the werewolf began to destroy it in accordance with prescriptions carefully transcribed from foreign notebooks. Being political adventurers, they were intoxicated with power and were burning with impatience to outstrip and amaze everyone. Clearly suffering from an inferiority complex, the leaders of the regime undertook to implement their sinister utopia with maniacal consistency brought to the point of absurdity, and with a dull, crushing method. Growing on the lean but poisonous soil of Maoist dogma, this utopia flourished under the specific conditions of a backward peasant country.

The results of the experiment are known: some 3 million totally innocent people died; those who survived experienced heavy moral and physical trauma. The national economy and national culture were destroyed. Whatever aspect of reborn life we discussed during our trip, the invariable refrain was "we began literally from scratch!" for such was the regime's doctrine: sweep off everything, destroy everything to the foundations, resolve all contradictions in one fell swoop, most frequently with a hoe, in order to build something in between a primitive community, barracks and forced labor camp.

Tireless regress, the chain reaction of the breakdown of all social structures and institutions, slaughtering people with mattocks and sticks, thus saving bullets for the bandit war against Vietnam, the loyal ally in the liberation struggle, were all proclaimed to be the "revolution of the big leap, tremendous progress, outstanding perfection," "pure, collectivistic socialist system." The anthem of "democratic Kampuchea," which had become

* "Istoriya Kampuchii. Kratkiy Ocherk" [History of Kampuchea. Brief Outline]. Edited by Yu. Ya. Mikheyev (responsible editor), Yu. P. Dement'yev and V. A. Kozhevnikov. Nauka, Moscow, 1981, p 219.

one large concentration camp--"Red blood is flowing on the cities and villages of the Kampuchean homeland, the blood of workers and peasants, the great blood of the revolutionary fighters!... We are uniting to build Kampuchea and the new socialism, democracy, equality and justice in order to follow the path of our predecessors in the struggle for true independence"--sounded like a sinister irony and mockery of the memory of those who had died and over the slavish lot of the living, throughout this country paralyzed by horror, for a little less than 4 long years. Lying on the floor in Tuolsleng High School, in the capital, which the Pol Pot executioners had turned into a jail, but in which the people's regime opened a genocide museum, was the seal of "democratic Kampuchea," symbolizing the free toil of workers and peasants. It was thus that the very idea of socialism was defiled, vilified and destroyed in the awareness of the people.

"Our people bitterly hate the Pol Pot executioners. This is unquestionable," said Chheng Phon, minister of information, press and culture, addressing himself to the bitter lessons of the recent past and the difficult concerns of the present. "However, the Pol Pot regime left in the minds of the people a muddy sediment of social and political demagoguery. Getting rid of it is no simple matter, the more so in a country such as ours. The awareness of the Kampuchean people remains petit bourgeois. It is not free from extreme individualism and nationalism. The situation historically has developed in such a way that Buddhism has a great influence in the country and the centuries-old tradition of the cult of the monarchy is still felt. In building the new Kampuchea we also take into consideration that during the life of a single generation the country has had several "models" of sociopolitical systems and that all of this had to influence the people one way or another. The gain of political independence is linked to Sihanouk's monarchy and so are demagogical promises of building a "Khmer Buddhist, royalist socialism."

No less demagogically the reactionary General Lon Nol made political capital from overthrowing the monarchy and instituting the republic.

"Naturally, however, the most difficult and important thing is to eliminate Pol Potism," the minister went on to say. "We must convince the people that Pol Pot does not mean socialism and that the Pol Pot regime is irreconcilably hostile to it. We must help the people to come closer to an understanding of the progressive outlook of the working class. Today this is one of the most important areas of struggle for the socialist future of Kampuchea...."

This problem, which the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party is resolving, is also extraordinarily complex, for the country has virtually no modern working class while the party itself is in its period of establishment.

The Strategic Task

Kom Kousal, 26 years old, who graduated from the high school in the capital before 1975 and was among the lucky ones left alive, a charming and concerned man, was my permanent assistant in my trip around the country. He was working in the press sector of the propaganda and agitation department of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. He quite justifiably considered himself a cadre worker, although not yet a party member.

This detail says a great deal about the urgency and the exceptional difficulty of structuring the party and developing and strengthening the country's revolutionary forces. In today's Kampuchea this is a strategic task.

The way in which the contamination of leftist extremism eventually penetrated the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, which was founded in 1951 and which had continued the great combat traditions of the Communist Party of Indochina, has a long history and is a separate subject. For our story, it is important to recall that the Pol Pot clique, which took over the party's leadership, applied to it that same "zero option" strategy of total "purge." Party veterans, the best Marxist-Leninist cadres, anyone who had either gone to school in Vietnam or had somehow expressed a disagreement with the ideology and practice of the regime or was even suspected of opposing it, was killed either singly or en masse or sent to "political courses" from which no one returned. The lightest measure, although a leftist radical measure, was to expel from the party ranks entire cells considered either unsuitable or suspicious. They were replenished mostly by illiterate and ignorant adolescents, many of whom did not even know that the earth on which the blood of their compatriots was being shed is round, or that it turns.

The Pol Pot ignoramus equally ignored the objective laws of social dynamics. Along with everything else, they intended to rewrite the party's history. Under Pol Pot the time of its founding was reported to 1960, when the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party was renamed the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Judging by available data, however, the purpose of this official title was to serve the propaganda needs of the regime. The short word "Angka," which meant "organization," was gaining an increasingly sinister popularity. As is natural, this despotism was surrounded by strictest secrecy. In business correspondence the central leadership of Angka had the code name of "Department 870." It was from here that the basic directives were promulgated. It was on behalf of Angka that people were killed, marriages were "contracted" by force, and other monstrous crimes were committed.

Literally a few months before its collapse, the regime distributed Pol Pot's speech of 27 December 1978, translated into foreign languages, delivered on the occasion of the 18th anniversary of the "Great Communist Party of Kampuchea," which had been virtually destroyed. The regime was agonizing yet the leader of Angka continued to claim shamelessly that "the key factor of our victory is our party's leading role, that "the number of shortcomings in party activities is declining," and that such activities are based on the "principle of democratic centralism." It is no secret that this more or less clever and coarse forgery of Marxism misled for a while sincere friends of the Kampuchean revolution. Such verbosity can trick people to this day. The overwhelming disparity between the "revolutionary" words and counterrevolutionary practices of the Pol Pot regime offers to this day rich material for anticommunist speculations. Pol Pot's demagoguery continues to harm new Kampuchea. Its exposure is also part of shaping the country's revolutionary forces.

Kandal Province, in which the Kampuchean capital is located, has 12 counties, 164 districts and 1,248 villages with a population of more than 700,000. By the end of December 1982 it had six party cells, one per two counties. Here

are some more figures which give an idea of the party's current concerns. I obtained them from Keo Saphon, head of organizational affairs of the provincial party committee. The Kandal party organization consists of 42 members, including army servicemen. Most of them are young. Keo Saphon himself joined the party in 1980. It is true that he is assisted by three veterans who began their revolutionary activities as members of the Communist Party of Indochina, took part in the war against French and American imperialism, and fought the Pol Pot regime. Communists may be found in 10 of the 12 counties. There are 14 party members in "out-of-the-way" places. In Kompong Speu Province, which is half the size of Kandal, there are five counties, 58 districts and 1,189 villages with a population of some 350,000. It has 36 party members working in four party cells. This year the task of the provincial party committee is to create a cell in each county.

The Kandal party committee intends to see to it that there is one party member per district in the immediate future. Keo Saphon agreed with me that this was not much. However, in this case haste is dangerous. The people well know what happened when a number of semi- or totally illiterate peasants joined the party after 1970. These people had virtually no experience in the liberation struggle. They proved to be untrained for conscious participation in the revolutionary movement. Developing new party members in today's Kampuchea is a very difficult matter.

Such work is being done persistently but without haste. The party trains and raises its reinforcements among the groups of activists. Selection is very strict. Three most important requirements must be met by the future communist: labor activeness, full support of the party's political course and high moral standards. The difficulty in becoming an activist may be judged by the fact alone that only two ministers and one deputy minister I met turned out to be members of such groups.

There are 184 activists in Kandal although the membership is close to 1,000. They are actively promoting the party line in the local areas. The Kampong Speu party committee is quite proud of the fact that groups of activists are already working in 13 villages. In 1981 the province had 363 activists and by the end of last year it had 76 groups with 477 members. This is a great force.

"In the 4 years after the liberation of the homeland," said Men Samon, Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee member and deputy head of the Central Committee's propaganda and education department, "we achieved great successes in the military, political and economic areas and in cultural construction.

"However, we consider as our greatest success the fact that we were able to rebuild the party within a short time, firmly on the positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The Third Congress, at which the party was restored, was held in January 1979. The Fourth Party Congress was held in Phnom Penh in May 1981. It was given its former name--the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party. The second thing we were able to do in the area of party construction is to set up organizations in a number of provinces,

counties and districts. These efforts will be continued. However, we must display vigilance and carefully protect party rank purity.

"Currently we are conducting extensive educational work among the party members and our cadre workers at all levels. We ascribe exceptional importance to this. As we know, we have virtually no old and tried revolutionary cadres left. We are short of experience. All of us must learn a great deal. We are short of literally everything. However, despite tremendous difficulties, the party is successfully heading the country's revival, relying in its work on the broadest possible people's strata...."

A congress of people's representatives, which proclaimed the creation of the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea, met in the liberated zone in December 1978. Very shortly afterwards it was renamed. It accurately expresses the changes which have taken place in the country. Today the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense is a prestigious mass organization which unites and rallies all revolutionary and patriotic forces of the nation. "Front" is a word which has become a firm part of the contemporary political glossary. Applied to Kampuchea, however, it immediately loses its metaphorical nature.

Defending Independence and Freedom

The past never surrenders without a fight. The enemies of the people's republic, sparing no funds, undertake from time to time to renovate the rather threadbare decorations and settings of phantasmagoric and absurd activities which took place in Kampuchea. Their producers and extras continue to stage cynical political shows which insult the national feelings of the Kampucheans and the civic conscience of anyone who cherishes the ideals of peace and social progress.

The latest farce in the defense of "democratic Kampuchea" is being performed by the members of the "coalition government," who dislike one another and who, in their effort to help the Pol Pot executioners and to give them some kind of external seemliness, apply great pressure to involve leaders of other political blocs within the reactionary Khmer exiles--Sihanouk and Son Sen. The members of the tripartite coalition, who are trying to set up a "united front" against the People's Republic of Kampuchea, claim that "Kampuchea is occupied and that its sovereignty is violated."

"Our party responsibly states," I heard in a talk given at the propaganda and education department of the party's Central Committee, "that the 'coalition government' has no influence in the country whatsoever. Our people hate not only Pol Pot but Sihanouk, who has become a national traitor by entering into a conspiracy with the worst enemies of the nation. Perhaps no more than a few, very few members of the rich classes are bemoaning their rich life and privileges they enjoyed under Sihanouk. However, we try to open the eyes even of those people to the progressive changes taking place in the country. The simple people, our peasants, all working people reject the uninvited defenders of our Kampuchean sovereignty...."

Only yesterday, zealously obeying foreign self-seeking orders, the Pol Pot people were sending peasant boys, poisoned by slumbering nationalism, to kill and violate the population of the border areas with Vietnam. They are now slandering the Vietnamese volunteers, accusing them of allegedly accusing the Kampuchean peasants. The Pol Pot survivors falsely repent for the "errors committed," and swear that the 3 million patriots they killed are nothing but a malicious fabrication by the Kampuchean "enemies." They are trying to convince everyone that they are not fighting against the Kampuchean people and that Khmers do not fire at Khmers.

However, for the past 5 years it has not been practice shells and mines which are continuing to explode in the Kampuchean areas bordering Thailand, on whose territory the Pol Pot and other counterrevolutionary rabble have found shelter at one time or another, after escaping from Kampuchea. It is here that the line of the "front of undeclared war" passes, a war which the enemies of the Kampuchean revolution would like to spread throughout the country's territory.

Last December I was lucky to see the extensive celebration in the republic of the 38th anniversary of the Vietnamese People's Army. This was a general holiday! It was general, for the two neighboring countries had been joined for many years in the revolutionary fraternity of war. The Kampuchean patriots have not forgotten that the units of the Vietnamese People's Army, which entered their country on their request in 1971, fully liberated many provinces and thus made a very great contribution to the 17 April 1975 victory. Nor will the people of Kampuchea forget the fact that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its soldiers, responding to the appeal for help of the patriotic forces bled white by the Pol Pot tyranny, saved the country from doom.

On the eve of the holiday I had the opportunity to visit the Vietnamese Army Hospital in Phnom Penh, where a brief but touching ceremony was held in the course of which members of our embassy presented gifts to the wounded and Soviet medical personnel working in Kampuchea. After the meeting, which has already developed into a good tradition, the hospital management made it possible for the guests to visit the wounded in the wards and talk to them.

Nguyen Kong Hoan, sergeant, squad commander, excellent in combat and political training, and member of the Communist Party of Vietnam, has served in Kampuchea since 1979. He was wounded in the hand by a mine fragment in the combat operations zone on the Thailand border. During his long military service he has been unable to get married or even find a bride. The last letter he received from the homeland was before he was wounded, 6 months ago. The soldiers' mail takes a long time.... The wife of the 26-year-old driver, Master Sgt Hyng, did not learn for some time the fact that 4 days ago a mine smashed his knees. Master Sgt Pham Ngok was patiently waiting for his wife. The same day he had lost his legs, like the fellow in the next bed, only at the other end of the border.

"It is very hard there. The enemy is steadily firing on Kampuchean territory with howitzers and guns," said Sr Lt Nguyen Hong Tien, deputy editor of

the army newspaper, who was with me. He had just returned from the border where he had collected data from a series of reports on the posts and patrol groups which prevent the counterrevolutionary gangs from occupying bases and strongholds and seizing equipment in the remote mountainous border areas.

"Yes, it is not easy," the senior lieutenant repeated. His wife and four children were also probably waiting to hear from him. "It is difficult with the food, particularly meat and fish. Equipment breaks down very quickly in the jungles and in these conditions it is difficult for the rear services to organize regular supplies for the mobile groups with everything they need. However, the people are holding firm despite difficulties and losses...."

The entire world is well familiar with the courage with which the Vietnamese volunteers are fighting, suffering from privations and dying for the freedom and independence of Kampuchea on the request of the fraternal people, side by side with their own sons, motivated by their international duty.

Later on, elsewhere, I would fill my notebook with spontaneous testimony of the selfless, concerned and friendly attitude shown by the troops of the Vietnamese People's Army toward the population, testimony of the calm faith and growing sympathy with which the Kampuchean people are responding to their defenders. Here, on wounded Kampuchean soil, one can see particularly clearly the entire fabrication and immorality of the propaganda hullabaloo on the subject of the so-called Kampuchean problem. The problem simply does not exist for this country which is grateful to its rescuers.

Last year Kampucheans warmly sent off Vietnamese subunits returning to their homeland. Last May members of the Kyulong Army Corps, consisting of an infantry division and six separate brigades and regiments, left Kampuchean territory, since the situation in the country is becoming increasingly stable. At the same time, the regular Kampuchean army is growing stronger, gaining experience and acquiring combat skills. Throughout the country territorial military formations, militia detachments, numbering dozens of thousands of troops, have been raised to assist it.

Naturally, it is still too early to speak of full tranquility. The refugee camps on Thai territory, in the immediate neighborhood of the border, are sources of reinforcement for the counterrevolutionary gangs. The bandits try to penetrate deep within the country. They terrorize the peasants, kill activists, and attack transport facilities which bring to the country goods from Vietnam and the Soviet Union, try to prevent the restoration of the national economy and to cause panic among the population. The Kampuchean peasants, however, are supporting the people's regime with increasing resolve.

"We have achieved great successes in the struggle against the enemy," said Keo Saphon, who is one of the heads of the Kandal provincial party committee. "The enemy looks at our province as a bridgehead for reaching the capital. To this end the counterrevolutionary elements are hiding around Phnom Penh. Furthermore, espionage and sabotage groups enter our territory from Thailand. The population is actively participating in the struggle against them. With increasing frequency it not only identifies and exposes bandits but itself

participates in their elimination. In 1981 we were able to rout 31 counter-revolutionary groups and to arrest 102 people. In 1982 we eliminated 36 such groups and arrested 101 people. We captured 86 weapons...."

In the evening, with the approach of the curfew, my companions along the road to the hotel exchanged jokes with the Kampuchean soldiers guarding the control point in the center of Phnom Penh. In the morning we traveled around the rural areas, then in the suburbs caught up with young draftees who were zealously marching under the orders of a squad commander. Outside the city, we note isolated peasants in word clothes, holding a submachine gun or a rifle, walking to the rice fields where the crop is being harvested during the rainy season, in the flooded areas. Armed people can be seen upon entering a village, near a bridge or in the caravans of peasants carts slowly pulled by oxen along the sides of the road.

The revolution must know how to defend itself. This familiar Marxist truth is becoming increasingly clear to and accepted by the Kampuchean peasants.

The Power of Collective Toil

The greenish-yellow squares of the peasant courtyards, with their small houses on piles, resembling pigeon coops, and low banana trees, line the two sides of the rural streets. Cows and pigs lazily lie in the warm dust, while the ducks strut about importantly. As is the case throughout Kampuchea, the model village of Andong Sla in the Tan Krot district, Kompong Speu province, rose from the ruins. Until 1975 it was inhabited by about 40 families. As a result of the coercive "concentration," "settlement" and "termination of previous ties," most families, which were sent far beyond the province, perished.

In April 1979 some 30 widows and widowers, frozen with grief, returned. They had not found their village, which had been destroyed by the Pol Pot people, who had also destroyed all the palm trees known here as sugar palms, in the vicinity. These beautiful palm trees, standing out singly or surrounding the monotonous flatness of the rice fields, giving such a charm to the classic Kampuchean landscape, provide the peasants their homes, from the roof to the pillars, their boats with oars, their wine, medicines, sugar and many other things. Draft livestock, seeds and even the simplest farm tools were lacking.

Suspiciously and fearfully the village population listened to the representatives of the new system, who advised them to undertake the cultivation of the land jointly. Was that another "work together, eat together, live together," as they were being told only yesterday by the Pol Pot people in their "communes?" The new people tried as best they could to explain to the peasants who could not understand them very well that this had nothing to do with Pol Pot's "communes" and that they themselves were free to choose a suitable form of labor organization and wages. Life itself, however, proves to be the best agitator in favor of cooperative work. The common difficulty led those despairing people, who had lost everything, to production groups for mutual aid, urged by the ghost of hunger at their threshold and with which, as everyone understood, they could not deal alone. Two "joint labor brigades," as they are also known, were set up in the village and cultivated 55 hectares in 1979. Where did this strength come from!

At that time they lacked everything. In 1979 the state was able to allocate only one hoe per family. Tractors and other equipment had broken down. The herds of oxen and water buffalo had been reduced by two-thirds, totaling slightly over 1 million head. The irrigation system had broken down.

My numerous collocutors spoke with tremendous gratitude of the help which Kampuchea received during that difficult time from the socialist countries, above all the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and the international organizations which provided the weakened people with food, fertilizers, seeds and trucks However, the Kampucheans are justifiably proud of the fact that immediately after their liberation they were able to plant 800,000 hectares in rice and to harvest half a million tons of uncorticated grain the next year. The people who had gained their freedom rescued themselves from the imminent threat of a hungry death.

Like many other cases, we can speak with full justification of the patriotic exploit of the people. The production mutual aid groups became one of the main participants in this exploit.

Today the village of Andong Sla has six such groups staffed by peasants from the nearby destroyed villages. All in all, these six autonomous brigades grow rice on 145 hectares and auxiliary crops, such as sweet potatoes, fruits and vegetables, on another three.

These fields are commonly owned. The group owns draft cattle, carts, plows, harrows, and industrial buildings. Each such group includes as many as 15 families. It is headed by a committee elected at a general meeting, consisting of a chairman, his deputy and a secretary. Payment in kind is based on the number of work days. The norm for children and all people is half the regular one. Bonuses are given to those who particularly distinguish themselves. Any surplus rice the peasants have grown privately can be sold on the free market. Every family has a plot of up to 0.2 hectares. The state does not limit the number of privately owned animals. Nor does it tax them.

Competition has been organized among the mutual aid groups in the countryside. The victorious fourth group had harvested from its fields between 2.5 and 3 tons of rice per hectare. In 1980 the Andong Sla village sold the state 75 tons of rice. The following year, which was quite droughty, it sold 34 tons. Last year as well was not among the best, but the peasants were hoping to sell the state approximately 50 tons of grain. How not to work hard, for the people's regime was helping them with fertilizers, pumps, quality rice seeds and vegetable transplants free of charge and was giving them loans to purchase cattle.

After such a visit to the countryside one is no longer astounded to find out that the province has 5,501 mutual aid groups encompassing 90 percent of the population. The province has such groups in forestry as well. Naturally, by far not all mutual aid collectives are model ones. Many of them are merely taking their first steps toward labor socialization. However, no one is hurrying the peasants.

Today nine-tenths of the Kampuchean peasants are members of mutual aid production groups. In 1982 Kampuchea produced an average of 300 kilograms of rice per capita and the area in rice reached 1.6 million hectares. Compared with 1981 the rice crop was 25 percent higher. Animal husbandry is being rebuilt quite rapidly. Compared with the preceding year the cattle herds increased by 9 and the hog herds by 22 percent. The catches of fresh fish, the bountiful stock of which has made the country famous, are increasing. The Kampuchean fishermen have also united in production mutual aid groups.

At the same time, the people's regime ascribes great importance to the development of industrial and collective auxiliary farms. Territorial military units are extensively involved in agricultural production. The state also helps in the upsurge of individual peasant farms and in increasing their contribution to the production of foodstuffs and enhancing the living standard of the people.

In a single year areas under industrial crops have doubled in the country through collective labor. The republic has undertaken to rebuild the hevea plantations, which provide raw materials for the production of natural rubber. Compared with 1981 their area has expanded by more than one-third. The impressive progress achieved in agriculture is the most outstanding success of the national economy.

This success is quite important and encouraging, for it is this success, as was emphasized at the Fourth Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party Congress, that must become the key sector of the Kampuchean national economy, by considerably increasing the production of food and industrial crops. The solution of the problems set by the congress involves the full restoration and further development of industry, and the resumption and expansion of exports of traditional Kampuchean goods. Finally, the decisions call for an overall socioeconomic upsurge of the exhausted country.

... Traveling back from the model village to the provincial center, one could see on the side of the road lonely electric power poles. Without their wires, they looked like dried stumps without branches. As though in support of the topic of the malicious anti-urbanism which distinguished the overthrown regime, in Kompong Speu itself the dry, burned, huge branches surrounding a wasteland stretch toward the sky. Once this was the city market, which the Pol Pot people destroyed as a matter of principle, turning it into an ammunition dump which they exploded before fleeing. The ammunition took a long time to explode, lighting up the dead city from which the population had long been exiled. Such was the irrational means through which the regime was resolving, as we know, the real contradictions between town and country, turning urban settlements into stone deserts.

The rebirth of the city is yet another miracle of new Kampuchea. Actually, in Phnom Penh, over an area covering dozens of square kilometers, on the eve of the liberation only 31 buildings were being used and inhabited by some 5,000 people, mostly Pol Pot soldiers. Today the Kampuchean capital numbers approximately 400,000 people, including more than 260,000 natives. Nearly 800,000 of them perished during and after their exile from the city. These

figures, both happy and sad, were given to me by the capital's people's revolutionary committee. The face of the city today still reminds us of the fact that it was known as the pearl of Southeast Asia. Naturally, Phnom Penh today is entirely different from what it was. However, the capital of Kampuchea lives and that is what counts! Like other Kampuchean cities, it regained the role which the urban settlements played in the life of mankind for millenia. In new Kampuchea they will probably play this role better than before.

The reason for such thoughts is found in the last 4 years of life in Phnom Penh and the level of organization and pace of restoration work. Only 10 days after the liberation, for one had to hurry to provide water to the people, before the city mains could become operative again, in this hot city under the tropical sun, specialists who had flown in from Ho Chi Minh City repaired the soft drinks factory, all the equipment of which had been destroyed by the Pol Pot people. And that is what took place in the various sectors of the city economy and in industrial enterprises, one after the other...

Initially, as throughout the country, since money had been abolished, everything was based on a barter economy. For example, three cucumbers were the equivalent of a cup of rice. Subsequently, as was natural to occur, Vietnamese donges became the currency, helping somehow to organize life. When the people's regime began to circulate the brand-new crisp riels, the donges disappeared modestly, within a single day. And although not without difficulties and breakdowns, quite understandable in a broken-down national economy, the riels are continuing to work for the restoration of the country, promoting exchanges between agriculture and industry and between town and country, and strengthening the alliance between workers and peasants. In order for such work to be more successful, the people's regime is comprehensively concerned with increasing the production of industrial goods.

Half the textile plants in the country are already working. Small enterprises and minute workshops are being rapidly organized to manufacture clothing, for after the excesses of the Pol Pot regime, the people had nothing to wear. The production of utensils is increasing as well. They also had disappeared, for the majority of the citizens of "democratic Kampuchea" were to "eat together." There already are 3,000 bicycles on the streets and in the rural settlements. They were manufactured or repaired and spare parts made for them from available materials through the skill of the artisans who survived. There is an enterprise for the production of bicycle tires. The production of the simplest farm tools and harnesses for the draft animals is increasing steadily and tangibly. The production mutual aid groups which, in Phnom Penh for example, include 6,000 artisans, play an important role in organizing the production of commodities in extremely short supply and providing consumer services to the population. Such groups have been set up in trade.

A great deal could be said of successes and failures or breakdowns in the work of industry. Breakdowns are caused, above all, by the shortage of electric power, equipment which had been either worn out or has broken down

for a great variety of reasons, the lack of spare parts, and a most acute shortage of raw materials, which forces the enterprises to come to a stop occasionally. The number of skilled workers, technicians, engineers and managers, toward whom the Pol Pot regime displayed "doubled revolutionary vigilance," is extremely small.

How not to mention at this point that currently several hundred Soviet specialists are at work in Kampuchea. They work hard! No few lines in a journalistic report could provide the reader with even a general idea of the scale and nature of the internationalist aid which the Soviet Union is rendering the fraternal Kampuchean people in their difficult efforts to restore the national economy and revive the country.

During the first 2 years, which were the most difficult for the republic, the USSR supplied it free of charge with 120,000 tons of rice, 80,000 tons of corn, 30,000 tons of wheat, 20,000 tons of wheat flour, 173,000 tons of petroleum products, 12,100,000 meters of fabric, utensils worth more than 5 million rubles, 650 trucks and 200 tractors. In subsequent years deliveries of Soviet goods continued to grow.

Our country is providing Kampuchea technical assistance in rebuilding its hevea plantations, organizing communications in the capital and the provincial centers, and technically equipping Kampuchean ports. The Soviet Union is helping Kampuchea to rebuild and build bridges, highways and irrigation systems and to restore power supplies to Phnom Penh and other industrial centers. The governmental construction organization, which was created with the help of our country, has extensive opportunities in the field of capital construction. The USSR extensively participates in the restoration and development of the health care and education systems as well.

Healing Wounds and Treating Souls

The nation was very sick when it welcomed its liberation. Chronic malnutrition, horrifying lack of sanitation, physical torture and the oppressive atmosphere of fear, paralleled by exhaustive hard labor, undermined the health of the people day after day. The regime had its own "consistently revolutionary" view on the organization of health care. Destroyed hospitals were replaced by so-called social hospitals where 14- to 15-year-old adolescents from the mountainous and most backward areas of Kampuchea acted as the "new physicians."

Chhun Yan, a famous fencing expert in the past, repeated winner in national and international competitions and now coach, member of the Kompong Speu province party committee, visited such a hospital twice. Finding out that Chhun Yan had traveled to other socialist countries, the "physicians" were most seriously interested in whether or not he had seen elsewhere such perfect hospitals.

A person finding himself in a Pol Pot hospital had virtually no chance of survival. He could die of hunger, for he was often not fed. He could die from the treatment, if he believed in the healing power of the black pills of

ground bark. He could die as a result of the radical means of diagnosis applied in the spirit of the time, in the course of which they opened the stomach of the patient to look for the cause of his disease. Those who, in an effort to get out of this vivarium, claimed to be cured, were tested by the "new physicians" who stuck a hoe in their hands and asked them to dig a hole 1 meter wide by 1 meter deep. Fortunately, Chunn Yan was able to pass the test both times.

The situation in the country, which was finally liberated from the wild social vivisectionists, was desperate. A tremendous number of people were suffering from malaria, fever, tuberculosis, and dystrophy, and there were no physicians, no hospitals, no instruments, no medicines, no bandages. Nevertheless a solution was found.

Chea Tang, deputy minister of public health, recalls that the initial aid came from Vietnam in specialists and medicines. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries hastened to come to Kampuchea's rescue. The campaign was joined by international organizations. The new regime immediately undertook to locate the surviving medical personnel throughout the country. Sixty-nine of the 643 physicians and pharmacists who had practiced in Kampuchea in 1975 were found. A group of health care workers was quickly sent off to Vietnam for training. Briefly, such was the beginning of the battle for the health of the nation. The first, most important and very difficult victory in this tremendous battle in terms of scope and persistence was the prevention of epidemics. The consequences of hunger were eliminated quite rapidly as well.

On the fourth anniversary of its liberation, the Kampuchean health care system employed more than 12,000 people. As early as 1981 one out of every three persons had no specialized training; 1 year later, only one out of four. Last year the country had 109 physicians, 89 pharmacists and 92 nurses. In areas in which no graduate specialists may be found as yet, the ministry sends mobile brigades of physicians on tours lasting 3 to 4 months. The medical school in Phnom Penh, currently attended by more than 1,000 students, resumed its activities. They are going through a full training course without vacations. More than 700 people are attending the Phnom Penh School for Nurses and Midwives. At the beginning of this year 94 percent of the districts had medical centers, 98 percent of the counties and all provinces had hospitals. There are some 10 hospitals in Phnom Penh, including the Khmer-Soviet Friendship Hospital.

"You're asking how we live here?" N. A. Khrushcheva, head of the therapy ward, willingly joined our conversation. "We live like Russians! We cook borscht and wrangle among ourselves. And we quietly yearn for our homes...."

Nina Aleksandrovna clearly omits something: they sympathize with the difficulties of the Kampucheans the way Russian people know how to sympathize with other people's troubles, and the way they work is also typical of Russians--energetically, gaily and with dedication. They are never bored. The moment the Soviet physicians came, the Khmers engaged in rebuilding the hospital and the personnel were drawn to them. The polyclinic opened in March 1982. Now

it is staffed on a regular basis by an internist, a surgeon, a dentist, an oculist and a physiotherapist. A 30-bed hospital opened in April, the surgical ward headed by Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, N. A. Khrushcheva's husband; a 30-bed therapy ward opened as well. Last year the pediatrics building for 120 beds and a children's polyclinic were opened. Initially there were 120 patients--adults and children--per physician per day with the full complement of extremely neglected illnesses. The Khmer personnel, who had forgotten everything in a period of 4 years, had to be retrained to give shots, make bandages and do blood transfusions. They managed! Six Khmer physicians underwent retraining at the hospital. They have developed into excellent specialists, N. A. Khrushcheva noted with satisfaction....

The hospital in Kuk Trop District, Kandal Province, headed by Tut Tiun, a graduate specialist in folk medicine, could hardly be compared to the Phnom Penh hospital which, in addition to everything else, is being restored at no charge by the Soviet Union and is staffed with Soviet specialists and abundantly supplied with medicines and everything else. However, it too is a model medical institution, one of the best in the country, I was told. The hospital serves nine villages or some 3,000 people. It has an outpatient clinic where the patients are examined and a pharmacy where the patients receive their medicine free of charge. Medicinal herbs grow in front of the hospital building. The hospital has a maternity ward. Furthermore, the head of the hospital regularly visits the villages to examine the expectant mothers. Infant mortality here is very low and the birth rate has increased sharply. This is occurring not only in this district but throughout the country. Currently the Kampuchean population is growing at a 4.8 percent rate--one of the highest in the world. More than anything else this figure convincingly proves the growing strength of the nation and the changes which are occurring in the country.

Kampuchea also undertook energetically to heal the souls of its compatriots and to promote their education and exposure to culture.

"The Khmers were forced to forget the purpose of their eyes, mouths, ears and heads," said Chheng Pon sadly, minister of information, press and culture. "Our people have yet to get rid entirely of their permanent fear of death, their blind obedience, and to revive spiritually. That is why it is so important to expose the people who have regained their right to life to true cultural values, to an education...."

It is symbolic that my acquaintanceship with new Kampuchea began on a bright, sunny morning with a visit to the art school, which was restored through the efforts of the people's regime and a handful of surviving teachers. It was not easy to refrain from crying, noting how young Khmer boys and girls, in the bright classrooms, under the guidance of their prematurely grey teachers, were learning drawing, modeling, weaving, spinning, woodcutting and pottery, and studying the graceful movements of classical Khmer dance in the open gallery of the former royal palace. It is there, in the classrooms and workshops, currently attended by 430 Kampuchean boys and girls, that the sacrament of the revival of the thousand-year-old national culture is taking place.

It is also taking place today on the theater stage. The theater, folk theater above all, performs two simultaneous tasks: it meets the needs of the people, who have become unused to happiness, for a bright holiday celebration and it educates them. In addition to the capital, theaters have been opened in all of the country's provinces. Each performance is attended by 4,000 to 5,000 people. Grateful audiences of several hundred people also attend the performances of the small art companies in which two actors perform a scene.

The people's regime considers as one of its primary tasks the creation of centers of culture in each county and district, regardless of how modest they may be. It mandatorily includes a reading room and a radio receiver. It organizes collective readings of newspapers and talks on agriculture, sanitation and hygiene. Here amateur performers gather to rehearse. These centers promote the new way of life in forms understood by the peasants.

The Kampucheans show an uncommonly great interest in the socialist world and its people. I was told that when a group of Soviet specialists arrived in Kampong Chhnang crowds of people lined up along the roads simply to look at them. Dozens of thousands of people came from all over the country, especially to Phnom Penh, for a soccer game in which a Soviet team participated, to see for the first time representatives of the world of real socialism.

This explains the great interest with which the journal SOVETSKIY SOYUZ, published in Khmer, was welcomed, when it appeared for the first time at the end of last year. It carries a number of pictures, which makes it particularly attractive to its readers.

"The people of Kampuchea were hungry for knowledge. Despite all difficulties, in 4 years we have been able to reorganize the totally destroyed educational system," Pen Navut, minister of public education, said. "The country has first, second and third-degree schools, a medical school, and a school for foreign languages. In the 1982-83 school year the number of students in the country exceeded 1.6 million..."

How was such an impressive success achieved? One of its components was already mentioned by the minister: the desire of the children to learn and that of the surviving teachers to teach was tremendous. Under Pol Pot the children of Kampuchea had forgotten the meaning of the word "school." Immediately after the liberation, on the eve of the first school year, retraining courses were organized, attended by 500,000 children. Anyone who could be of any use was recruited to teach the courses. In September 1979 more than 700,000 children went to school.

There were no textbooks. Enthusiasts were found who daringly took up the project. There already are 43 different textbooks and school aids for first, 37 for the second and 33 for the third-degree schools. So far only textbooks for the primary grades have been printed on Soviet paper in the presses of Ho Chi Minh City while the others are printed on a duplicating machine and, for the time being, for teachers only.

Urgent measures were taken to restore and expand the network of schools for teaching the cadres. Every year 70 to 80 school teachers undergo training in Vietnam.

Never before had the country faced the task of eliminating adult illiteracy. The republic undertook to resolve this problem as well, for at its liberation, the country had more than 1.2 million illiterates. A National Committee for the Elimination of Illiteracy was founded and special courses were opened for adults, while on-the-job training was organized for working youth. Curriculae and school aids were developed and in 4 years more than 300,000 Kampucheans learned how to read and write. Soon the number of illiterates will be reduced by yet another 400,000.

"Many difficulties still exist! I could talk about them a long time," the minister said, smiling. "Here is an example. This school year there were no more than two notebooks and ballpoint pens per student. The problem of cadres which were destroyed by the regime remains equally acute. Without an adequate number of trained teachers we cannot upgrade the quality of schooling and organized labor training of the students...."

The republic is educating its young citizens on a broad scale, with its eyes on the future!

It is for the sake of this future that the Higher Technical Institute of Khmer-Soviet Friendship, which is experiencing its rebirth, is working today. Built in 1964 and presented by the USSR government as a gift to the people of royal Cambodia, it became the largest training institution in Southeast Asia. In 1975 the Pol Pot people turned the institute into an army barracks. Today the Soviet Union is rebuilding it so that it may become a national center for the training of technical specialists.

Classes at the institute began 1 year ahead of schedule while restoration work was in full swing. For the first time in world practice the training was in Russian. Currently 412 students are attending the two institute programs. The preparatory department is working successfully. The future specialists are trained in three departments: construction, electrical engineering and hydroengineering. This year the geological department will be opened. The training process is based on a full curriculum. This very year the first specialists, who were trained abroad, will begin work. A total of 1,500 people, 999 in the USSR, are currently studying abroad.

... Last year the second-year students at the Higher Technical Institute of Khmer-Soviet Friendship held a competition in honor of V. I. Lenin. A total of 120 people participated. Some of the errors in the compositions and the poems, written in Russian for the first time, were amusing. However, one could easily excuse their authors, who were taking their first steps in the Russian language. That did not matter! I found the time to copy one of the works. Here is what it said, among others: "The Pol Pot and Ieng Sari regime ruled Kampuchea in 1975. Under this regime the Pol Pot government told all the people that Kampuchea had socialism. However, Pol Pot did not speak of Lenin. He did not speak of how the revolution in Russia took place...

I did not understand why he did not mention the Soviet Union--the country of the revolution.... There was no one I could ask. I later realized by myself that the government was not running the country properly. It was not applying the doctrine of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

"A new, serious people's regime began in Kampuchea in 1979, headed by the Heng Samrin government. The people are very happy with the new life. They can obtain everything they want. I think that now our country will follow Lenin's path."

It would hardly be necessary to add anything to the words of tomorrow's builder of new Kampuchea.

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ANTIMONOPOLY POTENTIAL OF THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

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[Article by Willi Gerns, member of the German Communist Party Presidium and Board Secretariat]

[Text] An upsurge in nonparliamentary social movements has been noted in the FRG in recent years. This process is manifested in the increasing class confrontations in production, the stubborn struggle waged by the trade unions for higher wages and a variety of actions on the part of the working people at many enterprises and throughout the country against mass layoffs and closing down of jobs.

Even more noticeable is the growth of nonparliamentary protest movements in the nonproduction area. This applies above all to the struggle for peace and, more specifically, against the NATO decision on deploying in Western Europe American medium-range nuclear missiles and the neutron bomb.

Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of FRG citizens are joining in a protest against the destruction of the environment by the concerns. They participate in various civic initiatives aimed against the calamitous situation in health care and education. This includes actions by organizations of tenants against the usurious actions of landlords and increased speculation in land and real estate.

The movement "from below," which demands an end to the policy of limiting civil rights and freedoms exercised by the authorities and, particularly, for the lifting of the so-called professional bans, which are one of the forms of persecution of communists and other democrats, has become widely known. Alliances for the purpose of struggling against right-wing trends in the country's development and the neofascist danger are being organized in cities and settlements. The struggle for the emancipation of women is intensifying.

The FRG ruling circles are frightened and concerned. They are doing everything possible to reduce the growing wave of indignation of the working people. To this effect they extensively resort to various means for manipulating public opinion, including the mass information media. Occasionally the authorities ascribe to the democratic resistance of the working people an almost criminal nature. They are trying to frighten the petit bourgeois and do not shy even at police terrorism.

As to the profound reasons for the enhancement of the social activeness of the broad masses, they are found above all in the drastic aggravation of the contradictions in which capitalism finds itself as a social system. The crisis has affected virtually all areas of bourgeois society: economics, politics, ideology, culture and morality. It is expressed in widespread and ever-growing unemployment, economic and monetary crises and energy crises. Capitalism is unable to put an end to the catastrophic situation in education and to offer prospects for the development of the youth. The reaction is continuing its offensive on democratic rights and freedoms. All of this triggers and increases the mistrust of the citizens in the bourgeois state.

The various manifestations of the crisis are considerably worsened by the fact that the monopolies make use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution to extract maximal profits, neglecting the vital interests of the people and destroying the environment.

The capitalist pursuit of profit becomes particularly dangerous when it develops into an imperialist arms race. This is eloquently confirmed by the plans for deploying in Western Europe, in the FRG in particular, American medium-range nuclear missiles and the neutron bomb. These armaments increase the threat of the outbreak of a totally destructive nuclear war. The new round of armaments initiated by the aggressive NATO circles has now brought about extremely negative social consequences. The famous policy of the "red pencil" (reducing budget appropriations for social needs), to which the federal, state and municipal governments are actively resorting, increasing unemployment further, has already exceeded the 2-million-mark level in the FRG.

It is not astounding that under these circumstances the various social strata of the population are expressing feelings of protest and indignation. The growth of social contradictions leads not only to energizing the struggle waged by the workers but brings to life new forms of nonproduction democratic and social movements.

On the Nature of the New Social Movements

The concept of "new social movements" has been largely adopted to characterize the ascending social struggle which, occasionally, assumes unusual aspects. In our view, although it gives a certain idea of the current stage in the developing struggle, this concept inaccurately expresses the heart of the matter. Not all movements covered by this concept are new. The movement of civic initiative for environmental protection is indeed a new one. Others have their own history and traditions which developed in the postwar period. They include, above all, the peace movement. The movement of protest against American Euromissiles, occasionally described as a "new movement for peace," essentially continues the glorious traditions of the postwar movement in support of the Stockholm appeal for banning nuclear weapons, and the movements "without us" and against the remilitarization of the federal republic, during the first years of its existence, the movement against equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons, the "Easter peace marches," and others. What is new here is that these movements have become more specific and that they include new forces which in the past remained marginal observers.

Movements whose purpose is to take their participants away from the problems of real life are frequently classified as new together with the active movements of protest and for a democratic alternative. Let us note this important feature as well: there are people who are willing to pit the "new" movements against the "old" or even, as they say, the "obsolete" movements, by which they mean above all the labor movement. Their purpose is clear.

Because of its popularity the communists also use this concept. However, they invest in it a more realistic content in the sense of movements which are developing in the nonproduction sphere and which, despite their entire variety, are in the nature of a civic initiative. They rally people of different political views and outlooks and members and nonmembers of a given party or organization. They focus their efforts on obtaining more or less common objectives. This commonness may be determined by their place of action or nature of problems and their typical feature is their relatively weak organizational structure.

At the same time, many civic initiative movements which develop on the basis of a specific problem go beyond its framework, establish interregional relations and develop stronger organizational forms. Realizing that the "faults" which they oppose are of a social nature, the participants in the civic initiative begin to formulate broader requirements and alternatives. Such an assessment of civic initiative movements is found in the analytical work "Civic Initiatives. Social and Political Aspects of the New Social Movement," published by the Institute for Marxist Research in Frankfurt-am-Main (K. Fred, "Die Burgerinitiativen. Soziale und Politische Aspekte einer Neuen sozialen Bewegung." In: "Soziale Bewegungen," Hrsg. vom IMSF, Frankfurt a. M., 1981, H.10, S.8).

It is difficult to formulate a political platform common to all participants of democratic movements which have the nature of a civic initiative, for they proceed from different political views and outlooks. The same reasons determine the weakness of the organizational structure of their local groups and nationwide associations. This is what distinguishes them from political parties, and any attempt to give a civic initiative a party aspect can only lead to their collapse.

The social composition of many movements is defined by the fact that they are being increasingly joined by the middle classes. The objective reasons for their energizing are related, above all, to the processes of declassing and proletarianization in which these strata become involved under the circumstances of the deepening crisis of the state-monopoly structure with the invariably growing feeling of social uncertainty.

All major political parties in the FRG--SDP, FDP and CDU--try to draw the middle classes over on their side. Initially, this benefits parties such as the SDP and FDP who promise, as they did during their governmental coalition, to follow a course of "socioliberal reform policy," which, in fact, limits itself to lame reforms. However, the CDU as well has the possibility of using in its interest those disappointed by unfulfilled promises. Significant middle-strata groups, particularly wage earners, are generally dissatisfied

with the "main" parties sitting in the Bundestag. They join organizations supporting environmental protection and so-called "alternative" voter associations and democratic and social movements classified as social initiative groups.

There has been a particularly strong affiliation of the middle classes with the environmental protection and other "alternative" movements. Their eyes are not always turned to the future. They sometimes display conservative views and a low level of political consciousness. They are nostalgic for the "small enterprises," or structures based on simple commodity production. Their protest is sometimes directed against scientific and technical progress which is perceived painfully, based on the false concepts that "technology" is an "intrinsic" evil. Many members of the intelligentsia ascribe "demoniacal" properties to technology. This resumed "criticism" of machines meets with a response, for the destruction of the environment is initially (and not only initially!) triggered by their use in industrial production in general rather than the use of production forces under capitalism.

It is precisely in such phenomena that we should also look for the social roots of partially anticapitalist and partially anti-industrial and anti-trade union feelings prevailing among the middle classes.

The middle classes feel themselves particularly harmed by the results of the advancing capitalist production rationalization and the loss of identity it creates. Such feelings are expressed in the intensified aspiration of the people to communicate with one another and their emotional solidarity and self-assertion. The intelligentsia and the white-collar workers are the first to experience the increasing work stress, for in their case a production process based on the division of labor and depersonalization (something which the working class has experienced for quite some time and more intensively) is a relatively new matter. Some groups within the middle classes develop a pessimistic attitude toward social progress and begin to look for an "alternative lifestyle."

This explains why the middle classes are particularly extensively represented not only in environmental protection movements but even more so in movements of a nihilistic nature, pursuing the objective of organizing "alternative" rural communities or similar structures. The young workers, who are particularly strongly affected by unemployment, become involved in such types of projects. They fear the future, which explains the increased desire for contacts between workers and middle-class wage earners.

As a whole, the structure of the various social movements classified as civic initiative is heterogeneous. Thus, workers are far more active in the tenants' movements than in the environmental protection movement. Naturally, let us not forget the influence which local conditions and characteristics have on the social composition.

Understandably, they are different in terms of their nature: for example, a movement may be concerned with the economic and social consequences of the

economic crisis; another may be alarmed by the growing threat of war, curtailment of democratic rights, discrimination against women and foreign workers, environmental destruction, and so on. Nevertheless, we, Marxists, realize that essentially the struggle is waged against the same enemy--the monopoly bourgeoisie--which is unrestrainedly aspiring to power and profits. This is the objective basis for the need for an possibility of an anti-monopoly alliance between the labor movement and the new social movements.

Nevertheless, the situation is such that this interconnection has not been realized as yet by the members of the new social movements. They have not realized with sufficient clarity that the evil they are fighting is rooted in the capitalist system itself.

Nor should we forget that the monopoly bourgeoisie--represented by its entrepreneurial associations, parties and mass information media--is doing everything possible to prevent the organization of such an alliance in order to preserve its power and privileges. Feelings of mistrust are being encouraged, those who oppose the establishment of such an alliance are supported, movements are pitted against each other, reciprocal prejudices are strongly manipulated, and so on.

The reaction is also helping theoreticians, who describe themselves as leftists, in rejecting the leading role of the working class in the reorganization of the capitalist society on a socialist basis. Their "revolutionary subjects" are the marginal population groups or those same new social movements. Hence the basic need for the communists to wage an ideological struggle against such views in the interest of the alliance between the worker movement and the new social movements and of providing an antimonopoly alternative and a socialist future for the FRG.

The Working Class--The Decisive Transforming Power

The working class was and remains the decisive force in the transformation of the existing society on a new basis. Its historical mission as the "grave-digger of capitalism" cannot be "removed" either by structural changes within it or by the fact that a class awareness (particularly in its superior form--socialist awareness) is either lacking or underdeveloped in the majority of the working class members in the capitalist countries today. Yet without the active efforts of this class any effort for basic antimonopoly change and the replacement of capitalism with socialism remains nothing but a pious wish.

Blue- and white-collar workers, with their families, account for the majority of the population in the highly developed capitalist countries. It is above all the working class which in these countries is the main creator of all values; society could not exist without its toil. However, it is precisely the working class which is being most strongly and directly exploited by capitalism. Unlike some middle-class categories, it is not bound by the ties of private ownership. Its nucleus is largely concentrated in the big enterprises. Under the conditions of the contemporary division of labor, it is essentially this segment of the working class which determines the very possibility of the functioning of the production process and, with it, social

life in general. Both the production process and the concentration of the proletariat in large enterprises contribute, under capitalist conditions, to its discipline and organization as the main prerequisite in the decisive struggle for immediate and final objectives. Today we have more reasons than ever before to tell the industrial proletariat and the entire working class "awaken, working man, and learn your power."

The fact that the working class is the decisive force which can change the existing system is confirmed, naturally unwillingly, by big capitalism itself and the bourgeois political leaders and mass information media at its service. It would be hard to find any other social movement to the struggle of which they would react so sharply. Some social movements which are developing such as, for example, against the deployment of the new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the neutron bomb, become the more frightening to them the more actively the workers and their organizations become involved in them. Big capital and the bourgeois ideologues are not mistaken in terms of the strength and the potential of the working class. They also realize the importance of organization in its struggle and are concentrating their strikes against the trade unions which stand on class positions and, above all, against the communist party.

In emphasizing the historical role of the working class, the communists do not belittle, not to say deny, the role and significance of the other mass nonproletariat movements. On the contrary, movements such as those for peace and defense of democratic rights and the struggle waged by the intelligentsia, the peasantry and the other toiling strata for their rights have always been supported by the revolutionary worker movement.

As we pointed out, in recent years new movements have been added to the already "traditional" democratic and social ones against the background of the deepening crisis within the capitalist system.

Role of the New Movements in the Antimonopoly Struggle

These new democratic and social movements, manifested in civic initiatives, address themselves to truly vital problems. In particular, they have helped millions of people to realize the danger related to NATO's decision on the so-called Euromissiles and to realize the social consequences of the destruction of the environment, the curtailment of democratic rights, the pitiful situation in education, the steady rent increases, and speculations with land and housing. They have expressed indignation at the discrimination against women and their degraded status in society and in the family. The protest actions organized against all of this have left their mark on the overall course of the political struggle in the FRG.

Some successes were achieved in the course of this struggle. The peace movement (directed above all against NATO's "missile" decision) has become so strong that we can consider it having assumed a central position in the country's political life. As to the environmental protection movement, it has disclosed to the broad strata the entire importance of the problem. Today the captains of big business and the federal government are forced to take it into consideration.

Successes have been achieved in some other areas as well. In a number of specific cases the reaction failed in its attempts to impose a "profession ban." Here and there the authorities have been forced to revoke planned rent increases, i.e., real estate speculation has been prevented, and so on. Under the pressure of the women's movement, the trade unions have intensified their struggle for equal wages for equal work. A strike was dealt at the philistine mentality of a hostile attitude toward working women, which prevails among some population strata. As a result, women have undertaken a more energetic defense of their rights. Such partial successes have contributed to the increased self-awareness of the participants in democratic movements. Under the conditions of the still-widespread feeling that "I can change nothing," such partial successes are a major prerequisite for the further development of the democratic and antimonopoly struggle.

The understanding that imperialism is the source of the threat of war and that the existence of monopolies leads to the destruction of the environment is growing among many participants in the new movements. They are gradually beginning to realize the interconnection between big capital's pursuit of superprofits and the use of the machinery of the state in the adoption of measures of coercion and suppression. Finally, they realize the role which the state plays in promoting the interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie.

In the nonproduction area the democratic and social movements are making a considerable contribution to shaping the antimonopoly awareness of the population and the antimonopoly struggle as a whole. With their largely new forms of confrontation and protest actions, which open new areas of social conflicts and battles, they are giving the labor movement a major impetus. Thus, the Krefeld appeal and the powerful peace movement unquestionably played a significant role in the fact that the United German Trade Unions in the FRG joined the struggle for peace and disarmament by raising the slogan "Peace Through Disarmament" in 1981. In turn, the environmental protection movement was helped by the fact that in some labor movement sectors--political organizations and trade unions--although retaining an essentially positive attitude toward scientific and technical progress--have begun to realize far more clearly than in the past (and to discuss) the interconnection between ecological problems and scientific and technical progress, and to analyze problems of economic growth not only from the quantitative but also the qualitative, the social viewpoint.

Furthermore, under the influence of the increasingly energetic women's movement, the labor movement, including the communists, has begun to realize more clearly that in the struggle for women's equality, along with the main features in this struggle--clarifying the reasons for work discrimination and vocational training which, as we know, are rooted in the capitalist production method--it is important not to ignore the problems facing millions of women as a result of hostile views on the social role of women, found in bourgeois awareness. This is manifested with particular clarity in the physical abuse of women, which is practiced in many families.

The tenant movement, which demands of landlords to maintain houses properly, proved, in turn, even more clearly to the labor movement the great amount of

social fuel which has been accumulated as a result of the capitalist speculation with land and housing and the need not to ignore rental and housing problems.

What is required in order to establish a cooperation between the labor movement and the new social movements? Above all, the political and trade union organizations of the working class must launch positive initiatives. They must support and strengthen the antimonopoly trend in such movements on the basis of their own programs and practical policies. The purpose should be to formulate common antimonopoly alternatives.

Let us take as an example civic initiative organizations for environmental protection. In order for the programmatic objectives of the labor movement to be influential in this respect such movements of an antimonopoly orientation should not be imposed on such organizations. Such an orientation should be developed in the course of discussions useful to both sides and in close connection with the questions which arise and the practical experience which is acquired by the civic initiative organizations. Rooted in the mind of the population is the idea that "industry" there is the main responsibility for the harm caused to the environment. That is why the "principle of the direct culprit," which is clear and understood by the working people, must be used in giving an antimonopoly content to the struggle for environmental protection.

Unlike the reactionary currents in the ecological movement, which call for "changing the way of thinking" and the abandonment by the "small people" of unnecessary consumption of material goods (under the conditions of a capitalist society!) the democratic forces must strengthen in the people the awareness that the efficient solution of ecological problems requires taking the big concerns to task and assuming democratic control over them. In other words, the antimonopoly policy in the area of environmental protection must raise the question of ownership which, as we recall, was defined by Marx and Engels in their "Communist Party Manifesto" as "the main problem of the movement" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 4, p 459).

Naturally, a demand for nationalization does not constitute a solution of the problem, for under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism the large nationalized enterprises operate in accordance with the capitalist principle of extracting maximal profit. It is clear, therefore, how important it is for the labor movement to add to its demand for nationalization of energy concerns, for example, that of democratic control over them.

We must have a clear idea of what the concept of "democratic control" constitutes. The construction and operation of nuclear power plants has shown that not only the trade unions but anyone directly affected must participate in such control, such as the local population, civic initiative groups, peasant associations, and so on. At the same time, although necessary, democratic control is an insufficient prerequisite for success in this matter. The principle of coparticipation in production management, supported by the trade unions, must include the element of influencing the process of development of production forces and technological policy. An uncritical attitude toward

capitalist (frequently destructive) production forces must be abandoned to the same extent that, for example, the labor movement as a whole rejects a critical attitude toward science and technology. Already under capitalist conditions democratic control over production by the workers must mandatorily mean a regulating influence on production technology: the possibility of determining the influence which any new technological process may have on production forces as a whole, manpower in particular.

In the interest of cooperation between the labor movement and the new social movements, we must emphasize the commonness and primacy of targets in the joint struggle. Also useful is the comradely criticism of ideological views which hinder such cooperation. For example, the trade union must oppose concepts according to which concern for environmental protection is incompatible with the preservation of jobs. Such arguments play in the hands of the concerns which try to extract maximal profits. As to the protection of both the environment and jobs, if we consider this interrelationship from the viewpoint of the interests of the working people, it will become clear that environmental protection calls for more jobs.

On the other hand, the environmental protection movement should rebuff those who claim that the main reason for the ecological crisis under the conditions of monopoly capitalism cannot be identified. At one point, references to scientific and technological progress, to "industry" in particular, were used to justify the predatory plunder of natural resources. A "zero" economic growth was preached together with rejection of "unnecessary" consumption (calls for "tightening the belt!"), etc. The fact remains that such arguments did not help the working people in the least to identify the essence of environmental problems.

Possibility and Framework of the New Social Movement

The communists realize the nature of existing opportunities and the limits of the activities of democratic and social movements considered civic initiatives. Unquestionably, the strength of these movements is in the fact that they are aimed at one specific task or another, as a result of which they are joined by people of different party-political and conceptual orientations. However, the limited nature of the demands and the openness and variety of reasons which lead the people to participate in a given movement determine the impermanence of its structure which, in general, prevents it from developing a strong organizational structure. All of this combined hinders the participants in the movement in identifying their common enemy and where to find him and in formulating a program for joint struggle.

In other words, while focusing on strictly individual targets, the civic initiative democratic and social movements by themselves are unable to formulate a common antimonopoly alternative to the domination of state-monopoly capitalism. Such an alternative can be formulated only by the labor movement based on the doctrine of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

It is equally unquestionable, however, that the antimonopoly tasks and socialist objectives of the revolutionary labor movement can be implemented

as soon as it can actively support progressive social movements, regardless of how limited their tasks may be. In achieving partial successes and developing within the ranks of their supporters an antimonopoly awareness, such movements contribute to changing the ratio of forces between the monopoly bourgeois and the working class and its allies in favor of the latter and create prerequisites for the formulation of more far-reaching demands on their part.

We must also emphasize that in terms of the working class as well the democratic and social movements and their tasks are of intrinsic value. The labor movement supports the peace movement for the reason alone that the preservation of peace is a prerequisite for the existence of the workers and their families. The labor movement cooperates with the environmental protection movement, for the destruction of the environment also damages the health of the workers and their families, who account for the overwhelming majority of the population in the developed capitalist countries.

The position held by the communists toward civic initiative organizations and groups was expressed at the Sixth German Communist Party Congress, which was held in Hanover. The communists are actively joining the ranks of such movements and try to play a uniting and guiding role within them. They bring to them an antimonopoly content and a Marxist outlook. The position of the communists cannot be reduced to the formula "either the working class or the new social movements."

"Working class and the new social movements" is the proper position. The communists consider themselves a structural component of the labor, democratic and new social movements, for which reason they bear great responsibility for the establishment and strengthening of alliances among them.

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YOUTH LABOR EDUCATION

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pp 112-113

[Letter to the editor by A. Gitalov, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium member, tractor brigade leader, Twice Hero of Socialist Labor]

[Text] The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum emphasized that improving developed socialism is inconceivable without extensive work on the spiritual development of the people. In noting that the shaping of man begins from the first years of his life, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov stressed the role of the school: the party demands of it not merely to provide a certain amount of knowledge but, above all, to educate the citizens of the socialist society as active builders of communism with their specific ideological concepts, morality and interests, and high labor and behavioral standards. "Combining training with productive labor is a good means of education," the Central Committee general secretary said. "We must firmly follow a course of accustoming the school students to and develop a love for useful toil. Be it physical or mental, it must mandatorily be real labor--productive and needed by society."

I would like to point out in this connection that I am excited and pleased by materials published in KOMMUNIST on school education, particularly the article "People's Teacher" (No 13, 1982), because of the scope of pedagogical and educational problems raised and the high rating given to the work of teachers and progressive pedagogical experience.

The problem of the labor training and upbringing of the students is formulated on a principled basis, sharply, in a party style. This is both a school and a social problem, directly affecting us, instructors at student labor associations.

I frequently have the opportunity to speak to young people. In my talks with boys and girls I argue with them that the lack of good technical knowledge and practical skills under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution not only drastically lowers man's labor contributions but adversely affects the development of his personality. The slogan "If you live in the village know your equipment!" has been dictated by life itself and by the prospects for the socioeconomic and cultural development of the contemporary socialist village. On my part, I do everything possible to ensure its successful implementation.

I consider my task as instructor of young people comprehensively to help the schools and teachers to develop in the students from their early years a conscientious attitude toward the land and the equipment, labor initiative, worker sharpness and the need at all times to find the best possible and most economical solution to practical problems.

The villagers say that "grain-growing begins at school."

What type of school should this be?

Today the student production brigade is the support of the school's comprehensive and targeted educational activities. Over the past almost 30 years it has raised many a generation of skillful and knowledgeable workers, convinced and involved labor guards. This has been universally acknowledged.

Now, however, under the conditions of highly mechanized agricultural production, the student brigade has met with a major juridical "veto." The following situation has developed: on the one hand, according to the "Model Regulation of the Student Production Brigade," it must consist of 7th-10th-grade students, i.e., 14- to 17-year-old adolescents. On the other, the official instruction exists, based on current legislation, on the protection of child labor, which bans involving 14- to 17-year-old adolescents in productive work using equipment.

I feel no particular sympathy with such "instructions-bans." I remember my personal experience and that of my generation: I sat behind the wheel of a tractor at the age of 13; at 14 I was already considered an experienced tractor driver. In my youth we used Fordsons and KhTZ, which we have preserved for the young people so that they can physically compare the equipment of the period of the first communes and agricultural cooperatives with our modern equipment.

In this connection I am extremely amazed by the official stand taken by senior personnel who believe that it would be inexpedient to change current legislation on adolescent labor, for in many cases contemporary equipment does not take the age possibilities of the students into consideration.

All I can say on my part is that the boys and girls express a number of different opinions regarding modern agricultural equipment, as one can see by attending rayon, oblast, republic and all-union competitions for the title of "best plowman." I know from personal experience that adolescence and early youth demand real work and an open door to material production.

Regardless of the profession which the young person will choose, he must be granted the opportunity, during his adolescence and early youth, to create something of significance, to feel his own practical independence. It is particularly suitable in the case of the rural student if this initial accomplishment is the growing of a grain crop, which embodies the creative power of the human mind and the social significance and poetry of labor.

My fellow instructors and I, together with the educators, considered how to enhance the level of the student brigade instead of leaving it on the level of using a chopper and practicing manual labor only.

What do we have in actual rural life?

In the summer, 7th-10th grade students, members of student brigades, operate tractors and combines in many villages and hamlets in the Ukraine and in the Stavropol, Rostov, Orenburg and many other oblasts. This has been accomplished thanks to the persistence and even the daring of economic managers and educators and the support of local party and soviet organs.

The country already has thousands of family teams. The father and his adolescent son drive the same combine or tractor. The best young farmers have even been given government awards.

The growing attraction of the young people for machines has become a mark of the times, a spiritual need.

What is the result? From the viewpoint of the instruction, which has the force of a law and which bans 14- to 17-year-old youngsters from doing productive labor involving the use of agricultural equipment, an infraction of the law takes place. Yet, such an infraction is punishable. However, if we look at Article 42 of the USSR Constitution, which speaks of the particular concern of the state for the health of the growing generation, "including the banning of child labor unrelated to education and labor training," no violation whatsoever has taken place, for the work of the adolescents handling modern Niva and Kolos combines and T-150 tractors, is precisely the type of work related to training and labor upbringing. It is an extension of training, a means of developing and strengthening classroom studies under the conditions of live agricultural practice. This means is very important! Therefore, on the one hand it is banned, while on the other, it is allowed. I see the social aspect of this contradiction, i.e., if the formal side of the law diverges from the interests of our socialist society the law must be changed, supplemented and concretized.

Guided by Article 42 of the USSR Constitution, the Ministry of Education and the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences should immediately draft a law on the work of children and adolescents, related to labor education and training, and publish it in the press for the purpose of nationwide discussion.

The farmer's practical experience teaches us that if we do not wish the childhood of the students to be artificially extended, we must combine the efforts of scientists, practical teachers and instructors--representatives of kolkhozes and sovkhoses--to resolve the vitally important problems of the practical activities of student brigades and to improve their work under the new conditions of the social environmental and scientific and technical progress in agriculture.

In our view, the following is necessary:

To create a curriculum and textbooks on the optional subject "Foundations of the Choice of Agricultural Professions;"

To draft recommendations on the use of the advantages offered by the scientific organization of labor and the elements of cost-effectiveness in the production activities of student brigades;

To determine the optimal sizes of the training fields in which modern agricultural equipment and progressive technology could be used;

To develop scientific recommendations on the creation of student self-management organs in the brigade, based on the ideas of A. S. Makarenko and V. A. Sukhomlinskiy, and the experience of the leading student brigades in the country;

To involve scientists and scientific research institutions in formulating the themes for agricultural experimental work and practical aid to the schools in its organization.

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized at the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum that "today the economical and thrifty attitude toward the people's property is a question of the reality of our plans."

Participating in productive labor is the best educator of such qualities in our children.

Let them become accustomed, from their early years, to speak of our field, our tractor, our crop, our project....

And let their farmwork help them to find their path in life toward the great kolkhoz grain-growing field and great state projects.

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TRIED VANGUARD OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE

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pp 114-116

[Review by Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Chernyak of the books
(1) "Leninskaya Partiya--Partiya Novogo Tipa" [The Leninist Party--Party of a New Type] by V. Ya. Bondar'. Politizdat, Moscow, 1982, 287 pp;
(2) "Vozrastaniye Rukovodyashchey Roli KPSS i Voprosy Organizatsionno-Politicheskoy Raboty" [Increased Leading Role of the CPSU and Problems of Organization-Political Work] by N. A. Petrovichev. Politizdat, Moscow, 1982, 255 pp]

[Text] The Bolshevik Party--a Leninist party of a new type--emerged on the historical arena 8 decades ago. "Our people," we read in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDWP Congress," "justifiably relate all of their achievements to the comprehensive activities of the CPSU--the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system. In 80 years, from a small organization of Marxist revolutionaries it developed into a powerful united party with more than 18 million members today. Under developed socialist conditions, having become the party of the whole people, the CPSU does not lose its class character and remains the party of the working class. The role of the communist party in the life of Soviet society is increasing steadily."

This specifically is the topic of the books on the party published by Politizdat. The first provides an analysis of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the party of a new type, proving the way the CPSU has systematically implemented this doctrine and intensified and developed it in the party documents. The second traces the increased role of the CPSU as the scale and complexity of the building of socialism and communism increased and the interconnection between the objective conditions and subjective factors which enhance the role of the party in Soviet social life. As though supplementing one another, the authors describe the heroic path of struggles and victories covered by the Leninist party and its universal historical experience.

The appearance of a Marxist-Leninist-bolshevik party is the greatest turn in the Russian and international labor movements, V. Ya. Bondar' notes. He discusses extensively the historical need for and legitimacy of the establishment of a party of a new type and its revolutionary nature.

The author convincingly proves that the situation of the party within the society and its leadership of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and all working people are determined to a tremendous extent by its loyalty to the theory of scientific communism and level of practical activities.

It is precisely Marxist-Leninist doctrine which helped the party to define its main task--to head the struggle waged by the working class for the revolutionary reorganization of society, the author concludes. He cites Lenin's words to the effect that his theory "learned to see under the cover of entrenched customs, political intrigues, strange laws and cleverly concocted doctrines the existence of the class struggle, the struggle between all property-owning classes and the masses of nonproperty-owners, the proletariat which heads them. It identified the real task of a revolutionary socialist party: not the formulation of plans for the reorganization of society or preaching sermons to the capitalists and their stooges on improving the situation of the workers and not the formulation of conspiracies but the organization of the class struggle of the proletariat and leadership of this struggle, the final objective of which is the seizure of political power by the proletariat and the establishment of a socialist society" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4, pp 182-183).

The author notes that as a combat organization based on Marxist-Leninist theory, the CPSU is not only mastering this science but is applying it, converting scientific conclusions into forms of political strategy and tactics and formulating a scientific, effective and realistic policy. The party cannot implement its role unless it pays proper attention to the interpretation of all occurrences and unless it sums up the new phenomena in life and in the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory. Revolutionary theory is developed above all in the resolutions of the CPSU congresses and its Central Committee plenums. This is confirmed by the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, and the May and November 1982 and June 1983 Central Committee plenums.

In describing the party of a new type, the authors emphasize that only a party with high social activeness and organization and strong discipline can fulfill its vanguard role, and successfully direct and guide society. Today the CPSU plays an increasing role in the life of society. This is determined, N. A. Petrovichev writes, above all by the increased scale and complexity of the tasks of communist construction, which require a higher level of political and organizational leadership; the enhanced creative activeness of the masses and the involvement of more and more millions of working people in the administration of governmental and production affairs; the further development of socialist democracy and enhancement of the role of social organizations and the expanded rights of union republics and local organizations; the increasing significance of the theory of scientific communism, its creative development and propaganda and the need to intensify the communist upbringing of the working people and the struggle for the elimination of vestiges from the past in the minds of the people.

However, the stipulation that the increased role of the party is an objective law of the successful building of socialism and communism does not mean that this is a spontaneous and uncontrolled process. As an objective necessity, it is taking place above all thanks to the conscious and purposeful actions of the party itself, related to organizational and ideological-political work, improvements in intraparty life and style and methods of social guidance. This is a steady trend rather than a temporary phenomenon typical of a specific period.

The question of CPSU membership and the qualitative structure of its ranks remains a basic problem of party life. The party can fulfill its historical mission only if it is always concerned with reinforcing itself with fresh forces, with the leading members of the working class and the other toiling strata, if it consists of people who think and act alike. On the basis of extensive factual data, N. A. Petrovichev analyzes the qualitative composition of the party and the problem of regulating its growth. The data he cites clearly reflect the class nature of our party and the place and role of the working class in society.

At the mature socialist stage, the author notes, when the communist ideals of the working class and its party have gained the recognition of the whole people, the CPSU has become the vanguard of the entire nation. However, the working class remains the leading force of Soviet society and is today the main social base of our party which has not lost its class nature. The CPSU is also reinforced through the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia. The party regulates its membership above all by increasing its exigency toward new applicants.

Both books pay great attention to improvements in intraparty democracy. The democratic nature of the CPSU is manifested, in particular, in the strengthening and further intensification of the principle of collective leadership. It is precisely collective leadership which is the antidote to subjectivism and one-sidedness, which guarantees the accuracy of political and organizational leadership and creates conditions for the development of the creative activeness and initiative of the party members and all working people. With the help of specific data the authors describe the way this most important principle is applied in daily practice.

The increasingly democratic nature of the CPSU is manifested in the electiveness, accountability and replaceability of its leading organs and the ability of the party critically to analyze its activities. The authors emphasize that the use of the method of criticism and self-criticism is predetermined by the very nature of the CPSU, the Soviet state and our social system. Criticism and self-criticism have become primary party methods for identifying and resolving arising contradictions in social development and eliminating shortcomings in cadre training. The books inform the readers of the extensive work done by our party in recent years in the development of criticism and self-criticism and in improving intraparty and sociopolitical information.

As a ruling party responsible for the country's destiny, the CPSU guides all aspects of social life. Its activities are focused on economic development and managing the national economy. This is understandable, for it is precisely here that the foundations are laid for resolving social problems, strengthening USSR defense capability and pursuing a peaceful foreign policy. It is precisely here that the necessary conditions which ensure the successful building of communism are created.

The authors prove that the strength of the economic policy and strategy and of all domestic and foreign policy pursued by the CPSU lies in its profoundly scientific nature. The party's economic policy constitutes a sum total of economic and political measures based on the conscious utilization of the objective laws of socialism. It proceeds from the basic interests of the

working class and the entire people and is subordinated to the increasing satisfaction of the material and spiritual needs of the Soviet people and the steady enhancement of their well-being. That is why the party's economic policy is unanimously supported by the people who are actively assisting in its implementation. The party organizations and their leading local organs direct this major and comprehensive work.

Cadre policy is the powerful lever through which the party influences the course of social development. This question is especially considered in the book on growing leadership role of the CPSU. Its author notes that the requirements governing the political, professional and moral qualities of managers are becoming increasingly strict. In the light of these requirements, he analyzes the system of the selection, training and retraining of leading cadres, enhancing their ideological and theoretical standards and methods for their education. He emphasizes that one of the most important conditions for all of our successes is the mastery of the Leninist workstyle which excludes complacency, opposes all manifestations of bureaucratism and formalism and presumes high exigency and close ties with the masses. The party demands of the contemporary manager organically to combine party-mindedness with extensive competence and discipline with initiative and a creative approach to the work. Furthermore, whatever his sector, the manager must take into consideration sociopolitical and educational aspects and be responsive to people.

The CPSU relies in all of its constructive activities on the initiative and activity of the masses and the numerous organizations of the working people. It influences the progressive development of society through a wide network of governmental and public organizations such as soviets, trade unions, the Komsomol and others. This important aspect of party work is described in N. A. Petrovichev's book. It does not assume their functions or take over their work. It implements its resolutions within the framework of the Soviet constitution. The party influences state and social organizations by the fact that, proceeding from a common political line, it formulates basic stipulations and draws their attention to the most important topical problems. It uses above all the method of persuasion and ideological influence, closely combining organizational work with the education of the masses. The CPSU pursues its political line within the state and social organizations through the party members working in them.

The book by V. Ya. Bondar' describes the international importance of the Leninist principles governing the construction and activities of the proletarian party of a new type. The experience of the CPSU, the author notes, is actively used by the Marxist-Leninist parties.

Both books are aimed at party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol workers, party and nonparty members, and anyone engaged in the study of party construction problems. They inform us of the extremely rich experience of CPSU organizational and political work and direct toward the further enhancement of the activeness and militancy of all party units in the struggle for the implementation of the historical resolutions of the 26th Party Congress.

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COMBAT PUBLICISM

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[Review by Yu. Idashkin and Yu. Stel'makov of the book "Literatura, Politika, Zhizn'" [Literature, Politics, Life] by Aleksandr Chakovskiy. Politizdat, Moscow, 1982, 367 pp]

[Text] The books by Aleksandr Chakovskiy enjoy great popularity. Works such as "This Happened in Leningrad," "Here It Is Already Morning," "Light of a Distant Star" and "Bride," although written a long time ago, are read to this day with unabated interest. However, the writer's latest novels "Blockade" and "Victory" have drawn the particularly close attention of the readers. This may have two reasons: the first is the tremendous power of the reality on which they are based, for the memory of the war years remains eternally alive in the hearts of the Soviet people. The second is the increasingly clear aspiration in Chakovskiy's work toward the artistic interpretation of some of the greatest historical events which defined the aspect of the age and the role and place within them of the people's masses and individuals.

A. Chakovskiy's special talent, his passionate civic temperament, and comprehensive experience as a prose writer, critic, foreign literature expert and editor-in-chief of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, with its extensive coverage of the most important problems of domestic and international life, combined with performance of important social obligations, have largely determined another essential feature of his creative personality--outstanding publicism. Actually, this publicism is so closely tied to and literally blending with the writer's social activities and is such an intrinsic part of it that it is sometimes difficult and even impossible to determine whether the writer has set himself a purely creative, a literary task or the writing of a speech, article or interview of a public figure, related to specific circumstances which subsequently become part of literature. This review of the book by Chakovskiy is an example of such an organic blend.

The book includes a great variety of materials, such as articles on purely literary problems, impressions of trips to other countries, meetings and discussions, records of speeches to Soviet readers and debates in which the writer has participated abroad, interviews and correspondences with members of foreign mass information media and speeches at important gatherings at home and abroad. Even such a brief enumeration proves that this was not a book written for a specific purpose. It came into being as a result of the extensive daily activities of the author, reflecting their content and outcome.

Literally every page carries a charge of passionate publicism. Unquestionably, by vocation A. Chakovskiy is an agitator, a propagandist, a polemicist. He asserts what he believes in and refutes what he disagrees with, what his mind and feelings oppose, with equal enthusiasm and conviction. The initial impression in reading this book is that the author can discuss anything with equal ease. This, however, is merely the appearance. It is by far not easy and simple, keeping calm under the hail of provocative questions, slanderous attacks and malicious fabrications, to defend our ideals with proofs and arguments, demonstrating excellent familiarity with the style of the ideological enemy, to preach the truth of real socialism, and to do this skillfully, combining science with imagery, and depth and scrupulous analysis with bright metaphors and apt comparisons. Unquestionably, the reader will appreciate the wit, resourcefulness and even elegance of many of the author's polemics. However, they are never self-seeking. Chakovskiy's purpose is not to win an effective victory in the argument with his opponents but to convince them of the rightness of the ideas he promotes and defends. This ability to see behind the specific opponent--Chakovskiy most frequently argues against more or less obvious ill-wishers of our country--always to see thousands, hundreds of thousands of people who may be unfamiliar with something, who may not understand, stupefied as they are by the bourgeois propaganda, who doubt something or who hesitate, this permanent aim in the struggle for the hearts and minds of such people is the most essential feature in Chakovskiy's publicism.

Under the contemporary conditions of the gravest ideological struggle, personal contacts among supporters of different outlooks, different socioeconomic systems and different ways of life and the dialogue between them become particularly important. However, it is important for this dialogue not to be a dialogue among the deaf. The participants must not conceal what divides them. They should be able to explain their viewpoints, motivations and true meaning of actions. A great deal here depends even on the tonality of the discussion, the ability without retreating by even an iota from principled positions, to keep the polemics specific, to prove good will. This precisely is the line which Chakovskiy systematically follows in all his trips abroad.

In a speech delivered in Great Britain, the writer said that "in order to be better understood allow me to draw your attention above all on the following circumstance: Descartes said that before arguing we must agree on terminology. I believe that this stipulation must be observed not only in a discussion but in any talk on subjects approached differently by different people. The circumstance to which I would draw your attention is that some concepts and the terms which express them, which sometimes sound almost identical in many languages, assume different meanings to people of different social persuasions. Naturally, you know that this phenomenon may be observed not only in the social area but in religion as well. Many people who believe in God conceive Him differently and that which God may like, according to some, may be considered blasphemy by others. I have used here the field of theology, alien to me, merely to point out that in both philosophy and politics seemingly ordinary concepts such as 'democracy,' 'freedom of expression,' 'state,' and 'party' are perceived by different people differently."

After this introduction, which takes into consideration the nature of the audience and which lays the ground for understanding, Chakovskiy turns to a

convincing interpretation of Soviet political concepts. He describes the place and role of literature in socialist society and substantiates the social responsibility of the writer. It would be unrealistic to assume that the audience would change its outlook. However, this unquestionably would have helped many among them better to understand the views of the Soviet people and to reject some opinions instilled by bourgeois propaganda.

Chakovskiy's article "What Next?," which expresses views on the book by the noted American journalist Harrison Salisbury "The Many Americas Must Become One," is quite typical of his creative style. The book's author, a convinced anticommunist, has frequently visited our country. He spent several years as the Moscow correspondent of the THE NEW YORK TIMES and wrote a number of anti-Soviet works, also found in his book. Unquestionably, with his inherent polemical skill, the Soviet writer could easily have refuted Salisbury's trite fabrications. However, Chakovskiy chose a different method. He focused his attention and that of the readers not on the anticommunist sallies of the American journalist, which contributed nothing new to the ordinary selection of arguments used by the overseas "Sovietologists," but on the observations, views and conclusions drawn by Salisbury, which apply to the United States itself and which confirm the most profound crisis experienced today by the largest capitalist state. This thoughtful and consistently calm and objective study of a book by one of the pillars of American journalism acquires a significantly greater counterpropaganda effect compared with a simple refutation of the anti-Soviet fabrications it contains.

The clearly expressed aggressive nature of Chakovskiy's publicism is one of its important merits. In answering questions which are frequently open attacks against our country, the writer never defends himself. In formulating our ideals and principles openly and directly, he not only reveals skillfully and substantiatedly the lofty humanistic meaning of the Soviet policy of peace and the true meaning of our way of life, traditions and customs of the socialist society, but, on the basis of extensive factual data, he passionately and convincingly exposes aggressive imperialist policy, above all that of the ruling U.S. circles, the incurable faults and ulcers of bourgeois society and its crying violations of elementary human rights.

The "Open Letter to U.S. President Carter" is an example of this kind of militant and aggressive political journalism, which combines depth with exceptional persuasiveness of content and impeccable form--the simplicity and clarity of style which is accessible only to great masters. In this letter most complex political circumstances and historical facts blend with the practical and literary experience of the author and come purely from his heart. That is why one cannot remain indifferent when reading this appeal to the head of the Washington administration, imbued with anger, pain, indignation and concern, for they are dictated by a sacred feeling of duty of the Soviet writer to his people, to the memory of those who fell in the battles for the homeland and to his own conscience. Every page of the letter to the U.S. president is supported by the great truth of the revolutionary cause to which the writer-communist serves loyally, profoundly revealing his personal involvement.

The historical confrontation between two ideologies and outlooks encompasses virtually all areas of social and cultural life. Part of the struggle is for the interpretation of the cultural legacy of the past and the assertion of the lofty aesthetic ideals in contemporary literature and art and for defining the ways of development of the individual and the free manifestation of his human essence. Together with other writers, Chakovskiy actively participates in this struggle not only as a prose writer but as a political journalist and critic. The book under review includes a number of his articles and addresses on the theoretical problems of literature, studies of its contemporary condition and discussions of acute and topical problems such as real and imaginary freedom of creativity and the responsibility of the writer to society, literature and the ideological struggle. These works are distinguished by the depth and consistency of party positions, accuracy of Marxist analysis, profound erudition and the aspiration, inherent in party publicism and criticism, toward drawing broad social summations. Equally important is the fact that, without lowering in the least the theoretical standard of his works, Chakovskiy is able to avoid the dry academic approach to the study of problems, which he discusses in a temperamental and imagistic style, handling with equal ease citations from basic works and live examples from history and contemporary political and literary practice. The personality of the author himself, his experience, involvement, and partiality are always present in his articles and addresses without, however, providing subjectivistic views or assessments.

Unquestionably, like a poet, a political journalist is born and not made. However, in order for this innate gift to develop a great deal is necessary. In reading Chakovskiy's new book we cannot fail to note the tremendous amount of work concealed behind the seeming ease of his style and exceptionally academic substantiation of the political, philosophical, economic and literary knowledge of the author, and his patience and purposefulness with which he seeks the most convincing and intelligible arguments. All of this is subordinated to the extremely responsible and most honorable and essential task facing the Soviet writer, which Chakovskiy himself sees as "to strengthen even further belief in the correctness of the way to communism we have chosen, in some, draw over on our side others, those who hesitate, and expose and tear down the masks of still others, the enemy!"

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DEEP TRADITIONS OF KINSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83)
pp 118-121

[Review by Academician D. Likhachev of the book "Drevnerusskoye Naslediye i Istoricheskiye Sud'by Vostochnogo Slavyanstva" [Ancient Russian Legacy and Historical Destinies of the Eastern Slavs] by V. T. Pashuto, B. N. Florya and A. L. Khoroshkevich. Nauka, Moscow, 1982, 263 pp]

[Text] Old Rus--a great power in medieval Europe--has left profound marks in the historical past of more than 20 nations in Eastern Europe--in the Baltic area, the north, along the Volga, the Northern Caucasus and the Black Sea area.

This new work by three known Soviet historians is a thorough study which shows the importance of the traditions of Ancient Kiev Rus to Great Russia, the Ukraine and Belorussia. The high level of culture and social development of the Ancient Rus feudal state created conditions under which even the invasion of the horde and the Mongol-Tatar yoke which dried out the very heart of the people were unable to destroy their traditions.

The book offers a profound study of the role of the ancient Russian legacy in the historical development of the eastern Slavs for a period of 5 centuries, starting with the 13th, when the Mongol-Tatar invasion disturbed the governmental unity of the eastern Slavs, to the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia and the Pereyaslav Rada of 1654.

The distinguishing feature of this work is its consideration of the extensive data on the background of the entire history of Eastern Europe. We can confidently say that no single published study on the role of Ancient Rus in the subsequent development of the three fraternal peoples, regardless of the topic treated--political thinking, folklore, art, literature, governmental traditions and chronicles--has covered the entire problem so comprehensively and with such convincing arguments.

The first part of the monograph, which studies the role of Great Russia in the destinies of the eastern Slavs, begins with a description of the age in which conditions for the forward development of the eastern Slavs drastically worsened. State relations among the individual parts of Ancient Rus were disturbed and the old Russian lands not only became heavily dependent on the Golden Horde but faced the real threat of total loss of statehood.

The comprehensive description of the main lines of the socioeconomic, political and cultural development of Ancient Rus in the 12th and 13th centuries, continued in the history of Great Russia, accounts for a long section in that part of the book, based on the author's research and the study of extensive scientific publications. The authors accurately emphasize that life in Ancient Rus at that time obeyed the overall laws of the socioeconomic and political developments inherent in all of Europe and that already then Ancient Rus had entered the stage of mature feudalism and that the customs inherent in that type of society were inherited by Great Russia and acquired their definitive aspects here. In arguing against the claims of bourgeois historiographers on the allegedly decisive importance of foreign influences, the authors convincingly prove that in the development of Great Russia such a determining significance came from the traditions of Ancient Rus, for it is they that laid the material and social foundations for the establishment of a centralized state.

Another important topic considered in the first part of the book is the significance which the activities of the main nucleus which had developed in Great Russia--The Muscovite Principality--had in terms of the historical destinies of the eastern Slavs in the 14th and 15th centuries. In depicting the broad panoramic view of interrelated events, which took place not only in Russia but in Asia, the authors clearly prove the decisive role which Muscovy played as the political leader of the entire Great Russia in the struggle against the Mongol-Tatar yoke, which was the main obstacle in the progress not only of the eastern Slavs but of nationalities which either voluntarily joined or were coerced to join the predatory Golden Horde state. The Kulikovoye Pole battle which was essentially won by the Russian forces, was objectively the main event in the history of the other eastern Slavic and many non-Slavic nations. The authors accurately describe the internal prerequisites and international consequences of this battle.

In comparing the development characteristics of the political activities of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and the other Eastern European state of that period--the Grand Duchy of Lithuania--the authors convincingly prove that as early as the 14th century the Duchy of Muscovy was the only true center for the political unification of the eastern Slavs and that already then the entire eastern Slavic population began to gravitate toward Moscow.

The monograph clearly proves that thanks to the resistance organized by Moscow, the plans of the Lithuanian nobility to seize Russian lands failed. This success is justifiably considered another important event of most significant consequences for the historical destinies of all of Eastern Europe.

The authors extensively describe the cultural upsurge of Great Russia, closely related to increased national self-awareness in the course of the struggle for liberation from the yoke of the horde and the unification of the Russian lands. From the works of the history of social thought, literature and art, the authors trace a common pattern in the various cultural areas: the cultural upsurge was accompanied by the broadest possible turn to the ideological content and artistic forms of the ancient Rus heritage. They describe the most important features of the subsequent political and ideological-cultural development of the eastern Slavs in the 16th-17th centuries,

such as the reinterpretation of some essential features of the Ancient Rus heritage, which enabled the Russian centralized state, in entering the world arena, to formulate a specific and effective political program for the unification of all eastern Slavs.

The second part of the monograph deals with the historical fate of Belorussian and Ukrainian lands from the 14th to the beginning of the 16th centuries. The question of the role of Ancient Rus traditions in Ukrainian and Belorussian life in the 14th-15th centuries is not new. It was persistently raised in 19th-century historical studies. However, matters did not advance beyond a general acknowledgement of the great role which these traditions played and a number of disparate observations. That is why the effort made in the book especially to study the fate of such traditions in the Ukraine and Belorussia on the basis of the classification of extensive factual data--from objects of material culture to historical thinking--is particularly important. Another important aspect of the study is its steady comparison between ancient Rus traditions in Ukrainian and Belorussian lands and lands northeast and northwest of Rus--the future territory of the Russian state. It is precisely such a comparative study of 14th-16th-century materials which makes it possible comprehensively to describe the importance of ancient Rus traditions on which the historical development of the eastern Slavs was based. Another very essential result of the study is the fact that for the first time the conclusion that a powerful layer of Ancient Rus traditions had been preserved in all realms of life of Belorussian and Ukrainian society has been thoroughly substantiated. This situation, the authors stress, was the consequence of the active struggle waged by the Belorussian and Ukrainian peoples who were quite successful in preserving their ancient heritage when Belorussian and Ukrainian lands became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The decisive elimination of originally Ancient Rus norms and customs began only in the 16th century, when the ruling classes in the Ukraine and Belorussia broke with their nations and national traditions.

The authors have made an exceptionally important effort to describe the specifics of the spiritual culture of the Ukrainian and Belorussian societies. The history of relations among Great Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian lands in the 14th-15th centuries has been relatively ignored in the past in our scientific publications. In describing these relations, the authors emphasize that they appeared on different levels, ranging from spontaneous population migrations to conscious exchange of ideas. Both processes, as later became clear, involved a far broader range of people than had been previously suspected.

The third part of the book deals with the Ancient Rus traditions and the struggle waged by the eastern Slavs for reunification. The authors concentrate on the position of Ancient Rus traditions in the sociopolitical life of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian societies in the 15th-17th centuries and their role in the struggle for the reunification of the eastern Slavs. They emphasize that Ancient Rus traditions were considered a standard, a model to which 15th-16th-century Russia always turned in resolving problems of state construction and defining the place of the country in contemporary Europe and in global history. Based on the works of Soviet scientists on the

history of social thinking and literature, the authors describe the major efforts made to learn about the historical past of the country and the reinterpretation of this legacy in accordance with the new requirements of the state and society. They justifiably point out that this phenomenon is characteristic of society at large, although the specific social content of the concepts regarding ancient Rus drastically varied between the ideologues of the ruling class and the popular masses.

Another merit of this book is that it not only confirms the tremendous importance of the idea of the historical unity of the eastern Slavs in terms of the policy pursued by the Russian government but indicates the impact which the monuments of Russian historical thought--15th-16th-century chronicles--had on historical thinking in the Ukraine and Belorussia and on the liberation movement which was beginning there at that time.

The history of the national liberation movement in the Ukraine and Belorussia between the end of the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries and the development of relations between this movement and the Russian state, as well as the joint struggle waged by their peoples for reunification, has been traditionally considered a topic of great importance by Soviet historiography. However, here again, along with summing up the results of previous studies, in their interpretation of this topic the authors have used new data on the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations (such as the period of the Polish-Lithuanian intervention in Russia), the feelings of the Cossacks and the petit bourgeois fraternity intelligentsia which cooperated with them.

In accordance with the overall purpose of the book, the authors have paid particular attention to the role of Ancient Rus traditions in shaping the ideology of the national liberation movement, a topic which has not been especially studied in the past. The study of a broad range of writings and historical works has enabled them to prove that the examples of the great victories won by their ancestors inspired the people in their struggle against the Polish-Lithuanian feudal lords and that the end purpose of the struggle was the restoration of the rights which the Belorussians and Ukrainians had enjoyed in Ancient Rus and had subsequently lost. The turn to Ancient Rus traditions improved their understanding of the need for historical unity among eastern Slavs and strengthened the orientation of the national liberation movement toward a rapprochement with Russia. The aspiration of Ukrainians and Belorussians to preserve their cultural heritage was of great importance. Such aspirations are justifiably considered an inseparable component of the national liberation struggle.

The work offers new data precisely on the national nature of the liberation struggle despite the very inconsistent position and even withdrawal from the liberation movement of a considerable segment of the upper classes of Ukrainian and Belorussian society.

An interesting analysis is provided in the final part of the work of reactions to the reunification of the Ukraine with Russia in 1654 as reflected in the records of that time. The authors reach the conclusion that their main feature is the concept of the need to restore the ancient unity of the

ancient Slavs, which would inevitably lead to the restoration of the former glory and power of the "name of the Rus," i.e., of the overall name which the ancestors of the three fraternal peoples gave themselves during the period of their unity within the ancient Rus state of the 10th-13th centuries.

The book is of major sociopolitical importance. Both history specialists and general readers will find in it extensive data with which to understand the fate of our fraternal peoples. We see once again how important the study of the past is in terms of the contemporary political struggle and patriotic education.

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BOOKSHELF

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83) p 121

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JOURNAL'S MAIL: JANUARY-JUNE 1983

Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 11, Jul 83 (signed to press 21 Jul 83)
pp 122-128

[Text] During the first half of the year KOMMUNIST received 1,277 communications as follows: 238 answers, essays, reviews and notes; 288 answers to journal publications; 295 questions, suggestions and wishes addressed to the editors; and 456 citizens' petitions and complaints.

In breaking down editorial mail we unwittingly seek above all responses to journal publications. This is entirely natural. Their number has increased of late. It includes letters in which the writers directly assess one publication or another, and manuscripts which continue the discussion of questions raised in KOMMUNIST. In approving or criticizing the publications or individual statements within them and in formulating their solutions to specific problems, our voluntary correspondence actively contributes as a whole to the interpretation of important concepts of Marxist-Leninist theory and social practice. The editors invariably feel the good will of the readers along with tireless reader supervision of their activities. They attentively study public opinion and suggestions on improving the content of the journal and requests for articles on one vital topic or another.

As in the past, priority is held in the semiannual mail by problems of party and state management of the national economy. Particular attention is paid to improving the economic management mechanism, planning and administration, and the struggle against negligence and trends inconsistent with the socialist principle "From each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work" in the distribution of material and cultural goods. The readers frequently relate problems of theory with topical tasks of ideological and educational party work among the masses, the further development of socialist collectivism and production and all other social relations. As a whole, the mail clearly confirms the relevance and exceptional importance of the decisions of the November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenums and their warm approval and support by the Soviet people.

A number of letters and so-called "unsolicited" manuscripts--articles sent by the readers without the preliminary agreement of the editors, essentially consistent with the strict requirements regarding their publication, were printed in the first half of the year in the sections "From the Editors' Mail" and "The Readers Ask." Topic surveys were written or are being prepared on a number of responses to specific articles which have excited the

readers the most. The present survey will provide a short description of other letters which, we believe, are of sociopolitical interest and cover a number of topics of interest.

P. Grechko (Voronezh), CPSU member since 1939 and Patriotic War veteran, enumerates the articles which have interested him most of late and "which have been read more than once," turns to the editors with the following entirely legitimate request: "Rewrite articles, particularly those on philosophical and educational topics, making their presentation simpler and more accessible, so that even the 'average' reader, which I consider myself to be, could understand them without turning to a political and philosophical dictionary."

Above all, the letters rate highly the article by Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, "The Doctrine of Karl Marx and Some Problems of Socialist Construction in the USSR" (No 3, 1983). This article not only triggered a flood of written responses but telephone calls to the editors as well. The readers thanked the author and the journal, asked for additional copies and the publication of the article as a separate pamphlet (which, as we know, was carried out soon afterwards by Politizdat). Among the first to write us was T. Bratishko (Riga), party and labor veteran: "This article was liked very much by everyone and many people would like to have a copy.... The journal is no longer available at newsstands. I beg you very much to print this article in a separate pamphlet. Our rayon has a Young Communist course attended by more than 100 people and all of them would like to have this article."

Muscovite V. Gridnev, an old bolshevik, formulates his attitude toward Yu. V. Andropov's article briefly but meaningfully: "A very lively work. No article on such a topic has ever been published in the journal. I have been a KOMMUNIST subscriber for many years. The author speaks of Marx in a simple, intelligible and profound manner. It makes interesting reading. It is a very serious work." Reader A. Pravdin (Kuybyshev), thanks the author "for the clarity, thoroughness and great scientific depth and practical concreteness, the brevity, importance and relevance of the article," and notes that it is "imbued from beginning to end with the vivifying creative spirit of Marxist-Leninist theory and the dialectics of social development." Here is the view of candidate of technical sciences, senior instructor at the P. Lumumba Friendship of the Peoples University A. Butenko: "It has been a long time since I had the opportunity to read such a good and useful theoretical article. My colleagues and I use it in our educational work with foreign students who are displaying increased interest in it. In my view, its greatest value (in terms of the practical use made of this work in occasionally sharp discussions) is the clear and convincing proof of the viability of Marxism in resolving problems of socialist construction in the USSR and other countries."

The following letter was received from Berlin, the GDR capital:

"Respected and dear comrades!

"Please forgive this intimacy, but when I read the article an inner voice told me: what a dynamic concept and guideline this is and how beautiful it is.

"Most gratefully yours,

"Friedrich Lange."

Many readers described the thoughts which Yu. V. Andropov's article triggered in them. Thus, A. Zaytsev from Grozny, in looking for the reason for the "major negative phenomena in our lives," reaches the conclusion that the prime responsibility for them is with the local party organs. This must not be forgotten "when a house building is delivered at the end of the year unfinished..." he writes, "when an official who has become compromised in one position is shifted to another, or when millions are wasted on expensive equipment or construction...."

In noting the unquestionable merits of the article, which indicates that "we must truly consider the legacy of the great makers of scientific socialism not as something previous which reminds us of the glorious past but as a weapon, an instrument for the study and building of the new society,"

V. Vinogradov from Riga expresses legitimate thoughts. "Economic management shortcomings, which are also discussed in the article, have one interesting property," he notes. "It is as though they are embedded in forms of economic management which we work so hard to apply in our practical work. It seems as though everything has been quite thoroughly planned yet a place is left for 'loopholes.' When the enterprises were given the right to set up economic incentive funds, the temptation appeared to increase the plans, which makes greater withholdings for this fund possible; when enterprise work was directed toward end results the quality of the work began to suffer; when cost-effectiveness was applied in the activities of ministries and departments, the practice appeared of reducing plant assignments, and so on. We are amazed by the lighthandedness with which economic managers are able to bypass the existing system." V. Vinogradov notes in this connection that "the article properly raises the question of the need for profound work on problems of socialist political economy. The 'loopholes' which appear and are used in economic management prove that the production relations have clearly fallen behind the development of production forces."

The author then provides a rather extensive presentation, unfortunately lacking sufficient logical consistency, something which, actually, he recognizes himself, of interesting proof of the following situation: "Socialist political economy...does not include a single process in which we can see the effect of economic development laws; it cannot prove this effect, for it does not take into consideration that "it is precisely distribution which provides an overall interconnection among reproduction processes within socialist society, the way trade provides such a tie among reproduction processes in capitalist society." For this reason, he believes, we do not ascribe the necessary status to such an important category as price; we do not take into consideration the objectively existing connection between two factors which affect price-setting: "The labor productivity of the individual worker and

social labor productivity." This leads to the arbitrary determination of the labor contribution to the common project on the part of individual workers and, consequently, the steady deviation from the principle of distribution according to labor with all negative consequences stemming from it.

Many of the letters in response to Yu. V. Andropov's article raises topical problems such as the struggle for increasing labor productivity and strengthening discipline and order in production and the public order, improving production quality, accurately accounting for and distributing material values, protection and multiplication of public property, and so on. Thus, noting that Soviet society is creating increasingly favorable conditions for the development of human capabilities, N. Ushkova (Lyubertsy) considers as just and timely the refining of the formulation of the basic principle of socialism as follows: "From each according to his highly developed capabilities." Those who "are unwilling to develop their capabilities 'work' according to their incapacibilities: they produce waste, impoverish the land, spoil its fruits, design useless machines and write useless 'scientific works.'" She suggests that people be "deprived temporarily of the right to work until they have straightened out." Extravagant though such a formulation of the problem might seem, it does contain a kernel of truth. Actually, it is a question of broadening the front of the struggle, to quote N. Ushkova, waged "against the economic irresponsibility" of people. In her further thoughts on the right to work, she suggests how to see to it that the work always be socially useful. "Frequently, as a result of shortcomings in the organization of labor and production," she emphasizes, "even the most skillful labor does not yield socially positive end results. Wherever there is no model production organization even conscientious labor may turn out to be useless."

Muscovite Ye. Chechenin writes of the need to intensify the struggle against negligence, lack of discipline, slackness, production of substandard goods, bribery and theft of the people's property, and frequent conversion of bonus funds into "actual feeding troughs." He also calls for using the people's controllers in making a comprehensive survey of housing areas in order to remove surpluses from those who exceed all housing norms and giving them to those who need such living space urgently. "I believe that the state already has the necessary residential facilities to ensure the solution of the housing problem."

V. Vititnov (Moscow) draws attention to a reason which, in his view, is among the most important for the still-insufficient successes achieved in the struggle for the production of high-quality goods. In analyzing the major shortcomings in this area he reaches the conclusion that it is precisely the departmental affiliation of technical controls and marketing services that makes them interested in the type of acceptance of an accountability for goods which allows them to earn maximal bonuses, finding it "suitable" to accept clearly substandard goods and to draw up reports in which they pad factual results. The author suggests that such services be subordinated to the Gosstandart and Gossnab, which would service enterprises and organizations on the basis of the territorial principle through departments created "like post offices." He believes that such a reorganization would provide unquestionably positive results, for "in this case the Gosstandart, together

with the technical control services, would become an inspecting service entirely answerable for the quality of output in the USSR and its consistency with world standards. In turn, the Gosplan with its marketing services would become an active apparatus in charge of accounting and distributing goods in terms of volume, variety and nomenclature stipulated in the Gosplan among production enterprises and organizations...."

Another response to Yu. V. Andropov's article was received from Tashkent. L. Umanskiy suggests measures which, in his view, would make it possible sharply to reduce the share of manual labor over the next 5-10 years. "To this effect," he writes, "we require above all highly efficient mechanization facilities." He also discusses so-called minor mechanization facilities--mechanized tools and special accessories which facilitate manual labor and make it more productive. He submits a number of suggestions on centralizing the designing, manufacturing and efficient utilization of such facilities.

The readers highly appreciated the editorial article "The Leninist Ethics of Bolshevism" (No 6, 1983). Their unanimous opinion is that the questions on improvements and of substantial "further development" of our current moral awareness have long become imminent and should be discussed most extensively. The letters express their total agreement with the increasingly extensive recent turning to the bolshevik experience, considered from both the socio-political and moral viewpoints. Bolshevik directness and principle-mindedness, high exigency toward oneself and others and dedicated work in the interest of building communism are justifiably considered most attractive and very necessary but, unfortunately, by far not as yet typical character features of the present generations of Soviet people.

As reported by the journal KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII, which reprinted this article, it triggered a broad response among the republic's party organizations and was discussed by some of them at party meetings. In particular, such a meeting took place at the Transistor Riga Production Association VEF imeni V. I. Lenin. "All the speakers noted the relevance of the problems raised in the article "The Leninist Ethics of Bolshevism," and the need to turn to them in our daily work and discuss them at party meetings more frequently."

Labor veteran docent B. Uspenskiy (Moscow) voices his feelings as follows: "... I was captivated and attracted by Lenin's bolshevism in my adolescence because of its ideals--truthfulness, honesty, goodness, justice and class consciousness, combined with principle-mindedness, consistency in actions and intolerance of shortcomings. I have preserved them throughout my long life. I react very strongly when I see in some cases violations of the Leninist ethics of bolshevism and even their trampling, concealed behind statements such as 'Life has gone forth and these are different times.' This is simply foul. Lenin's ideals cannot be reconstructed or modernized." He categorically favors the adoption of the strictest possible measures against all violators of the norms of communist morality, above all if they are party members.

Narrow-mindedness, boastfulness, impractical projects, lack of principles and reciprocal forgiveness, closely related to them, are largely due to the fact

that in pursuit of production accomplishments we have somehow unlearned to "consider moral losses," claims party member A. Ashurkov (Moscow). Pointing out that in our country frequently "a manager who has met the required indicators even if not always achieved through legitimate means is considered good," he expresses the conviction that the lowering of moral-ethnical requirements toward people "holding responsible positions in society" dampens the enthusiasm and lowers the civic activeness of the working people. "This is entirely explainable, for cases in which the efforts of hundreds of enthusiasts are reduced to naught by a single so-called manager have become a definite phenomenon in our society. Furthermore, as a rule such a sorry excuse for a manager is not made properly answerable to society.... Particularly damaging are the consequences from the improper behavior of party members holding leading positions.... We keep claiming that exigency toward party members should be twice as strict but in fact we frequently relieve them not only from moral obligations but from criminal liability." A. Ashurkov recalls Lenin's stipulation of the inadmissibility for the "ruling party to defend its scoundrels." The author justifiably believes that the party committees who protect party members who have compromised themselves "reveal by this token their political immaturity."

Propagandist G. Sharov (Miass) objects to the fact that in our theoretical explanations of frequent moral faults, we most frequently stop midway without determining their material causes, for which reason he criticizes, for example, the article by V. Davidovich "Components of Social Justice" (No 5, 1983). In indicating one of the reasons for the well-known resurrection of private ownership mores--"excessively inflated private ownership"--he writes that "... if the stores are selling jewelry worth 10,000-20,000 rubles or furniture worth 15,000 rubles or more, and if such objects are sold out quickly, one can imagine the value of the so-called 'petty' private property of some citizens and their mentality, in which features such as lack of principles, greed and others hold a leading place... Clearly, something must be done urgently to control the amount of private property. However, a very important prerequisite must be mandatorily observed: all achievements of Soviet society in the area of satisfying the material and spiritual needs of our people must not only be preserved but developed further. Essentially, however, this must not take place by increasing private wealth but by ensuring the growth of social funds."

Party member V. Kolobayev (Novaya Zbur'yevka, Kherson Oblast) favors the active struggle against money-grubbing, which develops in some people when their auxiliary farms or private plots are worked intensively for the market to the detriment of public production. Frequently the private plots of those who the author frankly describes as "private entrepreneurs" are expanded by fair and foul ways. Entire greenhouses are built on such plots, bringing tremendous income from selling at higher prices on the market early vegetables, tuber crops and flowers. The role of the private auxiliary plot in the implementation of the Food Program is universally known and should not be belittled. However, we are amazed at some articles in the periodical press and on television which praise the farmers who are dedicating their "full enthusiasm" to working their private plots.

The author of this letter justifiably claims that "the private plot must have an exclusively private and auxiliary nature... It must not be the main source of income of the rural family and...should not draw people away from active work in the public farm." This should be supervised by the local state organs, kolkhoz and sovkhoz managers and public organizations.

Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Pirogov (Moscow) suggests that the journal consider the question of the so-called "peasant morality." Some of our respected writers and painters, he writes, "emphasize in their writings and speeches that the origins of the people's life lie in the old peasant way of life. We must most militantly oppose such neopopulist, not to say neo-social revolutionary, views." Pirogov would like to read extensive articles which would explain the existence of petit bourgeois and philistine feelings in people leading a nonsocialist way of life under our conditions. "We need sharp articles against feelings of back-to-the-soil and neoslavophilism which appear in some publications and speeches." He also advises a continuing active opposition to the propaganda of religion "which, unfortunately, is still found in some writers" and calls for more frequent criticism of ideologically damaging publications.

The readers displayed great interest in the editorial "Measure of Labor and Measure of Consumption" (No 16, 1982). The great number of specific questions related to accounting for the quantity and quality of labor, encouraging labor productivity, making all public labor truly useful to society, and so on, and questions related to the various aspects of adequate and just wages, the elimination of actual equalization in many of our production and management units and the possibility of having unearned income and engaging in money-grubbing, raised and discussed in letters to the editor, clearly prove the extensive further work which is necessary in the area of implementing the basic principle of socialism.

Dr of Economic Sciences B. Babayev (Ivanovo), who agrees with the basic ideas expressed in the article, formulates a number of stipulations which, in his view, show the way "to the development of an efficient mechanism for encouraging in every working person the feeling that he is the master of the production process:" 1) Further development of collective forms of labor organization and wages, which mandatorily take into consideration individual contributions to the common project; their application, as much as possible, to engineering and technical personnel and employees, among whom wage equalization is most frequent; 2) periodic evaluation of enterprise collectives and their subunits on all levels, based on three or four quality and labor efficiency categories; 3) realization of the unquestionable fact that a collective is strong above all through its cadre nucleus on which one should rely; 4) further development of social control as the most important form of socialist democracy; 5) planned periodical reviews of possibilities of growth of productivity, extensively popularized; 6) submission of regular reports by managers to their collectives with subsequent extensive discussion of the questions raised.

Furthermore, in terms of resolving problems of encouraging the most skilled engineering and technical personnel and employees, B. Babayev deems it expedient "in developing the Shchekino method, to set up experimentally by the

plant management departments a fixed wage fund for a minimum of 5 years, in order to encourage the release of workers on the basis of a sensible redistribution of functions and condensing working time." Finally, he suggests a wage norm per 1 ruble of normative net output for the enterprise as a whole, with similar norms for enterprise subunits and services.

The most important feature in the letter of engineer I. Bokov (Voronezh) is its consideration of the current wage rate system. "In order for wage rates to act as incentives, they must be a measure of the socially necessary intensive work. In other words, in order to 'earn the right,' one must work intensively. Today bonuses which were initially assigned a shock labor incentive role, are no longer such and have become part of ordinary labor wages." He fully agrees with the fact that the time has come to restore to the bonus its original purpose: to be a material distinction for model work. Instead of practicing "debonification" we should withhold from wage rates for nonfulfillment of production norms, based on the principle "norm equals wage rate." Payments based on the wage rate will contribute to the application of scientific norms for time and output and accurate computation of labor outlays and, therefore, accurate price setting."

The journal has already published the views of writers on such topical problems as strengthening production and labor discipline. Let us consider two more letters. V. Kryutchenko (Leningrad) complains that "problems of organization, planning and management of the direct production process...are still being resolved on the basis of the purely subjective experience of individual officials, unrelated to true science." He states that strengthening discipline on a scientific basis means, above all, determining the nature of the objectively existing "organizational system for the production method." "Very unfortunately," he writes, "the traditional concept of the production method as merely the unity of production forces and production relations has become established and widespread. In this case we have inexcusably forgotten and eliminated from the structure of the production method the division of labor as the basic form of development of production forces and production as a whole and as one of the basic relatively autonomous and objectively existing elements of the production method, dialectically interacting with production forces and production relations."

Muscovite V. Volegov is worried by the substantial time losses, including working time. Such time is wasted, among other things, in the "procurement" of scarce commodities and obtaining consumer services. For this reason, the author suggests that "a system of advance fully or partially paid orders be introduced: orders should be accepted for all types of goods sold," and "additional markups should be charged for goods sold on a priority basis." He also writes that "I consider the second essential component the struggle against 'planned absenteeism.' It is no secret that the practice has developed of assigning to workers all kinds of projects not stipulated in the hiring contract or included in the labor code.... If the social need exists of assigning to the worker projects unrelated to his basic activities, the fact should be legalized. It is no secret that quite frequently so-called 'socially useful labor' conceals the inaction of individual managers and is exceedingly costly to the state."

The letter by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. Fetisov "On the Teaching of Scientific Communism in VUZs" (No 4, 1983), which was carried by the journal, literally rocked the teachers of this subject. Our study of the numerous responses indicates that the essence of the general view of those who participated in the discussion was accurately expressed by the chair of scientific communism and philosophy of the Moscow Chemical-Technological Institute imeni D. I. Mendeleyev: "This subject has been taught in our VUZs for the past 20 years and extensive experience has been acquired. However, each one of us teachers knows well that many important methodological and methodical problems in this serious matter remain unresolved. Let us single out among them above all two groups of questions: defining the subject of scientific communism; and the structure of the VUZ course in this subject." Clearly, the editors were not mistaken by printing this letter: the discussion on the subject and content of the scientific communism course dragged on and it became necessary to point out that the time had come to find a positive solution to the problem in which, incidentally, no unknown terms exist. Unfortunately, the journal is unable to meet the desire of all those interested in expressing in the journal their views on this problem. Yet the letters confirm the existence of a difficult situation in this area. Virtually everyone agrees with the inadequacy of the current definition of the subject of scientific communism merely as the sociopolitical theory of Marxism-Leninism (or worse--the sociopolitical views of the working class). However, we do not find even two definitions that are more or less in agreement in the readers' letters or, above all, definitions which are unobjectionable; as to the suggested structure of the course (amending the curriculum), opinions diverge even further. The editors express their sincere gratitude to all those who expressed their views but are also amazed at the silence of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, for to this day the journal has not received an official answer.

The topic discussed by teacher A. Mogil'nyy (Gorlovka) is that the principles of party construction which, as he writes, not only determine the party's life but play an "integrating role in all of our lives, i.e., they are starting points in the organization of the activities of 'state and economic organs, public organizations, labor collectives and society at large'." Naturally, here they acquire different forms and change or operate within certain limits. However, they should be considered as basic. This is an entirely accurate thought, in our view, worthy of a comprehensive development and concretizing, for it is unquestionably aimed at the further elaboration of the theory of the leading role of the communist party.

V. Pogudin (Murmansk), first officer aboard a high seas ship, who describes himself as a "rank-and-file political worker," writes in his extensive discussion on the shaping of the new man, in particular, that "the Soviet people must be made aware of the nature and type of contradictions characteristic of the contemporary stage in the development of Soviet society, the subjective and objective factors triggering them and the party's work on their prompt and efficient solution. I believe that today the mere theoretical study of contradictions is insufficient. They must be 'brought down to earth,' to the level of political education and specific political propaganda," for without this the people cannot develop an accurate idea of our society.

"The Objective Nature of Party Characteristics" is the title of the note sent by V. Nechitaylo (Kamenets-Podolskiy), Pedagogical Institute Party Committee member. "Why conceal it," he writes, "there still are cases in which party members, who turn to the party organization for a character reference, are told to write it themselves... It also happens that in promoting a party member he is praised but if he has to be released from his position all that is written about him is bad. Or else, a good reference is given to someone who is idle and avoids social work for the sake of getting rid of him sooner." Justly noting that in an important problem such as drafting a reference "one could judge of the principle-mindedness and maturity of a party organization and its concern for improving the qualitative structure of party ranks," he calls for always displaying "honesty and an uncompromising attitude in assessing the work of comrades and of one's own."

Pensioner G. Popov (Stavropol) complains of the formalism and callousness displayed toward him by the shop party organization and party committee at the Chemical Agents and Luminophors Plant, where he worked for many years as shop chief. Like other pensioners, he is no longer considered a party member at the plant. The party committee decision was read to him and he was told good-bye! In the majority of cases, transferring a pensioner to the party organization at his place of residence is both necessary and justified. However, naturally, such a decision should be made on an individual basis and, naturally, not by mail.

The journal's readers show a lively interest in international problems. Essentially they describe to us their firm support of the consistent peaceful foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, aimed at improving the international situation, ending the arms race, preventing a thermonuclear catastrophe and strengthening the positions of world socialism and the defense power of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact members. The constructive foreign policy initiatives of the party and the government create a rich response in the hearts of the people.

Along with theoretical articles which discuss profound processes of contemporary international relations, the readers also deem important materials which analyze the situation in various parts of the world and international problems of global development, as well as active responses to one event or another. The broad coverage of international life is of great assistance to ideological workers. Clearly, it is no accident that many lecturers and propagandists responded to the survey "The Year 1982. Most Important Trends in International Development" (No 18, 1982). Candidate of Historical Sciences G. Chernikov (Chelyabinsk), Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V. Gayevskiy (Moscow), a large group of lecturers on international affairs in Bryansk and others expressed their gratitude to the editors and the authors of the survey, noting that it aptly combines a theoretical analysis of the world situation with a consideration of specific practical problems of international politics. In their view, this broad scope did not prevent the use of rich factual data, organically combining it within a single entity. The lecturers thank for their valuable aid all those "who deal with problems of propaganda of foreign policy activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state."

A warm, friendly letter on the occasion of the article by S. Vishnevskiy and V. Kobyshev "Campaign Against...All" (No 4, 1983) was sent by reader Stephen Smith from the city of Goole, England. He writes that "I read this article with tremendous interest" and that he agrees with its conclusions. "The statement by Yu. V. Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, and the ceremony in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR, to the effect that the Soviet Union does not want to have a single medium-range missile more than those of Great Britain and France, is a particularly important foreign policy act. It is precisely this statement, rather than the demand for one-sided disarmament on the part of the USSR, that opens the way to a true 'zero option'," Smith emphasizes. "No, gentlemen, the facts are different," he concludes, rejecting the fabrication of the "threat" on the part of the Warsaw Pact members, addressing himself to the ruling circles in Washington and London, "the threat to peace comes from elsewhere."

In half a year the editors received dozens of answers from organizations which were criticized in one article or another. Thus, a quick answer was received to the journal's article on the subject of the book by V. Borodkin "Problems of Contradictions in Dialectical Materialism," by the heads of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy and the Nauka Publishing House, who reported on steps taken in this connection.

Here is another example: the editorial "Crux of All Economic Construction" (No 4, 1983) mentioned in particular the major shortcomings in the work of the Kineshma Weaving and Spinning Factory No 2. L. Simonov, chief of the Ivanovo Industrial Association for the Production of Industrial and Clothing Cotton Fabrics, reports that this fact was especially considered; the criticism was considered correct, the factory director was relieved from his position and a set of measures was taken to strengthen planning, production and labor discipline.

The editors closely study the answers of party, economic and other organs and organizations to complaints and suggestions submitted by the working people for their consideration. As a rule, they prove the serious attitude toward such signals and a thorough investigation of facts; they cite substantiated conclusions and describe steps taken to eliminate noted shortcomings. However, other answers are received as well, such as rejections, and partial and unconvincing answers which the editors consider unworthy and demand a repeated, qualified study of the essence of the matter, on a higher level if necessary.

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